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This thesis explores the conditions under which the EU is an effective actor at the United 
Nations in the policy area of human security. Since the late 1990s, the United Nations has 
been increasingly active in addressing challenges posed by human security concerns. The 
concept of human security was introduced to emphasize the post-Cold War shift from a 
state-centred approach to security to an approach focused on the security of individuals. The 
EU is considered by some as a driving force in the UN policy process and has presented 
itself as a leader in the promotion of concrete initiatives to address human security 
challenges. This thesis seeks to examine whether the EU is truly an effective actor at the UN 
in human security negotiations and aims to identify conditions which influence the EU’s 
effectiveness.  
 
This thesis suggests that the analysis of conditions affecting the EU’s effectiveness at the UN 
requires the understanding of the ways in which a complex web of actors and institutions 
interact at three different levels: international, European Union and domestic. Using a 
multilevel game approach, this thesis examines the willingness of EU actors to work 
collectively at the UN (internal effectiveness) and the achievements of the EU’s objectives 
(external effectiveness). This thesis analyzes three cases of human security negotiations: 1) 
the ban on anti-personnel landmines, 2) the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) and 3) the involvement of children in armed conflicts. Factors which have affected 
the EU’s internal and external effectiveness are identified in each of the case studies. The 
thesis uses qualitative methods such as expert interviews, documentary analysis and non-
participant observation. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that, at the international level, the commitment of the EU to 
multilateralism can have an effect on the EU’s effectiveness in human security negotiations. 
The position of other key UN actors (such as the United States and the G-77) regarding a 
potential agreement also appears to directly influence EU Member States in achieving their 
objectives. The thesis argues that the use of consensus in the negotiations process can have a 
significant impact on the EU’s effectiveness. At the EU level, the analysis reveals that 
several key EU Member States channelled their efforts to convince their EU partners to act 
on all three issues. This thesis shows how the role of the EU presidency in coordinating the 
position of EU Member States can also affect the EU effectiveness in human security 
 
 x
negotiations. The support of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, three dominant 
players in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, seems also particularly influential 
in negotiations. Finally, the case studies suggest that domestic politics can directly shape the 
EU’s effectiveness. Internal negotiations in EU Member States and the involvement of 
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The European Union at the UN: The Challenge of Human 
Security 
 
“As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s 
Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the 
European Union is inevitably a global player […]Europe should be ready to share in the 
responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” 
A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, December 2003 
  
“For the future I want the European Commission to place even greater emphasis on human 
security, in areas such as stopping the proliferation of small arms, tackling the role of 
children in armed conflicts[..], A foreign policy that would not try to alleviate the plight of 
the individual would miss its point.” 
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, November 20041 
 
1. 1 Introduction 
 
One of the most distinctive features of the European Union (EU) in its fifties is its 
aspirations to influence in international affairs. The European Union’s constructive 
contribution to international organizations has become an important measure of the EU’s 
success as a global actor. The United Nations (UN), with its quasi-universal membership and 
its activities covering multiple areas, has been recognized as a prime forum for the European 
Union to contribute to strengthening international peace and security. As the United Nations 
was approaching its sixtieth anniversary, the EU reiterated its commitment to support and 
                                                 
1 Speech by J.M. Barroso on “The European Union and the Emerging World Order. Perceptions and 
Strategies” at the 7th ECSA World Conference, Brussels, 30/11/2004. 
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strengthen it. In September 2003, the European Commission published a communication to 
the Council and the European Parliament entitled The European Union and the United 
Nations: the Choice of Multilateralism.2 The following December, the European Security 
Strategy3, approved by the European Council, affirmed the EU’s commitment to strengthen 
its relationship with the United Nations. In April 2004, it was the turn of EU Member States 
to approve a report entitled The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making 
Multilateralism Matter.4 All of these documents highlighted the strengthening the UN as an 
EU priority.  
 
While the EU is not a member of the UN, the 27 EU Member States now represent more 
than one eighth of the total number of members in the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA). They account for up to a third of the UN Security Council’s membership. The EU 
Member States together are also the largest financial contributor to the UN system.5 The EU 
is perceived by some as a driving force in the UN policy process. According to some 
observers it is often the case that nothing gets accomplished in many UN bodies if the 
Europeans are not on board.6 However, in commenting on the EU’s contribution to the 
United Nations, Taylor argued that, in the late 1990s, there was a “noticeable pattern of 
failure to achieve in the EU an acceptable consensus on foreign policy”.7 This thesis aims to 
explore whether the European Union has been an effective actor at the United Nations in 
negotiations in a specific field of so-called “new security”: human security. The concept of 
human security refers to the security of individuals and civilian populations.  
 
The European Union as a global player has attracted attention of a rising number of scholars. 
In the last few years, the scholarship on EU foreign policy in the context of the United 
Nations has been steadily growing. This is encouraging since, as recently as 2004, Jorgensen 
                                                 
2 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament. The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of 
Multilateralism, COM(2003) 526 Final, Brussels, 10/9/2003. 
3 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2003. 
4 European Union, The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism 
Matter, Luxembourg, 2004.  
5 Ibid., pp.6-7. 
6 See K.V. Laatikainen, “Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN: Authority, Cohesion, Recognition 
and Autonomy”, CFSP Forum, vol.2, no.1, 2004, pp.4-5. 
7 P. Taylor, “The Institutions of the United Nations and the Principles of Consonance: an Overview” 
in P.Taylor and A.J.R. Groom (eds.), The United Nations at the Millennium: the Principals Organs, 
London, Continuum, 2000, p.307. 
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and Laatikainen pointed out that “the EU at the United Nations has been an under-researched 
topic for years”.8 In contrast, a very fertile scholarship on another major UN actor, the 
United States, and its relationship with the United Nations already existed.9 The resurgence 
of academic interest in the EU as an actor in the United Nations has mirrored the concern of 
the European Union in strengthening its relationship with the UN. This thesis concentrates 
on a relevant topic and investigates the effectiveness of the European Union as an 
international actor. Yet, this thesis’ contribution is innovative not only in its analytical 
approach, but also in its examination of policy area of human security. First, this thesis uses 
a multilevel game approach to study the EU in UN negotiations. It addresses broader issues 
in the study of international negotiations and the discipline of International Relations by 
examining the behavior of the European Union, neither a state nor a typical international 
organization, in multilateral negotiations. Second, this thesis wishes to examine the EU’s 
contribution in support of the UN’s role as it seeks international agreements to improve the 
security, not of states, but of individuals, in advancing human security.  
 
1.2 Research Question: 
 
The primary focus of this thesis is to investigate the effectiveness of the European Union as 
an actor at the United Nations in the policy area of human security.  More specifically, this 
thesis analyzes the EU’s effectiveness in UN negotiations that aimed to design international 
conventions, treaties or other types of legal or political instruments “with the intent of 
strengthening existing international standards and norms in the field of human security.”10 
This thesis seeks to answer the following research question: under what conditions is the EU 
an effective actor at the United Nations in the policy area of international human security? 
(See Chapter 3)  
 
                                                 
8 K.E. Jørgensen and K. Laatikainen, The European Union and the United Nations, Second Pan-
European Conferences. Standing Group on EU Politics, Bologna, 24-26 June 2004, p.20. 
9 See for example, R. Foot, S.N. Macfarlane, M. Mastanduno, US Hegemony and International 
Organizations. The United States and Multilateral Institutions, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2003. 
10 See V. Rittberger, “Global Conference Diplomacy and International Policy-Making: The Case of 




Additional questions that have framed this research include: Which actors are involved in 
negotiations on human security issues at the United Nations? Who are the EU actors engaged 
in the negotiations?  Who represents the EU at the United Nations? Do EU Member States 
effectively coordinate their actions at the UN? If so, what type of coordination is involved? 
Another set of questions concerns the conditions which may influence the impact of EU as 
an actor at the UN. What types of factors influence the actors involved in negotiations in the 
United Nations?  Are EU actors at the UN influenced by factors at other levels of 
negotiations? Do factors in other levels of policy-making influence the EU actors at the UN? 
 
1.3 The European Union at the United Nations: A three-level game 
 
The European Union constitutes an interesting case to study for theorists: this thesis wishes 
to explore the distinctive nature of the EU as an actor at the United Nations using a 
multilevel game approach. Traditional systemic theories of international relations generally 
assume that states are rational “unitary” actors with fixed preferences and the ability to adopt 
various strategies to achieve their preferred outcomes.11 It is difficult to consider the EU as a 
unitary actor in the international system, especially in the context of UN negotiations. First, 
the EU is not a member of the UN. EU Member States remain the main players. Second, 
various EU actors, as well as different levels of decision-making, need to be considered to 
understand the behaviour of the EU as an actor at the UN.  
 
To identify and explain the conditions which might affect the EU’s effectiveness at the 
United Nations, one must undertake an analytical approach in which the complexity of the 
EU as a global actor is recognized and in which nuanced consideration is taken of the role of 
a variety of players and different levels of decision-making. This thesis argues that the two-
level game metaphor12 provides a valuable framework to examine the EU in UN negotiations 
on human security matters. It also contends that the study of the EU in human security 
negotiations involves not just a two-level game but rather a three-level game. This thesis 
                                                 
11 See, for example, K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York, Addison-Wesley: 
McGraw-Hill, 1979 and R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO, 
Westview Press, 1989. 
12 R.D. Putnam, “ Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, International 
Organization, vol.42,no.3, 1988, pp.427-460. 
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argues that three different levels of analysis - international level, EU level and domestic level 
- have to be considered to explain the EU’s behaviour in human security negotiations at the 
UN. 
 
The analytical framework of this research project draws on the “two-level game” metaphor 
and its view that international negotiations are the result of a multilevel process of decision-
making which flows through a complex web of actors and institutions. This framework 
integrates various levels of decision-making to understand international bargaining and 
acknowledges that both domestic and international politics can influence international 
negotiations. The two-level game metaphor depicts international agreement as a process of 
strategic interactions in which actors must consider and influence the reactions and demands 
of actors both at home and abroad.13 It argues that international negotiations should be 
considered as a two-level game, where each side is represented by a “chief negotiator” that 
plays at two levels: the international level (Level I) and the domestic level (Level II). At the 
international level (Level I), governments negotiate with each other to reach an agreement 
that takes into consideration domestic pressures. At the domestic level (Level II), different 
groups pressure the government to adopt certain policies. The two-level game implies that 
each game at each level is played simultaneously. Decisions taken at one level can have a 
direct effect on negotiations at the other level: strategies and outcomes at different levels of 
the game simultaneously affect one another. The crucial link between international 
negotiations and domestic politics lies in the necessity of “ratification”: that is, any decision-
process at the domestic level which is required to accept or implement an international 
agreement.14 In order for international negotiations to be successful, the chief negotiator 
must not only reach an agreement at the international level but must also confirm that the 
agreement will be accepted, or ratified, at the domestic level.  
 
The two-level game metaphor provides a useful framework to organise data and follow the 
interaction between different levels of negotiation. It also points to questions and potential 
hypotheses about the interactions between domestic and international negotiations. This 
thesis formulates its own hypotheses using insights from the Putman’s two-level game 
                                                 
13 A. Moravcsik,  “Introduction: International Bargaining and Domestic Theories of International 
Bargaining” in P.B Evans, H.K. Jacobson and R.D.Putnam (eds.),Double-Edged Diplomacy- 
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, p.15 
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metaphor, research on the EU as an actor at the UN and the literature on human security 
negotiations. Each of the hypotheses is tested across the case studies selected. Then, 
following a comparative analysis of the case studies, hypotheses are either accepted or 
rejected. 
 
This research project will be the first attempt to use this metaphor as an analytical framework 
to examine international negotiations dealing with human security issues, and to study the 
EU as an actor at the United Nations.  This thesis wishes to contribute to theory building in 
the field of International Relations. The two-level game approach is not a fully developed 
theory. As Moravcsik stresses, the metaphor to be used as a more formal theoretical model 
needs three sets of definitions and specifications: first, specifications of domestic politics; 
second, of the environment of international negotiations; third, of the negotiators’ 
preferences.15 This thesis aims to offer specifications and definitions of all three sets of 
influence on the interaction between international and domestic negotiations. It also seeks to 
offer specifications of constraints at the other level of analysis: the EU level.  
 
1.4 The European Union and Human Security at the United Nations 
 
With the end of the Cold War, “new” security concerns such as intra-state wars and gross 
violations of human rights became prominent items on the UN agenda. These concerns were 
direct consequences of dynamics changing within states, especially for former “clients” of 
the superpowers: several states began experiencing increasing instability and 
unpredictability. The victims of these conflicts and violations were mostly civilians. Issues 
of security now concerned civilian populations - individuals, ordinary citizens - rather than 
states. Some argued that “secure states” which were untroubled by contested territorial 
boundaries could still be inhabited by “insecure” people.16 In the late 1990s, the language 
used to discuss security concerns evolved to reflect these new realities. The term “human 
security” was introduced to describe these new security matters and to emphasize the shift 
                                                                                                                                          
14 Putnam, op. cit., p.436. 
15 Moravcsik ,op.cit., p.23. 
16 See N. Thomas and  W.T. Tow, “The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian 
Intervention”, Security Dialogue, vol.33, no.2, 2002, pp.177-192. 
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from a state concerned security to a people-centered approach to security.17 Issues such as 
the use of landmines, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, children and armed 
conflicts, as well as, human trafficking and organized crime were all considered part of these 
“new” security concerns.  
 
Protecting individuals became a priority for the United Nations and of all its members 
including all EU Member States. The European Union’s strong commitment to strengthening 
the United Nations but also to human rights, development and humanitarian assistance 
prompted many both in the international community and in EU Member States to have high 
expectations18 for the EU to become a significant actor in the area of human security. The 
EU’s involvement in the field of human security was considered crucial, especially as the 
United States, a dominant UN actor, appeared reluctant to commit to stricter regulations in 
this domain.  This thesis examines how effectively the European Union is responding to 
these expectations. 
 
While the EU has published various documents on its activities in specific human security 
issues19, few authors have examined the general involvement of the EU in human security 
initiatives. The EU’s contribution to the process to ban landmines and its role in the creation 
of the International Criminal Court are only two cases of human security negotiations which 
have been studied.20 Conversely, a number of major works have recently been published on 
                                                 
17 See S.Lodgaard, Human Security; Concept and Operationalization, Geneva: Expert Seminar on 
Human Rights and Peace, December 2000. 
18 The unveiling of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has generated high expectations 
in and outside the European Union. However, expectations have since been significantly lowered. See 
C. Hill, “Closing the capabilities-expectations gap?” in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds.), A common 
Foreign Policy for Europe? London, Routledge, 1993, pp.18-38.  While this thesis does not 
investigate the idea of “capabilities-expectations gap”, it does consider both internal expectations 
(within the EU) and external expectations (from the UN).  
19 See European Commission, The response of the European Union to the anti-personnel landmines 
challenge, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2000.; and 
European Commission, Small arms and light weapons. The Response of the European Union, 
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2001. 
20 See, for example, D. Long, “The European Union and the Ottawa Process to ban landmines”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9, no.3, 2002, pp.429-226. and M. Groenleer and L.van 
Schaik The EU as a global actor: Case studies of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate and the International Criminal Court, Second Pan-European Conference Standing Group on 
EU politics, Bologna, 24-26 June 2006. 
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the United Nations and human security.21 Most of these studies examine specific cases of 
UN initiatives in the field of human security. The overall conclusion is that despite the UN 
being a “natural and necessary forum for a human security agenda”22, much remains to be 
done to improve the protection and the security of individuals. This thesis fills a gap in the 
literature on the EU’s activities in the policy area of human security and contributes to the 
literature on the EU as an actor in international organizations. 
 
It should be stressed that this thesis does not focus on the utility of the concept of human 
security.23 While the thesis does not propose to engage with the debate on human security, it 
suggests using the term “human security” to label issues that share a number of 
characteristics and which, in recent years, have been at the centre of negotiations in the 
United Nations. Furthermore, this thesis does not examine whether the EU has (or should 
have) a human security approach in its foreign policy.24 It does, however, explore how the 
European Union has responded to the challenges posed by human security. To limit the 
scope of the research, it is important to circumscribe what will be considered “human 
security” in the context of this thesis. But before doing so, it appears useful to offer a short 
review of the various definitions of the concept including how the concept has been used in 
the European Union. 
 
 What is Human Security? 
 
One of the most cited definitions of human security was proposed by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) in 1994 in its Human Development Report. In this report the 
                                                 
21 See R. Thakur and E. Newman (eds.), New Millennium, New Perspectives. The United Nations 
Security and Governance,  Tokyo, New York, Paris, United Nations University Press, 2000.; R. 
McRae and Don Hubert (eds.), Human Security and the New Diplomacy, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2001; E. Newman and O. Richmond, The United Nations and Human Security, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001; R. M. Price and M. W. Zacher (eds.), The United Nations and Global 
Security, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; and S.J. Maclean and D. R, Black (eds.), A Decade of 
Human Security- Global Governance and New Multilateralism, Aldershot, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2006. 
22 L. Axworthy, “Human Security: An Opening for UN Reform”, in R. M. Price and M.W. Zacher 
(eds.), The United Nations and Global Security, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.256. 
23 On the concept of human security see, R. Dannreuther, International Security: The Contemporary 
Agenda, Cambridge, Polity, 2007. 
24 On these two topics, see inter alia, M. Kaldor, M. Martin and S. Selchow, “Human Security: a new 
strategic narrative for Europe”, International Affairs, vol.83, no.2, 2007, pp.273-288.; and J. H. 
 
  9
term “human security” has two main aspects: first, safety from such chronic threats as 
hunger, disease and repression. Second, human security involves protection from sudden and 
hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. The UNDP report also specifies four main 
aspects of this type of security. First, human security is a universal concern. Second, the 
components of human security are interdependent. Third, human security is easier to ensure 
through early prevention than later intervention. Fourth, human security is a “people-
centered” approach. The Report also insists on the concepts of “freedom from fear” and 
“freedom from want”, terms which have been part of the UN vocabulary since the creation 
of the United Nations in 1945.25 The UNDP also defined a list of several main categories of 
threats to human security. These are: economic security, food security, health security, 
environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. 26 
 
Several elements of this definition were subsequently used by other UN agencies as well as 
endorsed by the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan.27 While the definition proposed 
by the UNDP is recognized as useful in acknowledging the presence of new security 
concerns, it is also problematic as it encompasses such a diverse list of issues; it is difficult 
to distinguish areas that might be excluded from human security.  Following the publication 
of the UNDP Report, the term gained popularity in the international arena and a profusion of 
definitions of human security emerged crafted by both states and scholar.  
 
 
Middle Powers and Human Security 
 
A number of states, mostly “middle-powers” were captivated with the idea of a “different” 
type of security and defined their own concept of human security, often based on the 
                                                                                                                                          
Matlary, “Much ado about little: the EU and human security”, International Affairs, vol.84, no.1, 
2008, pp.131-143. 
25 United Nations Development Program (UNDP).Human Development Report 1994. New York, 
pp.22-25.  
26 Ibid., pp.24-25. 
27 See, for example, K. Annan, We the Peoples, New York, United Nations, 2000. and S.N. 
Macfarlane and Y. F. Khong, Human Security and the UN. A Critical History., Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2006, particularly Chapter 4.  
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initiatives they wished to pursue in their foreign policy.28 The definition used by these states 
is often narrower than the UNDP definition. Canada and Japan are two countries that have 
put a strong emphasis on the concept of human security and are often cited when defining 
the concept of human security (see Table 1.1). The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade defined the term as “a people-centered approach to foreign policy 
which recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from 
violent threats to their rights, safety or lives”.29  
 
Japan’s definition was much wider as it “comprehensively covers all the measures that 
threaten human survival, daily life, and dignity—for example, environmental degradation, 
violations of human rights, transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, refugees, poverty, 
anti-personnel landmines and [...] infectious diseases such as AIDS—and strengthens efforts 
to confront these threats.”30 The commitment of both of these countries to human security 
translated itself into the creation of international initiatives to promote a people-centered 
approach to security.   
 
First, Canada and Norway created in 1999 the Human Security network which focuses on 
practical responses to human security threats. Five EU Member States, Austria, Greece, 
Ireland the Netherlands and Slovenia - along with Chile, Costa Rica, Jordan, Mali, South 
Africa, Switzerland and Thailand - are all members of the Network.  For the Network, 
human security, in its essence, means “freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, 
their safety or even their lives”. This network proposes to address the issues of the promotion 
of the convention on landmines, control of small arms and light weapons and the protection 
of children in armed conflict as well as the fight against transnational organized crimes, the 
struggle against HIV/AIDS and the protection of human rights.31 Following a speech by UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan during the Millennium Summit, the Japanese government 
                                                 
28 On middle powers and human security, see R. M. Behringer, “Middle Power Leadership and the 
Human Security Agenda”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol.4, no.3, 2005, pp.305-342. 
29 Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/cip-
pic/humansecurityagendaoverview-en.aspx, accessed on 25/09/07.  
On Canada and Human Security, see L. Axworthy, “Canada and human security: the need for 
leadership”, International Journal, vol..52, no.2, Spring 1997, pp.183-196/  
30 Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic Blue Book 2004, Chapter 3. <http: 
www.mofa.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap3-c.pdf> , accessed on 10/09/2007.  
On Japan and Human Security, see B. Edström, “Japan’s foreign policy and human security”, Japan 
Forum, vol.15, Issue 2, June 2003, pp.209-225. 
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created the Commission for Human Security in 2001. For this independent Commission, 
human security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance 
human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security also means protecting people from 
critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations, building on their strengths 
and aspirations. Human security must create “political, social, environmental, economic, 
military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, 





As states were developing their own definition of human security, academics also began to 
provide their definitions of the concept. The definition and utility of this concept has 
generated great debate. Most discussions surround the broad versus narrow approach to 
human security. Proponents of the broad approach follow the UNDP’s outlook on human 
security. For example, Nef argued human security includes: environmental security, personal 
and physical security, economic security, social security, political security and cultural 
security. 33 Thomas also embraced a wide definition of the concept by arguing that human 
security means both fulfilling basic material need and achieving human dignity.34 One of the 
main criticisms of the broad categorization of human security is that it is difficult to 
determine what is not considered to be human security.  Other authors such as Krause and 
Macfarlane have promoted a much narrower definition of human security which focuses on 
protection from violent threats. They argue that a narrower definition can be useful both to 
                                                                                                                                          
31 See Human Security Network website <http: www.humansecuritynetwork.org> 
32 Commission for Human Security, Human Security Now, New York, 2003, p.4. < 
http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html > 
33 Nef defines environmental, personal and physical security as “the right of individuals and 
communities to preservation of their life and health and to dwell in a safe and sustainable 
environment”; economic security as “ the access to the employment and resources needed to maintain 
one’s existence, reduce scarcity, and improve the material quality of life in the community”; social 
security as  “freedom from discrimination based on age, gender, ethnicity, or social status”; political 
security as “the right to representation, autonomy (freedom), participation, and dissent, combined with 
empowerment to make choices with a reasonable probability of effecting change “; and cultural 
security as “the set of psychological orientations of society geared to preserving and enhancing the 
ability to control uncertainty and fear” See J.Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The 
Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment. Ottawa, International 
Development Research Centre, 1999. 
34 C.Thomas, “Introduction” in C. Thomas and P.Wilkin (eds), Globalization, Human Security, and 
the African Experience, London, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999, p.3. 
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set priorities in human security policy, and to establish a practical agenda for action.35 
Following a colloquium on the concept of human security, which included both proponents 
of broad and narrow definitions, Owen offered a “hybrid” definition. He argued that to 
narrow the concept of human security, only threats which seriously threaten lives should be 
included in the definition. For Owen, human security means “the protection of the vital core 
of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, 
personal and political threats.”36  While it does introduce the idea of using a threshold to 
delimit the concept, Owen’s definition includes six categories of threats to human security 
and thus remains a broad conceptualization of human security. 
 
Departing from the debate on conceptualizations of “human security”, Paris argues that 
human security should be used as a label for a category of research, rather than as a useful 
framework of analysis. This label would characterize a broad category of research in the 
field of security studies that is concerned with military or non military threats – or both- to 
the security of society, groups and individuals, “in contrast to more traditional approaches to 
security studies that focus on protecting states from external threats.”37  Paris suggests that 
scholars using human security as a label rather than as an analytical framework would not 
have to judge the validity of the concept per se, but rather analyze more specific questions 
which could be clearly defined. Furthermore, employing human security as a descriptive 
label would not suppose any normative agenda.38  This thesis does not engage in the debate 
on the definition or the utility of human security.  It does however fall within a category of 
works that examine negotiations on issues that are considered threats to the safety of 





                                                 
35 See Krause and Macfarlane’s respective contributions to a “Special Section: What is ‘Human 
Security’?“ Security Dialogue, vol.35, no.3, 2004, pp.367-368 and pp.368-369. 
36 T. Owen, “Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a 
Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition”, Security Dialogue, vol.35, no.3, 2004, pp.373-387. 
37 R. Paris “Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air”, International Security, Vol.26, No.2, 2001, 
p.96 and p.99 
38 Ibid., p.101. 
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Table 1.1 Definitions of Human Security 
 
Definitions United Nations 
 
 
Middle Powers Academic The Barcelona  
Report 
Broad Definitions Human security is 
safety from such 
chronic threats as 
hunger, disease and 
repression, and the 
protection from 
sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the 
patterns of daily life.  
(UNDP 1994) 
Human security 
means all the 
measures that 
threaten human 
survival, daily life, 
and dignity—and 
strengthens efforts 
















and cultural security 
(Nef, 1999) 
 
Human security is 
the fulfillment of 












Narrow Definitions Human security 
places human 
beings rather than 
states at the focal 
point of security 
considerations. It 






human rights and 
development 
(UNIDIR) 
Human security is a 
people-centered 




cannot be achieved 
until people are 
protected from 
violent threats to 
their rights, safety or 
lives. 
(Canada) 
Human security is 
the freedom from 






As an Academic 
Label 
  Human Security is a 
descriptive label for 
a type of scholarship 
which is concerned 
with military or non 
military threats – or 
both- to the security 











The EU and Human Security 
 
The concept of human security has been an important feature of the foreign policy of several 
EU Member States including Austria, Finland and the Netherlands. The European Union, 
however, has never offered or endorsed a definition of human security. The European 
Security Strategy (ESS) does not include the term “human security”. However, it does 
acknowledge that security is a precondition for development. Following the adoption of this 
Strategy by the European Council in December 2003, discussions within the EU were 
centred on the implementation of this strategy. Javier Solana, the High Representative for the 
CFSP, commissioned a group of experts to examine Europe’s future contribution to global 
security. In September 2004 at the end of the Barcelona Summit, the group of experts, led by 
Mary Kaldor, Professor of Global Governance and Director of the Centre for the study of 
Global Governance, at the London School of Economics, presented to Solana the report 
entitled “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe” (the Barcelona Report). 39   
 
The Barcelona Report defines human security as freedom for individuals from basic 
insecurities caused by gross human rights violations. It adopts a broad definition of human 
security: genocide, systematic torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, disappearances, 
slavery and crimes against humanity, but also (though their legal status is less elevated) 
massive violation of the right to food, health and housing are all identified as forms of 
insecurity that threaten human security. 40 The Report presents a doctrine which includes 
three main elements (see Table 1.2): a set of seven principles; a “Human Security Response 
Force”; and a new legal framework to govern both the decisions to intervene and operations 
on the grounds. The study group advocated that, in the present global environment, the EU’s 
security policy should be built on human security rather than just on state security. In this 
report, the concept of human security is clearly linked to the EU’s security capability and the 
implementation of the European Security Strategy. The report emphasizes the “primacy of 
human rights in what distinguishes the human security approach from traditional state-based 
approaches”.41 It also stresses that the “central goal of a human security strategy has to be the 
                                                 
39 Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, Barcelona, 
15 September 2004.  
40 Ibid., p.9. 
41 Ibid., p.14 
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establishment of legitimate political authority capable of upholding human security”.42 The 
report ends by suggesting that the “most appropriate role for Europe in the twenty-first 
century would be to promote human security”.43  
 
Table 1.2 Three Main Elements of a Human Security Doctrine 
 
Seven Guiding Principles for 
Operations in Situations of 
Severe Insecurity 
Human Security Response 
Force 
New Legal Framework  
governing both decisions to 
intervene and operations on 
the grounds 
 
1. the primacy of human 
rights; 
2. clear political authority; 
3. multilateralism; 
4. a bottom-up approach; 
5. regional focus;  
6. the use of legal 
instruments; 




 15 000 men and 
women 
 At least one third 
would be civilian 





Based on:  
 domestic law of host 
states, 
  domestic law of 
sending states, 
  international criminal 
law,  
 international human 






The Barcelona Report was welcomed by Javier Solana, who showed interest in studying 
more thoroughly the ideas put forward by the authors. However, it remains clear that the 
concept of human security as yet to be fully integrated in the EU’s foreign policy. Some have 
argued that even if the European Union is not using the term human security it is in practice 
already “doing human security”.44 Others have stressed that “human security as a concept is 
very much part of EU foreign policy and overall it is becoming a more fundamental part of 
the motivation behind EU foreign policy”, but that “human security is but one motivation 
behind EU foreign policy”.45 Kaldor, along with others, has argued that a European security 
policy should be founded on human security, on the primacy of individuals, not states. 
Human security can provide an “enduring and dynamic organizing frame for security action, 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p.15 
43 Ibid., p.29. 
44 See Kaldor et al., op.cit., p.274. 
45 R. Keane, “EU Foreign Policy Motivation: A Mix of Human Security and Realist Elements” in S.J. 
Maclean and D. R, Black (eds.), A Decade of Human Security- Global Governance and New 
Multilateralism, Aldershot, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2006., p.50. 
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a frame which European texts and practices currently lack.” 46 Kotsopoulos contends that the 
concept of human security can have internal and external benefits for the EU. First, human 
security could improve coherence within EU policy making by pressing the Council and the 
Commission to address problems of coordination and overlapping responsibilities in the 
EU’s external relations.  Second, the use of “human security” could allow the EU to expand 
its prestige and moral standing, increase its international influence, and thus enhance the 
EU’s soft power. Finally, it can also contribute to the EU’s cooperation with the United 
Nations and to the goal of “effective multilateralism”.47 Some remain more sceptical about 
the added-value of this concept for the EU. Matlary claims that “the problem is not that 
human security is not a good idea, but that interventions rarely happen for human security 
alone”. He concludes that “the EU may benefit from calling all its security policy ‘human 
security’, but if rhetoric promises more than policy can deliver, the ethical implications are 
grave”.48 While human security has not yet developed into a guiding principle in the EU’s 
foreign and security policy, the debate on the utility of the concept of human security within 
the EU has help promoted the idea that the security of individuals should matter.  
 
Definition of Human Security 
 
Debates on the utility of the concept of human security, and even how it should be defined, 
are still ongoing. The purpose of this thesis is not to contribute to this debate. This thesis 
uses human security as a descriptive label for a specific field of activities of the United 
Nations.  Yet, in order to limit the scope of the research, it is important to stress what will be 
considered “human security” in the context of this thesis. For the purpose of this thesis, 
human security will refer to the freedom and protection from pervasive indirect and direct 
violent threats to people’s rights, personal safety or even their life.49 Furthermore, the 
definition offered by UNIDIR, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research will 
also be used to define “human security” in this thesis. According to UNIDIR, human security 
places human beings rather than states at the focal point of security considerations will also 
                                                 
46 See Kaldor et al., op.cit..p. 273 and M. Glasius and M. Kaldor, “Individual First: A Human Security 
Strategy for the European Union”, Internationale Politik and Gesellschaft, no.1, 2005, pp.62-84,   
47 J. Kotsopoulos, “A human security agenda for the EU: would it make a difference?”, Studia 
Diplomatica, vol. 60, issue 1, 2007, p.230. 
48 Matlary, op.cit., p.143. 
49 This definition  of human security is based on the Human Security Network’s definition of the 
concept. See website <http: www.humansecuritynetwork.org 
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putting emphasis on the complex relationships and often-ignored linkages between 
disarmament, human rights and development.50 Thus this thesis will only examine the EU as 
an actor in negotiations dealing with issues that are violent threats to people’s rights, 
personal safety or even life, and where the relationship between disarmament, human rights 
and development is acknowledged by the United Nations. This research project will not be 
about the EU’s activities at the UN in promoting economic development, social justice, 
environmental protection or democratization. It will focus on violent threats to individuals. 
 
1.5 Thesis outline 
  
This thesis seeks to investigate the effectiveness of the European Union as an actor at the 
United Nations. This thesis analyzes three different case studies: 1) the ban on anti-personnel 
landmines, 2) the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, 3) the involvement of children 
in armed conflicts. All of these cases can be considered human security negotiations as they 
address matters which are violent threats to people’s rights, personal safety or even life and 
where the relationship between disarmament, human rights and development is 
acknowledged.  
 
This thesis determines that the EU’s effectiveness at the UN is limited by a number of 
conditions both internal and external to the EU. This thesis discovers that the approach of the 
European Union to human security issues at the United Nations is more about “managing 
expectations” than “effectively responding to high expectations”. EU Member States appear 
to believe that the EU cannot achieve all of its objectives at the UN and cannot meet high 
expectations.  Trying to meet these high expectations would, in fact, set the EU up for a 
failure. The European Union’s overall approach in human security negotiations is more 
about securing some progress on issues discussed at the UN, rather than pushing for the 
adoption of stringent agreements. In this sense, it is difficult at the present time to consider 
the European Union a leader in the promotion of human security.   
 
                                                 
50 See UNIDIR website, http://www.unidir.org/html/en/human_security.html, accessed on 10/09/2007 
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Chapter two provides the necessary background and analytical tools to understand and 
explain the EU’s behaviour in human security at the United Nations. It begins by exploring 
the literature on the European Union’s relationship with the United Nations. It then examines 
the EU as an actor in human security negotiations and shows that the EU is a multifaceted 
actor functioning in a multilevel environment. The chapter argues that different theoretical 
approaches put forward to study the EU as a global actor have failed to offer convincing 
explanations for the EU’s behaviour in its external relations. It argues that a multilevel 
analysis is necessary to grasp the complexity of the EU as an actor at the UN in human 
security negotiations. It thus introduces the analytical framework based on the two-level 
metaphor which will be used in this thesis. 
 
The third chapter introduces the research design used in this thesis. It begins by defining the 
dependent variable: “effectiveness”. The concept of effectiveness is defined in two ways: 
internal effectiveness and external effectiveness. The EU is considered internally effective if 
the EU had a common position on (supports) a potential UN agreement regarding a specific 
human security issue. The external dimension of effectiveness referred to the success of the 
EU in achieving its objectives in the field of human security. Eight Independent variables 
which may affect the EU’s effectiveness are also proposed in this chapter: the EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism; the decision-making rules; the position of the United States; 
the Involvement of the Council Presidency; the Participation of the European Commission, 
the Support of France; Germany and the United Kingdom, a Unified position within EU 
governments, and the Influence of NGOs. Testable hypotheses are formulated regarding the 
relationship between the dependent variable and each of the independent varia. The chapter 
also introduces the methods used to answer the research question and discusses the cases 
selected to test the hypotheses put forward. 
 
Chapters four, five and six analyze the case studies selected: the ban on antipersonnel 
landmines; the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons; and the involvement of children 
in armed conflicts. In each of the case studies, three-level negotiations are examined and 
particular attention is given to the EU’s internal and external effectiveness. The case studies 
also track the conditions which may influence the EU’s effectiveness. The three case studies 




Chapter seven offers a comparative analysis of all three case studies. All the hypotheses 
formulated in Chapter 3 are revisited. The analysis shows that there is a variation in the EU’s 
internal and external effectiveness. The EU was internally effective in the small arms case. 
However, it failed to achieve external effectiveness. The EU’s effectiveness in the landmines 
case was variable. While, the EU was not internally effective in the case of negotiations on 
the involvement on children in armed conflicts, it was externally effective. The comparative 
analysis is also crucial in determining under which conditions the EU is an effective actor at 
the United Nations in negotiations on human security issues. The comparative analysis 
confirms that a high level of involvement of the EU Presidency, a high level of French, 
German and British support, the presence of a unified position in EU governments and the 
presence of influence of NGOs/Coalition of NGOs are all conditions under which the EU is 
an effective actor at the UN in human security negotiations. Hypotheses on the EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism, on the use on consensus in negotiations, and on the position 
of the United States are partially accepted. Only one hypothesis is rejected: a high level of 
participation of the European Commission does not affect the EU’s effectiveness. 
 
The final chapter focuses on further considerations on the two-level game metaphor as 
formal theoretical model and its potential implications for the study of the European Unions 
and the discipline of International Relations. The chapter also offer some thoughts on the 






The EU at the UN:  a Multifaceted Actor in a Multilevel 
Environment  
 2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to situate this thesis within the broader debate on the EU at the UN and the 
EU as a global actor. It also provides the necessary background and analytical tools to 
understand and analyze the EU as an actor in human security negotiations conducted at the 
UN.  This chapter begins by exploring the literature on the European Community/European 
Union1 at the United Nations, including the EU’s focus on effective multilateralism. As this 
thesis examine the EU in a specific policy area - human security - this chapter then identifies 
the various players and forums, both in the UN and in the EU, which are involved in human 
security negotiations. This chapter then explores the literature on theorizing the European 
Union as a global actor and contends that the various theoretical and conceptual approaches 
that have sought to understand the EU as an international player have failed to appreciate the 
multifaceted nature of the EU’s participation in the UN. It concludes by proposing a three-
level game approach, based on Putnam’s two-level game metaphor, as a useful analytical 
framework to answer the research question:  under what conditions is the EU an effective 
actor at the UN in the policy area of human security?  
     
2.2 The EU, the UN and Effective Multilateralism 
For years, the topic of the EU at the United Nations was studied primarily within the broader 
– and mostly legal - literature on the EU’s participation in international organizations. The 
absence of major academic works on the EU at the UN prompted some political scientists to 
                                                 
1 Under the Maastricht Treaty, the European Community (EC) was included in a new structure, the 
European Union (EU). The term “EC” will be used to refer to the European Union prior to Maastricht 
and also to the designation of the EU’s “first pillar”.   
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argue that the topic had generally been neglected by the academic community.2 Nevertheless, 
the literature on the EU as an actor at the United Nations has witnessed recently a sharp 
increase. The next sections will examine three major themes addressed in the literature on 
the EU and the United Nations: the legal status and representation of the EU at the UN; the 
EU in the General Assembly and the Security Council; and the notions of effective 
multilateralism and effective partnership. 
 
Legal status and representation of the EU at the United Nations 
  
A number of legal studies have explored the relations between the European Union and 
international organizations, including the United Nations.3 These studies have focused on 
how the legal status of the EC/EU affects the EU’s participation in international 
organizations. They first observe the distinction between the legal status of the European 
Community and of the European Union. The European Community acquired a legal 
personality with the signature of the EC treaty; it can accede to an existing international 
organization and participate in the negotiations of an international treaty.4 In contrast, the 
European Union has not yet been conferred a legal personality. This means that the EC, but 
not the EU, can become a member of an international organisation.5   
 
The first contacts between the EU and the UN can be traced back to the beginning of the 
1950s, when the European Coal and Steel Community made a formal agreement with the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), one of the independent agencies of the United 
                                                 
2 J. Dedring, “Reflections of the coordination of the EU Member States in organs of the United 
Nations”, CFSP Forum, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, p.3. K.E. Jørgensen and K. Laatikainen, The European 
Union and the United Nations, Second Pan-European Conferences. Standing Group on EU Politics, 
Bologna, 24-26 June 2004, p.20. 
3 See J. Sack “The European Community’s Membership of International Organizations”, Common 
Market Law Review, vol.32, 1995, pp.1227-1256.; E. Denza, “The Community as a Member of 
International Organizations” in N. Emiliou and D. O’Keeffe (eds.), The European Union and World 
Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay Round, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1996, pp.3-15.; 
I.,Govaere, J. Capiau, and A. Vermeersch, “ In Between Seats: The Participation of the European 
Union in International Organizations”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol.9, no.2, 2004, pp.155-
187., pp.155-187.; S. Marchisio, “EU’s Membership in International Organization” in E. Cannizzaro 
(ed), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2002, pp.231-260. 
4 Govaere et al., op.cit, pp.156-157. 




Nations. However, the relationship was only formalized in 1974. The previous year, the 
Federal Republic of Germany had acquired its UN membership, which meant that all EC 
member states were now full members of the UN. The European Community, however, was 
not granted full membership as Article 4 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that only 
states can become full members of the organisation.6 Nonetheless, the General Assembly 
resolution 3208 (XIX) of 11 October 1974 did grant the European Communities an observer 
status at the UN. While observers have the right to access meetings, to speak within the 
General Assembly and to obtain official documentation, they are not allowed to vote or to 
participate in informal meetings and are not obligated to contribute to the UN budget.7 
 
In contrast, the EU has been granted full membership in several of the UN’s specialized 
agencies. For example, in 1991 the European Community became a member of the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the lead rural development UN agency.8 
The FAO is an autonomous organization and therefore could modify its statutes to permit the 
EC to become a member alongside its Member states.9 The EU can also participate in 
international conferences organized under the framework of the United Nations, but its status 
remains as an observer. 10 However, if the issues discussed at the conference fall within EC 
competence, such as trade or environmental issues, the EC may become a “full participant” 
of the conference as well as a party to the agreements negotiated. The EU has been a “full 
participant” in the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Commission on Sustainable 
Development, at some UN General Assembly special session such as the Millennium 
Summit, and in some UN conferences such as Rio and Kyoto. In 2001, the EU even hosted 
UN conference on the least developed countries (LDCs) in Brussels.11 
 
Even if it is not a full member of the UN, the European Union remains a highly visible actor 
at the United Nations. Thus, the question of the representation of the EU has also been 
studied. The task of representing the EU at the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) is 
                                                 
6 P. Brückner, “The European Community and the United Nations”, European Journal of 
International Law, vol.1, no.1, 1990, p.2. 
7 Marchisio, op.cit., p.255. 
8 Govaere et al, op.cit.,p..165.  
9 Ibid. 
10 I.,Macleod, I.D. Henry, and S. Hyett,, The External Relations of the European Communities, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, pp.194-195. 
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the responsibility of the Member State which holds the Council Presidency. The 
representation of the European Union at the United Nations is, therefore, assumed by the 
Presidency’s delegation to the UN, especially the Permanent Representative and the Head of 
Mission.12 Each of the 27 Member States has its own permanent mission located in New 
York. Member States also have a permanent mission that is usually responsible for dealing 
with UN agencies based in Geneva,  but also with other UN organizations such as the 
Conference on Disarmament and  international organizations (for example the World Trade 
Organisation) based in Geneva. 
 
Several authors have emphasized the central role of the Member State which exercises the 
Presidency. The delegation of the Presidency at the UN is responsible for the organizing and 
chairing of all EU coordination meetings at the UN. Throughout the years, a long-standing of 
practice of weekly meetings –coordination meetings- of Permanent Representatives of EU 
Member States at the UN has developed. Most Presidencies circulate a draft of agenda prior 
to each meeting to facilitate the flow of information. It must keep each member state fully 
informed of the outcomes of negotiations. Because the Presidency term is only six months, 
the contribution of manpower and time by the delegation of the Presidency is significant.13 
Frequent meetings between EU Member States also mean that the Presidency can obtain 
valuable support from other EU Member States, which each have their own network of 
contacts.14 Even so, studies on the representation of the EU at the UN have emphasized that 
the Presidency remains one of the most central player in maintaining cohesion in the member 
states’ actions. 
 
 Occasionally, when certain issues fall within the European Community pillar, the 
Commission may also be represented and may act on his own behalf. In matters relating to 
the Common Security and Foreign Policy, the “troika system” can also be used. According 
to this system, the Secretary General of the Council (who also acts as the High 
Representative for the CFSP), the Commission, and the next member state to hold the 
                                                                                                                                          
11 European Commission, European Union- United Nations Relations – The EU at the UN Overview, 
Brussels, 2001. 
12 See Dedring, op.cit.,p.2.  
13 Ibid. 
14 J. Wouters, “The European Union as an Actor within the United Nations General Assembly” in V. 
Kronenberg (ed.) The EU and International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony, the Hague: 
T.M.C.Asser Press, 2001, p.381. 
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Presidency will assist the Presidency.15 The European Commission was the first European 
institution to be represented at the UN. Following the acquisition of observer status in the 
General Assembly in 1974, the Commission opened an official delegation in New York. 
Other Commission delegations have since been opened in other cities that have UN 
headquarters including Geneva, Vienna, Rome, Paris and Nairobi. The delegation of the 
Commission aims to improve coordination between EU Members States and EU institutions 
working in the UN framework. It also supports the work of the Presidency. The Commission 
delegation is particularly active in the fields of trade, development, the environment and 
humanitarian affairs.16 Farrell argues that “the general rule is that the European Commission 
has special responsibilities in areas where there is exclusive Community competence”, that is 
notably trade, agriculture, fisheries, and some areas of environmental and development 
policy.17 In the area of development policy, a shared concurrent competence, Farrell stresses 
that the Commission has increased its profile at the United Nations and intensified 
cooperation with UN bodies. Following the publication of the Communication Building an 
effective partnership with the United Nations in the fields of development and humanitarian 
affairs18, the Commission concluded five partnerships with UN organizations, including the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).19 The Commission is also present at the regular 
meetings between representatives of the Council, the High Representative of the CFSP and 
the UN Secretariat. 
 
In 1994, a liaison office of the Council Secretariat was opened in New York as a support 
structure to the CFSP. The liaison office provides information on UN activities to the High 
Representative for the CFSP and to the General Secretariat of the Council. One of the tasks 
of the office is to assists the Presidency and EU Member States in daily affairs at the UN. It 
also provides technical infrastructures and support for meetings of EU Member States. The 
liaison office has the mandate to contribute to ensure the consistency and coherence across 
                                                 
15 See F. Cameron “Building a common foreign policy. Do Institutions matter?” in J. Peterson and H. 
Surjsen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe, London, Routledge, 1998, pp.59-76.  
16 See M. Farrell,  “EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations” in K.V. 
Laatikainen and K.E. Smith (eds.), Intersecting Multilateralism: The European Union at the United 
Nations, London, Palgrave , 2006, pp. 38-39. 
17 Ibid., pp.38-39. 
18 See European Commission, Building an effective partnership with the United Nations in the fields 
of development and humanitarian affairs, COM (2001)231 final, Brussels, 2/05/2001.  
19 Farrell, op.cit., pp.39-40.   
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the rotating Presidencies.20 The Council Secretariat also has an office in Geneva. The office 
was established in the late 1960s, primarily to monitor negotiations surrounding the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The office is now responsible for following developments 
on  the Human Rights Council and the Conference on Disarmament, but also the 
International Labour Organisation and the WTO. It also is active in UN agencies dealing 
with development, immigration and asylum issues.21 
 
The EU in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council 
 
Whereas legal studies concentrated on studying the legal status and representation of the EU 
at the UN, political scientists have primarily studied the EU as an actor in two UN organs: 
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the UN Security Council (UNSC).  
 
The first political studies about the EU as an actor in the UN focused on the EC’s role in the 
UN General Assembly. With the creation of the EPC in the 1970s, a number of scholars 
began to show interest in the role of the European Community at the United Nations.22 
Lindemann qualified the UN as “one of the most important areas for European Political 
Cooperation”.23 It should be noted that with the creation of EPC, member states did not 
commit themselves to agree but only to consult on important questions of foreign policy.24 
However, EPC promoted the idea that member states consult each other on issues discussed 
at the United Nations.  
 
The majority of studies on the EC at the UN during the EPC era focus on the voting 
behaviour of the EU Member States at the UN General Assembly. For example, authors such 
                                                 
20 See http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_1933_en.htm, accessed on 20/01/2008 
21 See http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_1176_en.htm, accessed on 20/01/2008 
22 See B. Lindemann, “European Political Cooperation at the UN: a challenge for the Nine” in D. 
Allen, R. Rummel and W. Wessels, (eds.) European Political Cooperation:  Towards a foreign policy 
for Western Europe, London, Butterworth Scientific, 1982, pp.110-133; See also Brückner, op.cit., 
pp.174-192; R. Foot, “The European Community’s Voting Behaviour at the United Nations General 
Assembly”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.17, no.4. 1979, pp.350-360.; L. Hurwitz, “ The 
EEC in the United Nations: the Voting Behaviour of Eight Countries, 1948-1973” Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol.3, no.3, 1975, pp.224-243. 
23 Lindemann, op.cit., p.110.   
24M.E.Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy – The Institutionalization of Cooperation, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.11. 
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as Foot, Hurwitz and Lindemann25 surveyed the voting records of the EC member states 
during the first years of the European Communities and the EPC era. These authors noted 
that the EC members voting behaviour strongly converged during this period, except on 
more controversial issues such as disarmament. Foot argues that this avoidance of having 
split votes in UNGA resolution suggests that EPC did have an effect on the cooperation of 
EC member states at the United Nations.26  
 
Progresses in co-operation at the United Nations between the member states were manifest 
during the EPC period. As early as 1971, consultation started between the EC member states 
on issues on the UNGA agenda.27 The Presidency speaking on behalf of the EC Member 
States also became an established practice during the EPC period.28 For Brückner, the 
creation of  EPC encouraged the Member States to progressively “developed disciplines, in 
written and unwritten rules and procedures, with a view to improving their cohesion in the 
UN through various modes of political expression, in particular joint statements, voting, and 
common explanations of vote.”29     
 
The introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992 raised not only the 
expectations of EU Member States, but also those of other states, that the EU should “speak 
with one voice” in the United Nations.  The CFSP increased emphasis on the concept of 
coordination and consultation among the Member Sates in international forums such as the 
United Nations. Indeed, Article 16 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) provides that 
member states shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of 
foreign and security policy of general interest to ensure that the Union exerts an effective 
influence. In the instance of international organizations and international conferences, 
Article 19 explains that member states shall coordinate their action and uphold the common 
positions.  
The development and the created of CFPS revitalized the interest of scholars to study the EU 
at the United Nations. Johansson-Nogués, Wouters and Luif have all examined the voting 
                                                 
25 Foot, op.cit, pp.350-360.; Hurwitz, op.cit., pp.224-243.; Lindemann, op.cit, pp.110-133. 
26 Foot, op.cit, p.360. 
27 Brückner, op. cit.., pp.174. 
28 Foot, op.cit.“p.360. 
29 Brückner, op.cit ., pp.176. 
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behaviour of the EU Member States in the UNGA since the creation of the CFSP.30 These 
authors point out that from the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a significant increase 
in convergence among the EU Member States’ voting behaviour within the UNGA.31 The 
proposed explanations of this growing cohesion reveal interesting aspects to consider when 
examining the EU as an actor at the United Nations. For Wouters, this convergence is the 
direct consequence of extensive and constant efforts of coordination between the EU 
Member States before meetings occur at the United Nations. Wouters highlights that, even 
when the UNGA is not session, EU Member States missions meet almost on a daily basis to 
coordinate their activities. During the six months period of each Presidency, more than 600 
meetings, on average, are organized during which not only ambassadors, but also deputy 
permanent representatives and EU experts discuss the issues on the UN agenda.32  
Johansson-Nogués stresses another interesting factor which may explain this convergence in 
what she qualifies as “the gradual adjustment of French and British UN policy positions 
towards the EU mainstream.”33 Although France and the United Kingdom continue to have 
divergent positions on certain issues such as nuclear arms and decolonization, in general they 
maintain similar positions as the majority of EU Member States. For Johansson-Norgués, 
this is due to “the growing realization in Paris and London that on a majority of issues they 
increasingly stand to gain from a stronger and more coherent EU foreign policy.”34 
All the EU Member States – without any exception – have to agree to the direction and the 
wording of the statements that the EU will support in the UNGA; an increasing amount of 
time and effort is usually required to achieve this unanimous position. The EU has been 
criticized for this lengthy process of coordination. 35 EU officials have responded to criticism 
by making their position known before the UNGA sessions. Indeed, it has now become an 
established practice to circulate a document stating EU priorities to all UN member states 
                                                 
30 See E. Johansson-Nogués, “The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: 
What Future for the European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the “Old” and the “New” 
Europe”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol.9, 2004, pp.67-92.; J. Wouters, “The European Union 
as an Actor within the United Nations General Assembly” in V. Kronenberg (ed.) The EU and 
International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony, the Hague, T.M.C.Asser Press, 2001, pp.375-404 
and P. Luif, EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly, Occasional Papers no.49, Paris, Institute for 
Security Studies, December 2003, 75 p. 
31 See Johansson-Nogués, op.cit., p.73, Wouters, op.cit., p.404 and Luif, op.cit.,pp.51-52. 
32 Wouters, op. cit., p.382. 
33 Johansson-Nogués, op.cit., p.73. 
34 Ibid., p.74. 
35 See Wouters, op.cit., p.383. 
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before the General Assembly begins.36 Because EU positions are perceived as a balanced 
result of the EU’s process of internal coordination and negotiations, other UN member states 
often consider these positions as possible compromise that would have a chance to attain 
consensus within the UNGA.37 The EU welcomes this and considers it an opportunity to play 
a central role at the UN. Yet, as Luif argues, finding consensus in the UNGA can be less 
demanding than making and adhering to binding decisions on matters of international 
politics.38 Indeed, the UNGA can only make recommendations and not binding decisions.  
While most studies about the EU at UN have focused on the EU and the General Assembly, 
some scholars have explored the issue of the EU in the UN Security Council (UNSC). The 
EU does not have a specific status within the Security Council because the EU Member 
States participate as individual states. The EU is, nevertheless, well represented at the 
Security Council. Two of the five permanent members, France and the United Kingdom, are 
EU Member States. In addition, EU Member States are represented in three of the five39 
regional groups that provide the non-permanent members: the Western European Group, the 
Eastern European Group and the Asian Group (with Cyprus). EU Member States could 
theoretically hold more six of the fifteen seats at the Security Council.40   
 
Article 19 of the Treaty on the European Union introduced several obligations for the EU 
Member States that are permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council: EU 
Member States not only have to work together but also keep the other Member States fully 
informed.  In addition, France and the United Kingdom, as permanent members, also have 
the obligation defend the positions and the interests of the European Union, but “without 
prejudice to their responsibilities under the provision of the UN Charter.” As Hill stresses, 
this section of the Article was introduced at the demand of France and the United Kingdom. 
While these two countries “had no objection to consulting, informing and coordinating with 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., p.404. 
38 Luif, op.cit, p.52. 
39 The five regional groups are: the African Group, the Asian Group, The Latin American and 
Caribbean Group, the Western European Group and the Eastern European Group. 
40 J. Verbeke, “EU Coordination on EU Security Council Matters” in J. Wouters, F, Hoffmeister and 
T. Rhys, The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership, The Hague, 
TMC Hasser Press, 2006, p.52, fn.4 
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their EU partners”, they “saw their UN status as representing a higher calling and would not 
be bound even by existing commitments to common European positions”.41  
 
Weekly “Article 19” consultations have been organized in New York to respect these 
obligations. The Permanent Representatives and Heads of Mission usually attend these 
meetings, which have evolved from as simple question-answer sessions to intense 
consultations allowing non-Members of the Security Council to state their opinions on issues 
to be debated in the UNSC.42 In addition, since the end of the 1990s, the number of 
statements offered on behalf of the EU at the formal meeting of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) has increased significantly.43 In fact, since 1996, statements on behalf of the EU 
have been delivered by the Presidency at the Security Council. The High Representative for 
the CFSP and, on rare occasions, the European Commission have also been invited to give 
statements.44 Even with this system in place, the current EU-coordination process in the 
Security Council as been described as “satisfactory”; most observers argue that the process 
could be improved through more systematic interactions between New York and Brussels.45 
 
Most recent works that have examined the EU as an actor at the Security Council have 
considered how the EU coordinates its actions and speaks with one voice in this UN body. 
The role of the two permanent members,46 the reform of the current Security Council 
membership, and the representation of states such as Germany and Italy within the Council47 
are key issues that have been recently explored. The idea of a single EU seat in the Security 
                                                 
41 C. Hill, “The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Different Arenas” in 
K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith (eds.), Intersecting Multilateralism: The European Union at the 
United Nations, London, Palgrave , 2006, p.57. 
42 Verbeke,  op.cit., p.55. 
43 Wouters, op.cit., p.382. 
44 F. Hoffmeister and P.-J. Kuijper, “The Status of the European Union at the United Nations: 
Institutional, Ambiguities and Political Realities”, in J.Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys (eds.) The 
United Nations and the European Union: an Ever Stronger Partnership, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2006, pp. 16-17.  
45 Verbeke, op.cit., p.57. 
46 See Hill, op.cit.,pp.49-69. 
47 See E. Drieskens, D. Marchesi, B. Kerremans, “In Search of a European Dimension in the UN 
Security Council”, The International Spectator, vol.42, no.3, 2007, pp.421-430.; B. Fassbender, “The 
Better Peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s Practice and the United Nations”,  European Journal 
of International Law, vol. 15, no.5, 2004, pp.873-882. ; J. Janes, “Between a Rock and Hard Places: 
Germany on the UN Security Council”, American Institute For Contemporary German Studies at 
Issue Report, 9 January 2003, www.aicgs.org, accessed on 12/11/207. 
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Council has also been widely debated as a way of enhancing the EU’s influence. However, 
even within the EU, the prospect of a single EU seat remains contentious.48  
 
The EU and  the UN: effective multilateralism, effective partnership? 
 
A third focus of studies on the EU and the United Nations includes the notions of effective 
multilateralism and effective partnership in the relationship between the EU and the UN.   
This new academic interest follows the publication of several EU documents that have 
clearly stated the deep commitment of EU to multilateralism and to its partnership with the 
UN. As mentioned previously, the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003 states 
that strengthening the UN is a European priority. According to the ESS, international 
cooperation with partners is a necessity; the EU “needs to pursue [its] objectives both 
through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnership with 
key actors”.49   The same year, the Commission reiterated the importance of multilateralism 
in EU-UN relations in a communication entitled The European Union and the United 
Nations: The choice of multilateralism. The Commission underscored that the EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism is a defining principle of EU’s foreign policy and describes 
the United Nations as the pivot of the multilateral system.50 Furthermore, in April 2004, the 
European Council published The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making 
Multilateralism Matter.51 In this document, the European Council reaffirmed “the deeply 
rooted commitment of the European Union to make effective multilateralism as a central 
element of its external action, with at its heart a strong UN”.52 
Cameron argues that the EU’s attachment to multilateralism is not new. The EU’s own 
history and system of intergovernmental negotiations has led the EU to being more willing to 
work through multilateral organisations. Cameron states that “the EU itself is an example of 
                                                 
48 See Drieskens et al., op. cit., pp.423-424 and Hill, op. cit., pp.56-61. 
49 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World .European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2003 
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50 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament. The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of 
Multilateralism, COM(2003) 526 Final, Brussels, 10/9/2003, p.3. 
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multilateralism at work”.53 In contrast, Jørgensen and Laatikainen argue the EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism is directly linked to the crisis of multilateralism that has been 
emerged in the last few years; they argue that recent transatlantic frictions regarding several 
global issues have prompted the EU to state their preference for a multilateral approach, 
especially in matters involving the United Nations. These authors, however, argue that this 
commitment is primarily a mixture of identity politics and of administrative reform 
proposals within the EU.54 
For his part, Fassbenser contends that the UN and the EU are intellectually and conceptually 
built on the same foundations. The EU is nearly required to support the global multilateral 
order that is the UN since the failure of multilateralism at the global level would provoke 
negative consequences on the European project.55 However, Ortega argues the EU’s 
contribution to debate on the reform of the United Nations has, so far, been disappointing, 
especially considering that the EU repeatedly professes its commitment to effective 
multilateralism and says that the EU and the UN share a common language and common 
objectives. For Ortega, when it comes to the EU-UN partnership,  “[t]he Europeans have 
ideas and the means; what is lacking is self-confidence, leadership and determination”.56 
Two recent major academic works have explored the concepts of effective multilateralism 
and effective partnership between the EU and the UN. The first book to thoroughly examine 
the EU’s relationship with the UN, The European Union at the United Nations- Intersecting 
Multilateralism, was published in 2006.57 In this book, “intersecting multilateralisms” refers 
to the study of the interactions between these two multilateral organizations. The book 
focuses on whether and how the EU can effectively act within the United Nations. It 
examines, inter alia, the impact of the collective action of the EU Member States at the UN 
on both organizations, the EU’s leadership within the UN, the compatibility between 
regionalism and universalism (including the UN system), and the EU’s role in promoting 
“effective multilateralism” (i.e. rendering international organizations and agreements more 
                                                 
53 F. Cameron, “After Iraq: The EU and Global Governance”, Global Governance, 2004, vol.10, no.2, 
pp.157-158. 
54 See K.E. Jørgensen and K. Laatikainen, op.cit., pp.15-18. 
55 Fassbender, op.cit. , p.857-884. 
56 See M. Ortega,” Conclusion. UN Reform: as necessary as it is difficult”  in M. Ortega (ed.) The 
European Union and the United Nations- Partners in effective multilateralism, Chaillot Paper no.78, 
Paris, Institute for Security Studies, p.100. 
57 K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith (eds.), The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting 
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effective).58 It examines three main concepts: multilateralism, Europeanization59, and 
effectiveness. The book also focuses on the EU Member States, central actors in both the EU 
and the UN, and explores the EU’s relations with the UN in four policy areas: security, 
economic and social development, human rights and environment. The various contributors 
to this book demonstrate that the EU has yet to become a more cohesive and consistent 
partner for the UN. The EU has been particularly successful in playing an active role in 
environmental affairs and, to a certain extent, in the promotion of human rights.60 However, 
the EU has – until now – been unsuccessful in taking a formal lead in making this 
organization more effective.   
The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership 61 is the second 
recent book that has focused on the EU’s relationship with the UN. The book examines two 
broad questions: first, to what extent does the EU enjoy a formal status at the UN, is it able 
to speak with one voice and to influence the decision-making process at the UN; second, to 
what extent does the partnership between the EU and the UN promote the objectives and 
initiatives of the United Nations. The book has extensive discussion on different UN arenas 
and policy areas. The book examines how the EU-UN partnership has manifested itself in 
various UN organs (General Assembly, ECOSOC, and Security Council), programmes and 
specialized agencies (FAO, International Labour Organization, International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank Group, UNESCO, World Health Organization). The book covers EU-
UN cooperation in specific policy area: cooperation on refugees, human rights, sustainable 
development, and the environment. The EU’s contribution on security issues including crisis 
management, counter-terrorism, and the UN Mission for Kosovo (UNMIK) is also analyzed.   
The book illustrates that  the coordination process between EU Member States has not only 
expanded but also diversified, covering an increasing number of policy areas. The EU has, 
therefore, increasingly spoken with one voice and exerted more influence; yet, EU-
                                                 
58 Ibid., pp.2-3. 
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coordination at the UN requires important improvements.62 Furthermore, the UN and the EU 
have proven that they can potentially be effective partners in multilateralism. Indeed, in 
specific areas such as environmental policy and human rights promotion, the EU has 
revealed itself as a key player and has displayed a promising capacity to be a reliable partner 
for the UN in achieving effective multilateralism.63 Crisis management is another area where 
the EU has developed a closer cooperation with the UN.  Several successful initiatives in this 
field have made crisis management “one of the most important and promising areas of EU-
UN cooperation,”64 an area where the EU could promote effective multilateralism. 
2.3 The EU and Human Security at the UN: A complex web of actors and 
forums 
The increasing amount of literature on the EU at the UN identifies the EU as a key- and, in 
some sense, growingly motivated- actor in the UN system. However, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the scholarship on the EU and human security at the UN remains scarce: 
there are no systematic studies of the EU’s role in UN negotiations dealing with human 
security matters. This section aims to provide the necessary background to understand the 
EU as an actor in human security negotiations at the UN. It explores what type of actor the 
EU is in human security negotiations.  This section first introduces forums in which human 
security negotiations are conducted in the United Nations system. It then examines the main 
EU actors who may participate in negotiations on human security.   
 
Human security negotiations and the UN system 
 
Human security issues such as disarmament, arms control, and human rights are debated in 
various UN forums (see Figure 1). The Security Council and the UN General Assembly are 
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two main UN organs that have witnessed debates on human security since the late 1990s. 
The Security Council (UNSC) is a central organ at the United Nations with the P-5 
(permanent members with veto) determining the main decisions and acting on behalf of this 
organization. Recently, the Security Council has dealt with numerous human security issues 
and has adopted resolutions on issues such as the protection of civilians in armed conflict, on 
women and peace and security, and on children in armed conflict.65 
 
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is a second forum wherein EU Member 
States can discuss human security issues with their UN partners. Resolutions and decisions 
adopted in the UNGA establish the agenda and are perceived as the expression of world 
opinion.66Disarmament issues are discussed in the First Committee of the UNGA (the 
Disarmament and International Security Committee); human rights in the Third Committee 
(the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee). All EU Member States are members of 
the UNGA and, therefore, are repeatedly called on to vote on UNGA initiatives regarding 
human security issues. EU statements in the First and Third Committee are most often 
delivered by the Member State which holds the Presidency.67 
 
Human security negotiations have also been conducted in two other UN bodies: the 
Conference on Disarmament and the Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights 
Council). Disarmament and arms controls questions are formally discussed within the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD). The CD is the international community’s most prominent 
multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament agreements. It works on the basis of 
consensus and currently, is comprised of 65 members including several EU Member States.68 
The CD can adopt its own Rules of Procedures and its own agenda, but it must report to the 
General Assembly annually. If the majority of negotiations on disarmament are held at the 
CD, meetings on this matter are also frequently organised at UN headquarters in New York. 
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Figure 2.1 UN bodies dealing with human security issues and EU 
representations at the UN  
 
Human rights issues were previously debated within the now defunct UN Commission on 
Human Rights.69 The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was created in 1946 by the UN 
Economic and Social Council to promote respect of human rights. The Commission, 
composed of 53 members, met annually in Geneva and was mandated to examine, monitor 
and publicly report on human rights violations. It was also responsible for drafting 
international instruments relating to human and, therefore, to some human security issues.70  
 
At the Conference of Disarmament and at the UN Commission on Human Rights, all EU 
Member States are represented by their own delegations, often composed of individuals 
                                                 
69 The Commission on Human Rights was officially replaced by the Human Rights Council in March 
2006. See http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/, accessed on 10/11/2007. 
70See P.R. Baerh, and L.Gordenker, The United Nations at the End of the 1990s, Houdmills, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999, pp.100-101 
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employed at foreign ministries.71 While the European Commission enjoyed an observer 
status at the Commission on Human Rights72, this status is not granted at the Conference on 
Disarmament. 
 
Lastly, the United Nations may also organize special conferences to address certain specific 
human security issues. Since its creation, the UN has developed a practice of organizing 
large global conference to attend to crucial global issues. The decision to convene a UN 
conference is often taken by one of UN decision-making bodies such as the UNGA or 
ECOSOC, often following a recommendation from the Secretary-General. The UN 
conference system is based on well-established practices regarding the proceedings and 
outcome of each conference, as well as the participating parties. In addition to states, various 
UN agencies, national agencies dealing with the issue covered by the conference, NGOs and 
the media may also be participants in UN conferences. 73  
 
Human security negotiations at the European level 
 
The notion of human security entails that they are existing linkages between disarmament, 
human rights and development. Disarmament and arms control fall under the second pillar, 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).74 In contrast, European development 
policy is formed by the Community’s development policy and the Member States’ policy in 
this field. As for human rights, Desgagné stresses that the “European Union’s international 
action in the field of human rights is based on a mix of instruments, both in its Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in its external relations covered by the EC 
Treaty.”75 However, as Smith argues, “[although] the EU’s external human rights policy is 
carried out in the first and second pillar, its implementation through international 
                                                 
71 See Dedring, op.cit., p.2.  
72 K.E. Smith, op.cit., p.156. 
73 See J. Foremand, “UN Conferences: Media Event or Genuine Diplomacy”, Global Governance, 2, 
1996, pp. 361-375. 
74 See R. Baratta, “Overlaps between European Community Competence and European Union Foreign 
Policy Activity” in E. Cannizzaro (ed.) The European Union as an Actor in International Relations, 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.51-75. 
75 R. Desgagné “European Union Practice in the Field of International Humanitarian Law: An 
Overview” in V. Kronenberger (ed.) The European union and the International Legal Order: Discord 
or Harmony?”, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001, p.455. 
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organizations is a CFSP matter.”76 As the next sections will show, various EU institutions are 
involved in negotiations that address human security issues (see Figure 2). 
 
In the CFSP framework, the Council of Ministers and more specifically, the Council of 
General Affairs and External Affairs, which regroups the foreign affairs ministers from EU 
Member States, are key players. Meetings at the Council are chaired by the rotating 
Presidency. The General Secretariat of the Council also provides assistance. The Committee 
of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), which consists of Ambassadors of the EU Member 
States prepares the agenda and the work of the General Affairs Council. While Coreper I 
consists of deputy permanent representatives and focuses on technical matters, Coreper II is 
the body where more delicate political issues, including foreign affairs issues, are 
discussed.77  
Council of Ministers








COREPER: Committee of Permanent Representatives
COARM: Working group on on conventional arms exports
CODUN: Working group on global disarmament and arms control
COHOM: Working group on human rights
CONUN: Working group on the UN – “Coordination Nations Unies”
CONUN
working groups






Figure 2.2:  EU decision-making bodies on human security issues 
                                                 
76 K. E. Smith, “Speaking with One Voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human Right Issues at 
the United Nations”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.44, no.1, March 2006, p.114. 
77 J. Lewis “The methods of community in EU decision-making and administrative rivalry in the 




The Council is also assisted by working parties which carry out the preparatory work for the 
Coreper. In the Council, four working parties may discuss human security issues on the UN 
agenda. The first preparatory body, the CONUN (“Coordination Nations Unies”), is 
responsible for coordination between the EU Member States. It debates texts that will be 
submitted on behalf of EU.78 A second working party is CODUN, the working group on 
global arms control and disarmament. This working group is comprised of senior 
disarmament officials from the foreign ministries and is assisted by the personnel from 
disarmament section of the Council’s General Secretariat. The Commission is also 
represented at each meeting of the working group by an official of the Security Policy unit of 
the External Relations Directorate General (DG RELEX).79 The Working Party on 
Conventional Arms Exports, COARM, is also involved in negotiations on certain human 
security issues. Representatives from national foreign ministries, as well as one 
representative from the European Commission, are usually present at meetings of this 
working group.80 Finally, the Council working group on human rights, the COHOM, 
composed of human rights experts from foreign ministries, examines issues debated in the 
Third Committee of the UNGA and the Commission on Human Rights.81  
 
The Political and Security Committee (PSC), also known under its French acronym COPS, is 
another important player as it provides political advice to the Council. It is composed of 
national representatives at senior ambassador level based in member states’ Permanent 
Representations. It meets regularly and works closely with the High Representative for the 
CFSP. The Commission is also present at PSC meetings.82 Although the PSC is now 
involved in discussions on human security issues, it previously focused on crisis 
management and defence-related issues. The PSC only had its first general discussion on 
arms control and disarmament in March 2002.83 
                                                 
78 Luif, op.cit., p.11 and 16. 
79 D. Feakes, “The Emerging European Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Agenda on Chemical and 
Biological Weapons”, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No.65, July-August 2002, p.3.  
80 A. Hudson, Case Study: EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Overseas Development Institute, 
www.odi.org.uk, accessed 30/10/2007. 
81 Smith, op.cit, footnote 9 
82 D. Spence “ The Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries in the Conduct of European Union Affairs” in 
B. Hockings and D. Spence, Foreign Ministries in the European Union, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan,2005 p.31. 




In addition to attending various meeting in the Council’s bodies discussing UN-related 
human security issues, the Commission is directly involved in human security negotiations at 
the EU level. The Commission’s Directorates-General (DGs) External Relations and 
Development are directly responsible for coordinating relations between the Commission 
and the UN. While human security issues such as disarmament and arms control remained 
CFSP issues, the emphasis on the important link between human security and development 
policy may suggest that the Commission’s input at the UN in this area will intensify. 
  
2.4 Analyzing the EU at the UN: A three-level game approach   
The European Union is undeniably a global actor.84 However, it is a different kind of actor. 
The EU is neither a state, nor a typical intergovernmental organization. Furthermore, the 
EU’s external relations consist of the “sum of what the EU and its member states do in 
international relations”.85 The previous sections have highlighted the multilevel nature of 
decision-making involved in the EU’s participation in human security negotiations at the 
UN. While significant scholarship on the EU as a global actor has been produced in recent 
years 86, the unique and multidimensional characteristics of the EU as an international actor 
continues to be a complex riddle for political analysts and theorists.  
 
This section first shows that most theories that have attempted to theorize the EU as global 
actor do not offer convincing explanations of the EU’s behaviour as an actor in the UN. A 
comprehensive assessment of the EU’s effectiveness at the UN requires the use of a 
theoretical or analytical approach that recognizes the complexity of the EU as a global actor, 
                                                 
84 On this point see, K. E. Jørgensen, “Overview: The European Union and the World” in K.E. 
Jørgensen, M.A. Pollack and B.Rosamond, Handbook of European Union Politics, London, Sage 
Publications, 2007, p.508.  
85 See C. Hill,  “Closing the Capability-Expectations Gap” in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds.), A 
common Foreign Policy for Europe? London: Routledge, 1993, pp.18. 
86 See recent works by  C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.) International Relations and the European Union, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.; S. Marsh and H. Mackenstein, The International Relations of 
the European Union, Harlow, Pearson Longman, 2005.; W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen, and B. White, B, 
(eds.), Contemporary European Foreign Policy, London, Sage Publications, 2004: B.Tonra and T. 
Christansen (eds.), Rethinking European Foreign Policy, London, Sage Publications, 2004.; K. Smith, 
European Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003; R. Ginsberg, The 
European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield 
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with its various players and different levels of decision-making. The section then argues that 
the two-level game metaphor offers a useful starting point to develop an analytical 
framework to examine the EU at the UN. Finally, this section proposes a three-level game 
approach for analysing the EU’s effectiveness in human security at the UN and answering 
the research question. 
 
Theorizing the EU as a global actor 
 
The study of the European Union as an international actor has generated vigorous debates 
and has challenged both European integration and International Relations theorists.87 First, 
European integration theories, such as neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, 
are interested in development of general theories of economic and political integration. 88 
However, as Pollack points out, “both neofunctionalism and its intergovernmental critique 
were limited in practice to the analysis of the European case and had little impact on the 
larger study of international relations”.89  
 
Neofunctionalists place emphasis on the process of socialisation and spill-over (from low 
politics to high politics) and the central role of supranational institutions. The 
neofunctionalist approach did not originally seek to explain the behaviour of the EU in 
international politics. Neofunctionalists have often struggled not only with the development 
of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is outside the framework 
of the European Communities and, in its nature, is intergovernmental, but also with the 
increasing role of the EU in global politics.90 In contrast, Liberal intergovernmentalism has 
attempted to explain EU integration by focusing on interstate bargaining and on the 
                                                                                                                                          
Publishers, 2001; and C. Bretherton and J.Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 2nd ed. 
London, Routledge, 2006.   
87 See B. Tonra and T. Christiansen “The Study of EU foreign policy: between international relations 
and European studies” in B. Tonra and C. Christiansen (eds.), Rethinking European Foreign Policy, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004, pp.1-9. 
88 F. Andreatta “Theory and the European Union’s International Relations” in C. Hill and M. Smith, 
International Relations and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p.23. 
89 M. Pollack “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 2001, vol.39, no.2, p.222. 
90 See J. C. Øhrgaard, “International Relations or European Integration: is the CFSP sui generic?”, in 
B. Tonra and C. Christiansen (eds.), Rethinking European Foreign Policy, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 2004, pp.26-43. 
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predominance of domestic preferences.91 This approach argues that another level of analysis 
(the domestic level) needs to be considered to understand European integration. In this sense, 
it does acknowledge the multilevel nature of the European Union.  However, liberal 
intergovernmentalists have also encountered difficulties when explaining the EU cooperation 
on foreign policy. For example, liberal intergovernmentalists struggle to account for the 
introduction of qualified majority voting in the CFSP and for the fact that the “lowest 
common denominator” has not always been the privileged EU position.92  
 
Second, mainstream International Relations theories, such as neorealism and neoliberalism, 
examine relations and cooperation between states in the international system. These systemic 
theories are generally concerned with producing models of states’ interactions and behaviour 
at the international level. These explanations of interstate relations focus on the pressures 
imposed by the international system and examine whether or not cooperation is possible 
between states. IR theorists who have taken interest in the development of the EU and its 
foreign policy have attempted to explain this singular form of cooperation and have focused 
on why EU Member States have voluntarily agreed to cooperate at the international level. 
Neorealists who argue that power struggle in international relations are a zero-sum game and 
that alliance between states are temporary 93 have offered explanations on why the EU is at 
times divided over issues of high politics. However, they have failed to explain why the EU 
has become a global actor. In contrast, neoliberalism focuses on the role of international 
organizations in facilitating cooperation between states by reducing uncertainty and mutual 
suspicions.94 However, for neoliberals, “the EU counts as one of those international 
institutions that matter, but state power rules the game implying in turn that the EU is not 
conceived of as an international actor in its own rights”.95   
 
                                                 
91 See A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998.  
92 See M. E. Smith, “Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy 
Cooperation”, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 10, no.1, 2004, p.97. 
93 See, for example, J.J.Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York and London, 
Norton, 2001. and  K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York, Addison-Wesley, McGraw-
Hill, 1979. 
94 See R. Axelrod and R. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions”, World Politics, vol.38, no.3, 1985, pp.226-254. and R.O. Keohane, International 
Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO, Westview Press, 1989. 
95 See Jørgensen, op.cit., p.519. 
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Other alternative IR approaches, such as constructivism, have also been used to study the EU 
as a global actor. Constructivist studies of the EU have focused on the interaction between 
structure and agency, on the construction of interests and identities through bargaining and 
on the perception and actions of third parties. For constructivists, the EU as a global actor 
“remains in course of construction”.96 Peterson argues that constructivism is now the 
“leading theory of European foreign policy”.97 However, constructivism faces the difficulty 
of explaining how ideas or norms actually cause the behaviour of Member States to change 
in the context of international relations. They also struggle with proving that ideas are in the 
end more important than interests.98  
 
The EU as a global actor represents a double challenge for IR theories: it is neither a state, 
nor a typical intergovernmental organisation. Furthermore, mainstream IR approaches 
assume that states are rational “unitary” actors with fixed preferences and the ability to adopt 
various strategies to achieve their preferred outcomes.99 However, it is difficult to consider 
the EU as a unitary actor in the international system, especially in the context of UN 
negotiations. First, the EU is not a member of the UN and the EU Member States remain the 
main players. Second, as previous sections of this chapter have highlighted, various EU 
actors, as well as different levels of decision-making, must be considered to understand the 
behaviour of the EU as an actor at the UN. Indeed, during UN negotiations, an EU Member 
State must consider the positions of other states, but also recognize the positions of its EU 
partners, and negotiations at the domestic level. In fact, Elgström and Strömvick argue that 
the “outcome of international negotiations involving the European Union is determined by 
bargaining at two levels: first, the member states have to agree among themselves on the 
Union’s [position]; second, the European Union has to reach an agreement with its partners.” 
These authors also stress that negotiations within the EU “are of course heavily influenced 
                                                 
96 See, for example, C. Bretherton and J.Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London: 
Routledge, 1999. 
97 J. Peterson, “The EU as a Global Actor” in E. Bomberg, J. Peterson and A. Stubb (eds.), The 
European Union: How does it work?, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p.218. 
98 See E. Bomberg, A Stubb and J. Peterson, “Introduction” in E. Bomberg, J. Peterson and A. Stubb 
(eds.), The European Union: How does it work?, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p.13 
and Table 1.1. 
99 See, for example, K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: Addison-Wesley: 
McGraw-Hill, 1979 and R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: 
Westview Press, 1989. 
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by domestic negotiations within each member states”.100 The distinctive nature of the EU as 
a global actor as prompted a number of scholars to adopt a multilevel game approach based 
on Putnam’s two-level game metaphor to study the EU as a global actor. 
 
 
The two-level game metaphor: the interrelations of domestic and international negotiations. 
 
With his metaphor, Putnam proposed to address the shortcomings of the existing literature 
on the relations between domestic and international affairs. 101 Putnam argued that most 
scholars have examined international negotiations either in terms of domestic causes on 
international effects or of international causes and domestic effects. However, both 
approaches only represent “partial equilibrium” analysis and “miss an important part of the 
story, namely how the domestic politics of several countries [become] entangled via an 
international negotiations.”102 This explains the need to “move beyond the mere observation 
that domestic factors influence international affairs and vice versa, and beyond the simple 
catalogues of instances of such influences, to seek theories that integrate both spheres, 
accounting for the areas of entanglement between them.”103    
 
Putnam proposed a “two-level game” metaphor to explain the outcomes of international 
negotiations.104 He argued that these outcomes are not exclusively the result of arduous 
negotiations at the international level, but should rather be viewed as the product of a 
multilevel process of decision-making that flows through a complex web of actors and 
institutions. The two-level game metaphor portrays international negotiations as “a process 
of strategic interactions in which actors simultaneously try to take into account of and, if 
possible, influence the expected reactions of other actors, both at home and abroad”.105   
                                                 
100 O. Elgström and M. Strömvick, “The European Union as an international negotiator” in O. 
Elgström and C. Jönsson (eds.), European Union Negotiations. Processes, Network and Institutions, 
London: Routledge, 2005, p.119.   
101 R.D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, International 
Organization, 42,3, 1988, pp.427-460. 
102 Ibid., p.430. 
103 Ibid. , p.433. 
104Ibid, pp.427-460. 
105 A. Moravcsik  “Introduction: International Bargaining and Domestic Theories of International 
Bargaining” in P.B Evans et al. (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy- International Bargaining and 




Putnam argued that international negotiations should be considered as a two-level game, 
where each side is represented by a “chief negotiator”106 that plays at two levels: the 
international level (Level I) and the domestic level (Level II). At the international level, 
governments negotiate with each other to reach an agreement that will consider domestic 
pressures (Level I). At the national level, different groups pressure the government to adopt 
certain policies (Level II). For Putnam, the crucial link between international negotiations 
and domestic politics lies in the necessity of ratification; the chief negotiator must not only 
reach an agreement at the international level, but must also make sure that the agreement will 
be ratified at the domestic level. Putnam defines “ratification” as “any decision-process at 
Level II [domestic level] that is required to endorse or implement a Level I [international] 
agreement whether formally or informally”.107 Hence, it is not necessary to consider 
ratification in parliamentary terms or linking it to a formal voting procedure.   
 
Putnam defines various constraints on negotiations at level I as “win-sets”.  “Win-sets” are 
the sets of all possible Level I agreements that would have gained the necessary majority 
among the constituents when voted up or down, thus that would be ratified by domestic 
constituencies108. A number of determinants and circumstances may affect the win-set size. 
At the domestic level, the size may be influenced by national preferences, coalitions formed 
at this level, domestic divisions, and the cost, both real and perceived, of “no agreement.”109 
The size of the win set also depends on the political institutions present at Level II and the 
ratification procedures which are in place.110  Strategies adopted by the negotiators at the 
international level (Level I) also directly affect the size of the win-set. Putnam argues that if 
the win-set is large, then the negotiations will have more chance to conclude an agreement at 
the international level. However, the ratification of this agreement at domestic level may be 
more difficult. If the initial win-set is smaller, then the negotiating latitude of the negotiators 
                                                 
106 See P.Evans, “Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics” in P, 
Evans et al., Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1993, p.399. 
107 Putman, op.cit., p.436. 
108 Ibid., p.437. 
109 Ibid., p.445 and pp.442-443. 
110 Ibid., p.448-449. 
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is limited. The state may achieve exactly what is wanted, but there is greater chance that the 
negotiations at the international level may cease before reaching an agreement.111  
 
Putnam’s metaphor is interesting because it implies that each game at each level is played 
simultaneously. Decisions made at one level can have a direct effect on the negotiations at 
the other level. This can be defined as “reverberation”: strategies and outcomes at different 
levels of the game simultaneously affect one another.112 Furthermore, one of the most 
significant assumptions of the two-level game is that an entity such as the “state” is not a 
“unitary actor” in international negotiations: the actors involved in the negotiations are 
different groups within the “state” groups with distinct interests and aims.113  
 
The two-level game metaphor has been used to analyze several cases of international 
bargaining.114 Putnam and other authors have primarily examined examples of international 
economic negotiations but other types of international cooperation have been analyzed using 
Putnam’s metaphor.115 However, to our knowledge, this research project will be the first to 
use this metaphor as an analytical framework to examine negotiations dealing with human 
security issues.  
 
The EU in human security negotiations: a three-level game 
 
Several authors have applied Putnam’s two-level metaphor to the analysis of the EU’s 
external relations.116 Manners and Whitman argue that the Putnam’s two-level game 
                                                 
111 Ibid., p.451. 
112 Ibid., p.454. 
113 H. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and Information, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997., p.253. 
114 See different cases in  P.Evans, H.K. Jacobson and R.D. Putnam (eds.) Double-Edged Diplomacy. 
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.; H. 
Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and Information, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997, p.253 and R. Paarlberg “Agricultural Policy Reform and the 
Uruguay Round; Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game”, International Organization, 
vol.51,no.3, 1997, pp.413-44.    
115 See Evans, et al. (eds.), op.cit., for cases dealing with issues in North-South relations and security 
issues and issues in North-South relations including  A. Moravcsik, “Armaments Among Allies – 
European Weapons Collaboration”, pp.128-167. 
116 See H. Hubel “The EU’s Three-Level Game in Dealing with Neighbours”, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 9, 2004, pp.347-362.;  S. Meunier, “What Single Voice? The European Institutions 
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metaphor can be useful in explaining how the international and domestic spheres are 
significant in explaining the foreign policy pursued by an EU Member State. They 
emphasize that “this is a two-way street as domestic change, such as a change of 
government, can have an international impact, but also EU events, such as CFSP, can have a 
domestic impact.”117  
 
If some authors have used the two-level game on its own,118 most authors using a multilevel 
game metaphor have drawn on other conceptual frameworks to analyse the EU as an 
international actor.119 Most often, when Putnam’s metaphor was used to study the EU in 
international negotiations, the two-level game metaphor was converted into a three-level 
game metaphor.120 Putnam himself acknowledges that examining the European Union 
involves not just a two-level game, but a three-level game.121 The three levels can be defined 
as follows: Level I remains the international level; Level II becomes the European Union 
level, where negotiations mainly take place between the Member States within the 
framework of the CFSP but may also involve other EU institutions; finally, Level III is the 
national/domestic level. A three-level game approach does not imply adding or 
                                                                                                                                          
and EU-US Trade Negotiations”, International Organization, vol.54,no.1, 2000, pp.103-135; S. 
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superimposing three level of analysis. The main contribution of this approach is to stress the 
interactions between the three levels. This approach is thus an “interactive approach”.122 
 
According to Putnam’s “two-level game” metaphor, each side is represented by a single 
leader or “chief negotiator” whose central aim is to reach an agreement that will be approved 
at the domestic level by the voters. In Putnam’s metaphor, the same negotiators are thus 
negotiating at the two levels. In the case of the EU, however, negotiators representing the EU 
may differ in various levels. Collinson rightly notes that the key EU negotiators at Level I 
and Level II are not always the same individuals who are playing at Level II and Level III. In 
addition, negotiations at Level I may involve more than one actor and each may represent 
different interests (as in the case of the member state holding the Presidency).123 This 
variation of negotiator poses an analytical problem, but only if the dynamics of the three-
level games are different from the two-level game. To be analytically useful, the three-level 
game metaphor must follow the same dynamics as the two-level game metaphor. The link 
between each level of negotiations must be clearly identifiable. The analysis of the various 
actors involved in human security negotiations presented in the previous section has revealed 
that the key negotiators who link the domestic, the EU level and the UN level are officials 
from foreign ministries. They are present at all three negotiating tables. Officials from the 
foreign ministries of EU Member States therefore constitute the interface between the three 
levels of negotiations. 
 
One main criticism of the two-level game approach is that it is not a fully developed theory. 
Putnam fully acknowledges this point.124 As Moravcsik has highlighted, for this metaphor to 
become a more formal theoretical model, definitions and specifications about domestic 
politics, the environment of the international negotiations, and about the negotiators 
preferences are needed.125 Nevertheless, this thesis argues that a multilevel analysis based on 
the two-level game offers a valuable framework to organise the data and understand how 
domestic and international factors are intertwined in international negotiations. In this thesis, 
a three-level game analysis will thus be used to answer the research question. The three-level 
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of analysis will be defined as follow: Level 1 – International (or UN) level, Level II- EU 
level, Level III – Domestic level. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This aims of this chapter was to provide the necessary background and analytical tools to 
analyze the EU as an actor at UN in human security negotiations. It has demonstrated that 
the literature on the European Union’s relationship with the United Nations has primarily 
focused on three themes: the EU’s legal status and representation in the UN; the EU in the 
General Assembly and the Security Council; and the concepts of effective multilateralism 
and effective partnership. This chapter has also illustrated that the study of the EU in human 
security negotiations conducted at the UN requires the analysis of a complex web of actors 
and decision-making processes. This chapter has argued that the complexity and the unique 
nature of the EU as a global actor constitute a complicated puzzle for both theories of 
European integration and International Relations. Most theories have failed to appreciate the 
multifaceted and multilevel nature of the EU in international organizations. This chapter has 
shown that a multilevel approach, a three-level game, can provide a useful analytical 
framework to examine the EU at the UN. This approach will be use in this thesis to analyze 
the European Union’s effectiveness in human security negotiations organized at the United 
Nations and answer the research question posed in this thesis. Before embarking on the 
analysis, it is important to clearly define the research design preferred in this thesis. The next 





EU effectiveness at the UN and Human Security Negotiations 
- Research Design 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The primary function of a research design is to ensure that evidence emerging from the 
project decidedly answers the main question of the research project.1 This thesis seeks to 
identify the conditions under which the EU is an effective actor at the UN in human security 
negotiations. It aims to determine the relationship between the “effectiveness” of the 
European Union, the dependent variable, and various existing conditions in human security 
negotiations, the independent variables. This chapter introduces the research design used in 
this thesis. It begins by defining the dependent variable: “effectiveness”. Independent 
variables that may affect the EU’s effectiveness are then identified. This chapter then 
proposes testable hypotheses that consider the relationship between the EU’s effectiveness 
and conditions found in human security negotiations. These hypotheses indicate how 
independent variables may affect the dependent variable.2 The hypotheses will be tested not 
only to explore whether a relationship exists between the concepts (the EU’s effectiveness 
and the various conditions), but also to examine the nature of the relationship. Finally, this 
chapter introduces the research methods used to answer the research question, a multiple-
case study approach, discusses the cases selected to test the hypotheses, and reviews the 
methods used for data collection. 
3.2 Dependent Variable: ‘effectiveness’ 
The concept of “effectiveness” is often used when discussing the EU as a global actor but is 
rarely operationalized. Jørgensen stresses that it is difficult to evaluate the performance of 
the European Union and to determine the EU’s successes and failures in international 
                                                 
1 D. A. De Vaus, Research Design in Social Research, London, Sage, 2001, p.9. 
2 J.B. Johnson and R.A. Joslyn, Political Science and Research Methods, 3rd Ed., Washington DC, CQ 
Press, 1995, p.55. 
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politics.3 The aim of this research project is not to rate the performance of the EU at the 
United Nations. It does not seek to evaluate either the ratification and implementation 
procedures or the effectiveness of the treaties or other agreements. This project, however, 
will examine if and when the EU can have an impact on human security negotiations.  The 
effect of the EU as an actor at the United Nations is directly related to the extent to which the 
EU Member States decide to act collectively at the UN. Thus, the cohesion of the EU 
Member States must be considered. The definition of “effectiveness” that will be utilized for 
this research project will account for these different aspects. 
 
Laatikainen and Smith have suggested four ways in which “effectiveness” can be defined in 
the context of EU-UN relations: internal effectiveness, external effectiveness, EU 
contribution to the UN’s effectiveness, and UN effectiveness. 4 The first two dimensions of 
“effectiveness” (internal effectiveness and external effectiveness) are useful in the context of 
this research project.5 However, these definitions will be adapted to reflect the reality of the 
EU as an actor in the specific area of international human security. In addition, while this 
research project examines both the internal and external aspects of the EU’s effectiveness, 
the primary focus of this analysis will be the internal dimension that determines the external 
dimension. Indeed, this research project is based on the assumption that the EU’s external 
effectiveness depends, to a considerable extent, on its internal effectiveness. 
 
 Internal Effectiveness 
 
Laatikainen and Smith argue that the “internal effectiveness” of the EU at the UN relates to 
the willingness of the EU Member States to act collectively at the UN through the EU 
(privileging EU action to independent national action). The EU is “internally effective” when 
                                                 
3 K.E. Jørgensen, “ The European Union’s Performance in World Politics: How Should We Measure 
Success” in Z. Zielonka (ed.), Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, pp.87-101.  
4 K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith “Introduction” in K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith (eds.), 
Intersecting Multilateralism: The European Union at the United Nations, London, Palgrave , 2006, 
p.10. 
5 Laatikainen and Smith’s third definition of effectiveness relates to the EU’s contribution to UN’s 
effectiveness and to the role of the EU in strengthening the UN’s capacity to act. The fourth definition 
relates to the UN’s effectiveness and influence in international relations. See Ibid., p.10.  Both 
definitions, while relevant to examine the EU at the UN, are not useful to answer the research 
question.   
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EU Member States reach an agreement on a common position and there is EU ‘output’. In 
this research project, the EU will be considered internally effective if the European Union 
has a common position (supports) a potential UN agreement regarding a specific human 
security issue. Certain EU Member States may not officially support the agreement; 
however, they may decide not to block the EU from endorsing the agreement. If the 
European Union supports the agreement (even if not all the Member States back the 
agreement), then the European Union will be considered internally effective. Statements that 
the Presidency delivers on behalf of the EU at the UN will be examined in each phase of the 
negotiations to determine if there is an EU position. 
 
 External Effectiveness 
 
Laatikainen and Smith argue that the “external effectiveness” of the EU at the UN involves 
the EU achieving its objectives. They also suggest that “external effectiveness” is related to 
the EU’s influence on other actors at the UN or on the general debate at the UN, to its role as 
a leader or “frontrunner”, and to the other states’ perception of the EU as a unitary and 
influential actor. Furthermore, Laatikainen and Smith stress that “external effectiveness” 
depends primarily on “internal effectiveness”. The two dimensions are thus linked.   
  
The “external” dimension of “effectiveness” as defined by Laatikainen and Smith 
encompasses several aspects. To limit the scope of this research project, only the first aspect 
of Laatikainen and Smith’s definition of “external effectiveness” will be the focus of the 
analysis. The “external” dimension of effectiveness will refer to the success of the EU in 
achieving its objectives in the field of human security. All the initiatives supported by EU 
members in the area of human security have been towards the adoption of stricter regulations 
and constraining agreements. The EU, therefore, will be considered an “externally” effective 
actor if the outcome of the negotiations on a specific human security issue mirrors the EU’s 
general objectives in the area of human security. In other words, the external effectiveness of 
the EU will be evaluated based on whether the UN was able to achieve an agreement on a 
specific human security issue. It is reasonable to believe that a new agreement would either 




The “external” effectiveness will not imply that the EU was responsible for introducing the 
issue on the UN agenda, or that EU was a “front-runner”.6 In addition, it will not take into 
account if the agreement adopted at the UN achieves its desired end. This thesis recognizes 
that the EU may not be solely responsible for the adoption of an agreement at the UN, as 
other factors or players may explain the success or failure of UN negotiations. However, if 
the UN has failed to reach an agreement on a specific human security issue, then the EU has 
also failed to achieve its objectives.  
 
3.3 Independent Variables: Possible Conditions 
 
Informed by the multilevel games literature and the studies on the EU as an actor in both the 
international sphere and at the United Nations, this section contends that several variables 
may influence the EU’s effectiveness. The previous chapter demonstrated that the analysis of 
the EU as an actor at the UN in human security negotiations requires an understanding of the 
ways in which the actors interact at various levels (international, EU, and domestic) and 
introduced an analytical framework based on Putnam’s two-level game metaphor. Following 
Putnam’s two-level game logic, a number of factors may have an impact on the possibility of 
an agreement at the international level. These factors can be a starting point to identify 
conditions that may influence the EU’s effectiveness in negotiations. If Putnam’s metaphor 
is useful in discerning conditions affecting the EU’s effectiveness, it has not been developed 
specifically to examine the EU as an actor in international negotiations. The literature on the 
EU as an international actor and as an actor at the United Nations is thus used to identify 
other potential conditions.  
 
The following independent variables were defined using concept definitions. These 
definitions are useful as they facilitated the search for empirical evidence. In cases where a 
concept was too abstract or could not be observed, measurable indicators were selected; each 
                                                 
6 On the EU adopting a “front-runner” approach see Commission of the European Communities, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The European 




indicator was chosen on the basis that it was easily observable.7 Two types of measurement 
were used: nominal and ordinal measurements. In a nominal classification, concepts are 
grouped into a set of categories but do not necessarily follow a specific order. In contrast, an 
ordinal scale divides and ranks the various concepts and may use terms such as “low”, 
“medium” and “high”.8  
 
Variables at the International Level 
 
Putnam argues that at the international level, prospect of an agreement depends on the 
preferences and strategies that the negotiators adopt. These preferences and strategies may be 
influenced by various motives, including the pursuit of chief negotiator’s personal 
conception of the national interest in the international context.9 In human security 
negotiations at the UN, the EU does not have one chief negotiator negotiating on behalf of 
the 27 Member States. It is, therefore, difficult to identify the preferences and strategies of 
the EU as a global actor. Nevertheless, the literature on the EU-UN relations gives a clear 
indication of at least one EU preference and strategy when identifying the EU’s interests in 
the international context: the commitment to multilateralism. In addition to this variable, the 
literature on the EU as an actor in international negotiations points to other factors that may 
influence the EU’s effectiveness: the decision-making rules in international negotiations and 
the position of other dominant UN actors, including the United States.   
 
a) The Commitment of the EU to Multilateralism.  
A strategy “refers to the general orientations of the actions that the negotiators take to 
achieve their objectives.”10 In recent years, the EU has repeatedly stated that it is committed 
to multilateralism.11 The term “multilateralism” has various meanings. Multilateralism is 
                                                 
7 G. King, R.O. Keohane and S. Verba, Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, p.110. 
8 See Ibid., p.151 and P. Pennings, H. Keman and J. Kleinnijenhuis, Doing Research in Political 
Science, London, Sage Publications, 1999, pp.66. 
9 R.D. Putnam,“ Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, International 
Organization, vol.42,no.3, 1988., p.457. 
10 G-O Faure and J.Z. Rubin, “Organizing Concepts and Questions” in G. Sjöstedt (ed.)International 
Environmental Negotiations, London, Sage Publications, 1993, p.19. 
11 See European Union, The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making 
Multilateralism Matter, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
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associated with cooperation and may refer to the coordination of relations among three or 
more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.12 The EU’s attachment to 
multilateralism is not new. The EU’s own history and system of intergovernmental 
negotiations has led the EU to be more willing to work through multilateral organisations.13  
 
EU Member States may decide to interact with other UN member states and coordinate their 
relations within the UN system. In contrast, the EU Member States may prefer to adopt a 
more unilateral approach to relevant issues. Furthermore, EU Presidencies may also 
encourage EU Member States to speak in meetings to reinforce the EU common position and 
thus, increase the EU’s effectiveness. If the EU Member States are strongly committed to 
collaborating with other states within the UN, the EU’s effectiveness may be affected. An 
ordinal scale will be utilized to measure this variable (low, medium and high). The EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism is an abstract concept; therefore, qualitative indicators will be 
considered: the direct contribution of EU Member States and of the European Union to 
negotiations will be evaluated to assess the EU’s commitment to multilateralism. To evaluate 
the degree of EU’s commitment to multilateralism, statements made by the EU and its 
Member States at the UN meetings will be analyzed.  
 
In human security negotiations at the UN, the EU Member States remain the main players. 
Nevertheless, Member States may decide to participate individually and separately in the 
negotiations without emphasizing and reinforcing the position agreed within the EU. This 
will be defined as a low degree of commitment to multilateralism. However, the European 
Union can, if it chooses and through the Presidency, deliver statements in UN negotiations. 
In most UN organizations, EU Member States – without any exception – must agree on the 
direction and the wording of the statement that the EU will supported.14 The degree of the 
EU’s commitment to multilateralism will be considered medium if an EU statement or 
contribution was presented by the Presidency and if the Member States mention the EU’s 
                                                                                                                                          
2004:and European Councill, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 
Brussels, 2003. 
12 J.G. Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the autonomy of an institution”, International Organization, vol.46, 
no.3, 1992, p.568 and p.571. 




position in their own national statement. Furthermore, the European Union may decide to 
submit an official contribution (for example, a working paper) to the negotiations. The 
Presidency, on behalf of the EU, would be responsible for delivering this formal contribution 
to the debate. If such a contribution is submitted and if Member States refer to this 
contribution in their own national contributions, then the degree of the EU’s commitment to 
multilateralism will be considered to be high. 
 
In summary, three different degrees of EU’s commitment to multilateralism will be defined: 
 
1. Low Degree of EU’s Commitment: Only contributions of EU Member States, 
without mention of the European Union.  
2. Medium Degree of EU’s Commitment: Statements from the rotating Presidency that 
were given on behalf of the EU. Also, Member States mention the European Union 
in their national contributions.  
3. High Degree of EU’s Commitment: Specific EU contributions submitted to the 
negotiations, and Member States’ statements/contributions refer to the European 
Union’s contribution.  
 
b) Decision-making rules 
Decision-making rules used in negotiations are another variable which might influence the 
EU’s effectiveness as an actor at the United Nations. UN meetings and conferences may 
differ in their organizational patterns and their rules of procedures including those related to 
decision-making.15 Three main decision-making rules characterize international negotiations: 
some form of majority voting, unanimity or consensus.16  The majority voting rule requires 
an agreement by some predetermined threshold. Under unanimity voting, all parties must 
agree with the outcome(s) of the negotiations. Consensus differs from majority voting and 
unanimity, as it is “neither quantitatively clear-cut nor formally defined” and usually entails 
                                                                                                                                          
14 J. Wouters, “The European Union as an Actor within the United Nations General Assembly” in V. 
Kronenberg (ed.) The EU and International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony, the Hague, 
T.M.C.Asser Press, 2001  p.383. 
15 See J. Fomerand, “UN Conferences: Media Events or Genuine Diplomacy?”, Global Governance, 
2, 1996, p.362. 
16 See J.Jupille, “The European Union and International Outcomes”, International Organization, 
vol.53, No.2, pp.409-425.  
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that there is no stated objection to the decision.17 Consensus does not require unanimity on 
all points from all the member states participating in negotiations. It is generally an 
agreement on general objectives. Yet, it is interesting to note that negotiations at the UN, 
particularly in UN-sponsored conferences, only resume when there is a consensus that will 
not be challenged.18 Hence, most often in UN negotiations, consensus is viewed as a type of 
informal unanimity.  
 
Institutional decision-making rules at the international level can shape negotiations.19 Each 
decision-making rule can facilitate international negotiations but can also create serious 
challenges. Majority voting rule involves a predetermined threshold and in UN negotiations 
usually follows the principle of “one state, one vote”. In negotiations using the majority 
voting rules, states can vote against or abstain but cannot veto or block the adoption of an 
agreement. Voting can also be introduced as a mechanism to overcome an impasse in 
negotiations based on consensus.20 However, the major challenge with majority voting is the 
alienation of powerful minorities.21 On the other hand, consensus, which aims to be a more 
“egalitarian procedure” as it recognizes the variation of power between nations,22 not only 
constitutes a very high threshold in decision-making but often becomes an extremely slow 
process.23 Achieving consensus often leads to lengthy and difficult negotiations in which the 
shadow of failure is always present, especially during the last hours of negotiations. 
 
International decision-making rules can affect the EU’s achievement of a common position 
in international negotiations but also international outcomes. Jupille has examined various 
combinations of EU decision-making rules (unanimity and QMV) and international decision-
making rules (unanimity, consensus and majority vote) to explain EU effects on international 
outcomes. Some of his observations are of interest for this research project. Jupille’s analysis 
                                                 
17 J. Depledge “The Opposite of Learning: Ossification in the Climate Change Regime”, Global 
Environmental Politics, vol.6, no.1, 2006, p.11. 
18V.Rittberger, “Global Conference Diplomacy and International Policy-Making: The Case of UN-
Sponsored World Conferences”, European Journal of Political Research, vol.11, no.2, 1983,p.178.  
19 See J. Depledge, op. cit., p.8-13, Rittberger, op.cit., p.178 and B. Buzan “Negotiations by 
Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”, 
The American Journal of International Law, vol.75, no.2, 1981, pp.324-348. 
20 However, the late introduction of a voting rule in negotiations is usually more a sign of negotiation 
failure than a step forward. See Ritteberger, op.cit., p.178.   
21 Buzan, op.cit., p. 326. 
22 See Ibid., p.327. 
23 See Depledge, op.cit., 2006, pp.11-12 and Buzan, op.cit., pp.341-342. 
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reveals that in the case combining EU unanimity (the rule most often applied in CFSP) and 
international consensus decision-making rules, the EU Member States, which are acting as 
free agents, will face greater difficulties in shaping the negotiations and obtaining their 
desired outcome.24  In this case, the more “revisionist” or “reformist”25 Member States will 
have to work harder to impose their preferences and to influence their EU partners, as they 
cannot rely on a rule such as the QMV to neutralize the voice of EU Member States 
supporting the status quo. Furthermore, under the consensus rule, the larger free-agents are 
usually the players in the best position to affect the negotiations. The “revisionist” EU 
Member States will also have to convince other non-EU larger free-agent states to adopt 
their point of view.  
 
Jupille also points out that in international consensus situation, “the weight of fifteen, 
including states like Germany, the UK and France, [EU Member States] should be better 
able to block an international consensus or [more importantly for our case] forge one of their 
own.”.26 In the case of EU unanimity and international majority voting, the EU common 
position has the summed voting weight of all EU Member States. Jupille argues that the 
effects of this combination are nearly identical to those in the case of EU unanimity-
international consensus rule combination; the difference is that the EU Member States are 
bargaining to have more votes.27  
 
The decision-making rules used in human security negotiations at the UN are a second 
independent variable which may influence the EU’s effectiveness. A set of nominal 
categories will be used to measure this variable. 
 
The nominal classification used for this variable is: 
- Majority voting rule  
- Consensus rule 
 
                                                 
24 Jupille, op.cit., p.421. 
25 “Revisionist” or “reformist” states are states which demand important changes in the policies 
already in place.  
26 Ibid., p.415 
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c) Position of the United States 
The position of the United States regarding a potential agreement will also be considered. 
Malone argues that “no country played a greater role in the design of, and in setting early 
aspirations for, the UN than did the United States”.28 The United States has “a major 
influence both in shaping the agendas of the institutions where its interests are at stake and 
even, more fundamentally, in shaping and reshaping the actual character of the institutions 
themselves.”29  Yet, one should recognize that “over the course of the 1990s, relations 
between the US and the UN deteriorated sharply, and US influence within the body 
inevitably waned”.30 Nevertheless, the United States remains a dominant actor at the United 
Nations. The US is also the first partner of the European Union, but “the EU faces the twin 
challenges in speaking with one voice whenever possible and nudging back the United States 
back into the multilateral fold. [. . . T]he former is a necessary precondition for European 
effectiveness in addressing the latter”.31The American position (whether it supports or 
opposes) regarding a potential agreement at the UN may influence the EU Member States. 
 
Groenleer and Van Schaik argue that in the cases of negotiations on the Kyoto protocol and 
on the International Criminal Court, the EU’s interaction with the United States may have 
had an impact on the EU speaking with one voice and may have prompted the EU Member 
States to adopt a common position at the UN. Groenleer and Van Schaik state that both these 
cases saw a strong opposition of the United States and the EU Member States were perhaps 
more willing to adopt a common position to counterbalance the US opposition.32 
Furthermore, most of the EU documents on the EU’s commitment to multilateralism were 
published following the Iraq crisis at the United Nations. This led to claims that the EU 
predilection for multilateralism at the United Nations is to contrast the recent increase of US 
unilateralism. The EU’s commitment to multilateralism may be directly linked to the crisis 
                                                                                                                                          
27 Ibid., p.414-415. 
28 D. M. Malone, “US-UN Relations in the UN Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era” in R. Foot 
et al. (eds.), US Hegemony and International Organizations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 
p.90. 
29 R. Foot, N. Macfarlane and M. Mastanduno, “Conclusion: Instrumental Multilateralism in US 
Foreign Policy” in R. Foot et al. (eds.), US Hegemony and International Organizations, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p.271. 
30 Malone, op.cit., p.90. 
31 Cameron, op.cit., p.158. 
32 M. Groenleer and L.van Schaik The EU as a global actor: Case studies of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate and the International Criminal Court, Second Pan-European 
Conference Standing Group on EU politics, Bologna, 24-26 June 2006, p.26 
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of multilateralism that has been transpiring in the last few years; they argue with the recent 
transatlantic frictions, the EU has felt the need to state their preference for a multilateral 
approach, particularly in the United Nations.33  
 
The position of the US regarding a UN agreement is the third variable to be evaluated at the 
UN level. It may be difficult to assess whether the US supports or opposes an agreement as 
the American position may oscillate during the negotiations. To determine whether the US 
supports or opposes an agreement, the statements delivered by the American delegation at 
the beginning and the end of each phase of negotiations will be examined. The United States 
will only be considered to support the agreement if it is willing to endorse the version of the 
agreement that is on the negotiating table. If the United States generally supports the UN 
agreement but, because it has reservations on certain clauses, refuses to sign the agreement 
on the table, then US position will be considered as opposing the agreement. Furthermore, to 
simplify the analysis, the United States which will be treated as a unitary actor, or a “black 
box”34: domestic negotiations in the United States will not be explored.  
 
A nominal classification of the US position will be used: 
-United States supports the agreement  
-United States opposes the agreement  
 
 
Variables at the EU level 
 
The EU level is the second level of analysis. Human security issues at the EU level are 
discussed in the framework of the CFSP. Putnam’s approach indicates that the preferences of 
major actors at each of the levels can have an influence of the possibility of an agreement at 
the international level.  Informed by the scholarship on the EU in international affairs, this 
                                                 
33 K.E. Jørgensen and K. Laatikainen, The European Union and the United Nations, Second Pan-
European Conferences. Standing Group on EU Politics, no.293, Bologna, 24-26 June 2004. pp.15-18. 
34 This concept is borrowed from Meunier’s analysis of the EU in international commercial 
negotiations. See S. Meunier, Trading Voices- The European Union in International Commercial 
Negotiations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005, p.61. 
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thesis argues that the preferences of three major EU actors involved in negotiations on 
human security issues should be examined. These three actors are the Presidency of the EU, 
the European Commission and the “trilateral axis” composed of France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom. 
 
a) Involvement of the Council Presidency 
The first variable to be identified at this level of analysis is the level of involvement in 
human security issues on the part of the Member State that holds the Council Presidency. 
While several authors have stressed the central role at the United Nations of the Member 
State that has the Presidency35, the role of the Presidency at the EU level is even more 
decisive. The Presidency’s responsibilities include, inter alia, the initiation of policies, 
policy management in the field of foreign affairs, leadership in Council decision and the 
international representation of the Council and the European Union. The Presidency 
schedules meetings, decides on agendas, directs discussions, proposes compromises and 
suggests new proposals.36 The rotating council Presidency is also in charge of chairing all the 
meetings of the Council of Ministers working groups as well as the European Council. The 
Presidency is, therefore, in an ideal position to promote certain of its priorities, including on 
CFSP matters. Not surprisingly, the Presidency often has a “stimulating role” in CFSP 
decision-making; it initiates most negotiations on the adoption of CFSP instruments such as 
Joint Actions and Common Positions. 37 
   
If the Presidency becomes involved, stimulates a debate at the EU level on human security 
policies and presses for the EU to adopt CFSP instruments, then this may have an impact on 
the EU’s effectiveness. To evaluate the level of involvement of the EU Member States 
holding the Presidency, CFSP policy instruments adopted by the Council and the Presidency 
will be examined.  
 
                                                 
35 See J. Dedring,, “Reflections of the coordination of the EU Member States in organs of the United 
Nations”, CFSP Forum, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, p.2. and J. Wouters, op.cit.,pp.381-383. 
36 See D. Metcalfe “Leadership in European Union Negotiations: The Presidency of the Council” 
International Negotiations, vol.3, no.3, 1998 pp.413-434.  
37 See R.A.Wessel, The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. A Legal Institutional 
Perspective, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.89. 
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Five main CFSP instruments can be identified and can either be legal or political.38 There are 
three legal CFSP instruments: Joint Actions, Common Positions, and Common Strategies. 
The two other instruments are politically (but non-legally) binding: Declarations and 
Conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council.  
 
Joint Actions and Common Positions were established by the Treaty on the European Union. 
Joint Actions focus on operational actions in which various resources, including human 
resource, financing and equipment are mobilized to achieve specific Council objectives. 39 
Furthermore, once Joint Actions have been adopted, EU Member States are not allowed to 
support positions or act contrary to the Joint Actions. It is also required that Member States 
adapt their own national policies following the Joint Actions’ guidelines.40 Common 
positions elaborate the EU’s approach to specific issues of geographic or thematic nature. 
The adoption of Common Positions may necessitate Member States to implement or modify 
their national policies to conform to the position agreed by the European Union on a specific 
issue.41 Both of these instruments are adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council. They have the same formal and legal status and it is often unclear why Joint 
Actions are chosen over Common Positions and vice-versa. Indeed, while Joint Action 
involved specific concrete actions, they may also present a position. On the other hand, 
Common Positions can also demand additional concrete actions.42  It should be noted that 
both Joint Actions and Common Positions often follow the adoption of resolutions at the UN 
Security Council and often include references to these UN resolutions.43  
 
Common Strategies are a third legal CFSP instrument. They were introduced with the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. Common Strategies are recommended by the Council of Ministers, but 
                                                 
38 See D.C.Thomas, The Institutional Construction of EU Foreign Policy: CFSP and the International 
Criminal Court”, prepared for presentation at the European Union Studies Association, Austin, Texas, 
March 31-2 April 2005.   
39 See also K.E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge, Polity, 
2003, p.44, Box 2.4. 
40 Wessel, op.cit, p.155. 
41 Thomas, op.cit., p.5. 
42 See, Wessel, op.cit, pp.125-130. Wessel notes that “the criteria used for choosing the appropriate 
legal basis are far from transparent. Nevertheless two policy lines may be distilled form the decisions 
which have been taken. First of all, most Joint Actions are explicitly based on general guidelines of 
European Council. […] Secondly, Joint Actions are not used to establish the reduction of economic 
and financial relations with third states or the imposition of an arms embargo, which decisions almost 
always follow a resolution of the United Nations Security Council.”, p.130.   
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adopted unanimously by the European Council. Common Strategies allow “the European 
Council to have the power to call on all aspects of the life of the Union.”.44 These strategies 
are adopted in areas where EU Member States have shared interests. They outline the EU’s 
aims, the duration and the means to be made available by the European Union and the 
Member States. Wessel notes that there is an “unconditional obligation for the Council 
indeed to come up with concrete CFSP decisions [such as joint actions or common positions] 
once the European Council has produced a Common Strategy”.45 The Council of Minister is 
therefore responsible for the implementation of Common Strategies. The fact that the 
Council recommends Common Strategies to the European Council also demonstrates that 
Common Strategies address issues that have previously been discussed in the Council.  
 
Two other instruments can be used to address specific CFSP:  Declarations by the Council or 
Presidency, and Conclusion by the General Affairs and External Relations Council. Title V 
of the Treaty on the European Union does not include any provision regarding Declarations 
or Conclusions. They are therefore considered politically binding rather than legally binding 
on the Member States.46 Nevertheless, the support of all Member States is required for their 
adoption. Declarations are general expressions of a political line the EU wishes to follow. 
They usually state the EU’s position vis-à-vis a specific international issue and may 
recommend that third states or other international actors act (or refrain from taking action) 
on a specific matters.47   Declarations are usually issued by the Presidency of the Council on 
the behalf of the European Union, but may also be presented on behalf of the Presidency, of 
the European Union, by the Council and the Commission or even by the European Union 
together with a non-member States.48 The General Affairs and External Relations Council 
adopts conclusions after the majority of its meetings. The Conclusions present the main 
results of the Council and emphasize certain decisions that the Council has adopted.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
43 Ibid., p.124. 
44 S. Nuttall, “Coherence and Consistency” in C. Hill and M. Smith, International Relations and the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.104. 
45 Wessel, op.cit., p.184. 
46 Thomas, op.cit. p.9. 
47 Wessels, op.cit.., p.186. 
48 See for example, Declaration by the European Union and the United States on the Responsibilities 
of States and on transparency regarding arms exports, Washington, 18 December 2000. 
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The level of involvement of the Presidency will be measured using an ordinal scale. Three 
various levels of involvement will be defined based on the political or legal nature of the 
CFSP instruments that have been adopted. If legally binding CFSP instruments are adopted 
by the Council, then the level of involvement of the Presidency will be considered to be 
higher. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Common Strategies are adopted not by the 
Council, but by the European Council and require the Council to adopt further legally 
binding CFSP instruments, such as joint actions or common positions. The adoption of 
Common Strategies will thus be considered to be a higher level of involvement as this will 
necessarily entail the adoption of more CFSP instruments. 
 
1. -Low level of Involvement of the Presidency: Adoption of Statements, Declarations, 
Conclusions (politically binding CFSP instrument). 
2. -Medium Level of Involvement of the Presidency: Adoption of Joint Actions and 
Common positions 
3. -High Level of Involvement of the Presidency:  Adoption of EU strategy that require 
the adoption of Joint Actions and Common positions. 
 
b) Participation of the European Commission 
The European Commission is responsible for the European Community actions in the field 
of humanitarian and development assistance which are considered intrinsic parts of human 
security. Furthermore, the DG for external relations usually deals with policy-making on 
external human rights; DG development also manages development programmes and 
policies which might directly affect human rights.49 The DGs responsible for development, 
for humanitarian assistance, and for external relations are all actors from the European 
Commission whose work could be affected by the outcomes of human security negotiations.   
 
Human security negotiations at the UN, however, have dealt with issues regarded as CFSP 
issues such as disarmament and arms control. In addition, although the EU’s external human 
rights policy can be both a first and second pillar issue, the implementation of this policy 
through international organizations such as the United Nations remains in the second pillar. 
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Nevertheless, because of its responsibility for many activities in the field of human security, 
the Commission has begun to increase its participation to the debate on human security 
issues at the EU level. As a recent ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)50 
demonstrates, the Commission increasingly argues that human security issues, such as the 
campaign against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons or the fight against 
landmines, have become an integral part of the policy of development cooperation and 
should fall within the scope of the competences conferred on the Community in that field. As 
the Commission is gradually more involved in addressing human security challenges, the 
level of participation of the Commission may influence the EU’s effectiveness in human 
security negotiations. 
 
The Commission may contribute to negotiations in various ways. Commissioners may make 
statements to encourage Member States’ to achieve a common position at the EU level 
and/or support the agreement being negotiated at the international level. The Commission 
may increase its participation by producing communications (COM documents) to indicate 
its intended course of action on the issue being considered at the international level. It may 
also organize international events to raise awareness on specific issues and publish reports or 
other material specifically designed to be distributed during UN meetings. The Commission 
may also cooperate with the Presidency. In fact, the Commission’s role in human security 
negotiations may depend on the attitude and capability of the member state who holds the 
Presidency. For example, smaller states with fewer resources might encourage the 
Commission’s involvement and welcome its support.51 Furthermore, while the European 
Commission enjoys observer status in the Commission on Human Rights (now the Human 
Rights Council), its contributions are often dependent upon the Presidency’s inclination to let 
it participate in the meetings. 52  
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The European Commission has become increasingly involved in the promotion of human 
security. It is thus reasonable to test whether the level of participation of the Commission 
influence the EU’s effectiveness in human security negotiations. An ordinal scale will be 
used to measure the Commission’s level of participation:  
 
1. -Low level of participation: Statements by EU Commissioners 
2. -Medium Level of participation: Statements by EU Commissioners and Adoption of 
Communications from the Commission (COM documents) 
3. -High Level of participation: Statements by EU Commissioners, adoption of COM 
documents and cooperation with the Presidency (production of material/reports for 
the UN conferences, organization of international events).  
 
c) Support of France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom are dominant players in EU foreign policy. Their 
support for or opposition to an agreement in the field of human security can be extremely 
influential.53 Regarding CFSP issues the larger EU Member States are likely to negotiate 
among themselves before coming to the negotiating table at the Council.54 France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom, the “trilateral axis”, have also been described as a directoire that is 
a “leadership group in the EU decision-making process that takes decisions affecting the 
interests of other EU Member States and this without their participation”.55 Furthermore, 
sometimes the EU’s final decision on a particular issue appears to mirror the outcome of 
discussion made within the directoire.56 The French, German and British support for the 
agreement on the negotiating table may thus have an impact on the negotiations at the EU 
level.  
 
These three countries may also influence whether there is “EU output” at the UN on a 
specific issue. Compared to other EU Member States, France, Germany and the United 
                                                 
53 See D.Long and L. Hindle, « Europe and the Ottawa Process : an Overview » in M. Cameron., R .J. 
Lawson and B.W. Tomlin (eds.), To Walk without Fear- The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, 
Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press Canada, 1998 p.253. 
54 C. Gegout, “The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US Directoire at the Heart of 
the European Union’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
vol.40, no.2, 2002, pp.331-332. 
55 Ibid., p.332. 
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Kingdom all have a “special” relationship with the United Nations. France and the UK 
chiefly differentiate themselves from other EU Member States by their permanent 
membership in the Security Council. These two Member States have a “privileged access to 
the other members of the P-5”57 and can therefore exert their influence on important players 
at the United Nations. Hill argues that because France and the United Kingdom are the “key 
players in the European foreign policy cooperation they are naturally pushed together”58, but 
French and British positions diverge on a number of human security issues. Although not a 
permanent member in the Security Council, Germany also has a close relationship with the 
United Nations. In 2006-2007, Germany was the third largest contributor to the regular 
budget (with a share of 8.6%), far ahead of the UK (6.1%) and France (6.0%).59 Germany 
has also actively campaigned to become a permanent member of the Security Council. The 
position of these three actors may therefore influence the EU’s effectiveness as an actor in 
human security negotiations at the UN.  
 
To measure the level of support of these three countries for a potential agreement, EU 
initiatives on human security discussed at the UN will be examined. The analysis will 
determine whether these initiatives were championed by one, two or all three of these 
Member States. Furthermore, these states will only be considered to support the agreement if 
they support the agreement without any reservations. 
 
An ordinal classification will be used to examine this variable: 
 
1. Low Level of Support: France or Germany or the United Kingdom champions EU 
initiatives that support the potential UN agreement on human security issues and do 
so without reservation. 
2. Medium Level of Support: Two of these states (France-Germany or France-UK or 
Germany-UK) champion EU initiatives that support UN agreement on human 
security issues, and support the potential UN agreement without reservation. 
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3. High Level of Support: France, Germany and the UK champion EU initiatives that 
support UN agreement on human security issues, and all three states support the 
potential UN agreement without reservation. 
 
Variables at the Domestic Level 
 
Agreements reached at the international level must be ratified, or accepted, by each of the 27 
EU Member States. According to Putnam, ratification may require a formal voting 
procedure, but can also be any decision-process at the domestic level that is required to 
endorse or implement an international agreement whether formally or informally.60 The 
process of ratification can thus involve various actors. Putnam argues that at the domestic 
level, the power and preferences of major actors as well as the formation of possible 
coalitions can be significant determinants on the achievement of an international agreement. 
61 It is reasonable to suppose that conditions, or variables, which may influence the EU’s 
effectiveness, are linked to main actors and coalitions involved in domestic negotiations on 
human security issues.  Several players at the domestic level can be identified as “major 
actors” in domestic negotiation on human security matters. This thesis argues that there are 
two main conditions at the domestic level that may affect on the EU’s effectiveness: a 
unified position within a government and the influence of the coalition of NGO. 
 
The examination of domestic politics becomes extremely complex when studying the EU in 
international negotiations. Collinson argues that it is important “to identify those interests 
that can be demonstrated to have a significant impact on negotiations taking place at the EU 
and international levels”.62 In the case of the EU in human security negotiations, certain EU 
countries may have a more impact on negotiations than other states. As previously discussed, 
France, Germany and the UK are important players both at the UN and in the formation of 
EU foreign policy. Furthermore, the Member States that hold the Presidency represent the 
EU at the UN and are in a strategic position to influence negotiations at the EU level. The 
                                                                                                                                          
59 See website of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations:  http://www.new-york-
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60 Putman, op.cit., p.436. 
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analysis of domestic politics will thus focus on four actors: France, Germany, the UK, and 
“The Presidency”. For practical consideration, all EU Member States holding the Presidency 
are represented by one category: “The Presidency”. 
 
a) Unified position within EU governments  
The presence or absence of a common position among various ministries within a national 
government/administration will be the first variable explored at the domestic level. The 
literature on  arms control negotiations suggests that “[p]ower struggles among domestic 
actors, agencies and pressure groups (bureaucratic, diplomatic, civil, military and political) 
may shift foreign policies and alter a state’s negotiating positions”.63 Most studies have 
examined arms control agreements in connection to the United States. In the US case, 
several significant players are involved in domestic negotiations. These players include the 
White House, often with its own political and foreign policy agenda, the State Department 
and various divisions of the Defence Department, which may be directly affected by the 
agreements on the table.64 Transposed to a European context, the players involved in internal 
negotiations would be the bureau of the head of state or government (President/Prime 
Minister), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defence. The main goal of 
domestic negotiations is to produce a position that will be accepted by each of these groups: 
“each of these organizations involved will seek, within the limit of its influence and 
effectiveness in the bureaucratic of situation, to preserve its own interests, or at least, to 
avoid having them badly violated.”65  
 
Human security negotiations do not only address arms control and disarmament; they also 
encompass issues of human rights and development. While the Foreign Ministry may be the 
actor present at the negotiating table, various ministries may be affected by the signing of an 
international agreement on a human security issue. This is especially true with respect to 
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Ministry of Defence: an international agreement on arms control or the age of recruitment of 
soldiers can have a direct impact on the military programmes. In addition to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, the ministry responsible for aid and 
development programmes and even the bureau of the head of state (President/Prime 
minister) may be involved in the decision to support a specific initiative. 
 
One observation remains constant: domestic negotiations on arms control, disarmament and 
other human security issues entail internal bargaining. This bargaining becomes a crucial 
part of decision-process that is needed to endorse or implement an international agreement, 
thus it is part of the ratification process. National government usually strive to achieve a 
unified governmental position and will not support a human security agreement unless its 
departments/ministries are in agreement. In fact, in situations of arms control agreements, 
military support for agreements is considered to be crucial to the ratification process.66 This 
internal bargaining can become problematic during negotiations that deal with human 
security affairs and should also be considered. As previously mentioned, the primary 
challenge at the domestic level is to reach a position that each ministry that is affected by the 
agreement at the international level will accept.  Each department/ministry may have its own 
policy and defend its own position regarding human security issues. More importantly, in 
certain cases, this division may be recognized and even articulated publicly by government. 
The statements and policy papers that each ministry produces often reflects this position and 
will be used as indicators to determine whether there is a unified position within a specific 
EU government. 
  
Nominal measurements will be used to explore this variable: 
-Presence of a unified position within EU governments 
-Absence of a unified position within EU governments  
 
b) Influence of NGOs and International Coalitions of NGOs  
Negotiations on human security matters at the domestic level may also involve another type 
of actors: non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The second variable at the domestic 
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level relates to the influence of NGOs and international coalitions of NGOs. One could argue 
that NGOs are active at all three levels of negotiations and that is, in some respect, accurate. 
However, this thesis agrees with Hampson and Reid, who contends that coalitions of NGOs 
are not necessarily capable of influencing the international arenas which are dominated by 
states. NGOs can generate interest and mobilize public support for the “cause,” but they need 
assistance of certain allies (i.e. states) who will endorse their positions, advocate their 
concerns on the negotiating table and in the negotiations.67 The need for NGOs to secure 
states as allies seems to indicate NGOs and coalitions NGOs will be more active at the 
domestic level and probably target individual states rather than EU institutions or 
international organizations. 
 
Several authors have recognized the increasing influence of transnational advocacy 
networks, such as NGOs coalitions, on international negotiations.68 Some even argue that 
NGOs can affect international negotiations on high political issues such as security and 
weapons control.69 In the last decade, civil society actors have become actively engaged in 
politicizing human security issues, mobilizing public opinion and attempting to influence 
states to review their security policy.70 In fact, there is evidence that civil society movements 
have been successful in influencing states’ preferences to cooperate with other states on 
disarmament and arms control.71 These types of negotiations often “demand detailed 
knowledge and persistent attention, and the existence of NGOs […] has often served to 
encouraged or discouraged certain governmental initiatives, or spur government 
representatives to action.”72  
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While NGOs can generate momentum in negotiations and “have become progressively more 
assertive in demanding a voice at the top decision-making tables,”73 they are often unable (or 
not permitted) to participate in international negotiations on human security issues and to 
have a direct effect on the negotiations. Nonetheless, actors from civil society should also be 
considered as significant players in domestic bargaining on human security issues. 
 
The general purpose of international coalitions of NGOs is to pressure governments to 
encourage agreement on a specific issue. The increasing role of transnational advocacy 
networks, such as NGO coalitions, in international negotiations has been increasingly 
acknowledged.74 The main aim of these networks or, in this case coalition of NGOs, is often 
to modify the behaviour of states and of international organizations.75  They may also 
directly stimulate the pursuit of cooperation on issues such as arms control.76 In fact, Knopf 
argues that arms control cooperation is less likely to occur if there is no organized public 
support for the cooperation: for example, the actual or potential mobilization of domestic 
opposition directly affected the US decision to cooperate with the Soviet Union on arms 
control issues during the Cold War.77  
 
The concept of “influence” is difficult to measure. Knopf identifies three influence 
mechanisms that can be used by citizen campaigns (or NGOs in this thesis) to influence the 
national government to pursue cooperation with other international actors: electoral pressure, 
elite coalition shifting, and bureaucratic utilization. This thesis will use these three influence 
mechanisms as indicators of NGOs’ influence in Member States.  
 
First, electoral pressure involves growing activism and mobilization of public opinion can 
produce electoral incentives for action. Faced with this growing citizen activism and 
mobilization of public opinion, an incumbent administration/government might decide to 
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shift its policies. An administration/government may be concerned that the opposition party 
or parties will gain the support of voters who are dissatisfied with the 
administration/government’s position.78 The second mechanism, elite coalition-shift, occurs 
when NGOs become part of the dynamics of elite coalition formation.79 NGOs combine their 
resources with elites who share their policy goals and thus enhance the capacities of these 
like-minded elites. These groups can persuade elites to take action on an issue in the first 
place and strengthen the elites’ ability to argue on behalf of a policy shift.80  The third 
mechanism, the “bureaucratic utilization”, takes place when arguments provided by NGOs 
are used by officials inside the policy making system to gain advantage in debates with other 
actors in the government. NGO activities, therefore, directly affect internal bargaining. It 
should be noted that Knopf identifies division within a government as a pre-condition that is 
necessary for this last mechanism to operate.81  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, if NGOs and coalitions of NGOs utilize one of the influence 
mechanisms, then the presence of influence of the international coalition will be confirmed. 
This thesis will only give a simplifying picture of the actual influence of NGOs and NGOs 
coalition within the EU.  It is important to stress that an absence of influence does not 
suggest that NGOs were not active in the European Union. It only indicates that there is little 
or no evidence of the use by NGOs of at least one of the three influence mechanisms in 
France, Germany and the UK and the Member States holding the Council Presidency. 
 
This variable will be measured using a nominal measurement: 
 
-Presence of Influence: NGOs and NGO coalition use at least one of the three 
influence mechanisms (mass electoral pressure and/or shifting elite coalition and/or 
bureaucratic utilization).  
-Absence of Influence: There is no or little evidence that NGO and NGO coalitions 
use at least one of the three influence mechanisms.  
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A relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable (the EU’s 
effectiveness) is expected.  The following hypotheses regarding the nature of the relationship 
between the dependent variable (effectiveness) and each of the independent have been 
defined. This thesis hypothesizes that the presence of the following conditions would lead to 
an increase of the EU’s “effectiveness”. 
 
The EU’s effectiveness at the UN on human security issues will increase if : 
 At the international level (Level I) there is: 
o Hypothesis 1: A high degree of EU’s commitment to multilateralism.   
o Hypothesis 2: A majority voting rule in negotiations   
o Hypothesis 3: A positive US position   
 
At the EU level (Level II) there is: 
o Hypothesis 4: A high level of involvement on the part of the Presidency 
o Hypothesis 5: A high level of participation of the European Commission 
o Hypothesis 6: A high level of French, German and British support  
 
At the domestic level (Level III) there is: 
o Hypothesis 7: A unified position in EU governments 
o Hypothesis 8: Presence of influence of NGOs and international coalition of NGOs 
 
3.5 Methodology and Research Methods 
In order to investigate the EU’s effectiveness at the UN, this thesis used different research 
methods. First, this thesis conducts a comparative analysis of case studies. Three cases of 
human security negotiations were selected: 1)the ban on anti-personnel landmines: 2) the 
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons: 3) the involvement of children and armed 
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conflict. Second, this research used three different methods of data collection: documentary 
analysis, elite interviewing and non-participant observation. 
 
Case Study Research and Comparative Methodology 
 
The case study is a research strategy that is often used when investigating a “why” question 
about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control.82 
Compared to other research strategies such as the historical or the experimental method, case 
study research enables researchers to examine current events, but “when the relevant 
behaviours cannot be manipulated”.83 While case studies and histories used similar methods, 
the case study’s advantage is its ability to use various sources of evidence such as 
documents, interviews and observation that might not be available for a historical study. 
Furthermore, the use of multiple cases provides a variety of convincing evidence; therefore, 
the research project is strengthened.84 Lijphart stresses that the case study method and the 
comparative method can and should be loosely connected and that certain types of case study 
approaches, including the multiple-case study approach, can be considered as implicit parts 
of the comparative method.85 A comparative perspective is also particularly relevant for 
testing hypotheses and investigating a supposed relationship between variables.86In this 
thesis, a multiple-case study approach was the preferred strategy to answer the main research 
question of this thesis. This approach was used to select data and to test the relationship 
between the dependent variable, the EU’s effectiveness, and the independent variables 
identified at each of the levels of analysis 
 
 Cases Selected 
In a multiple-case study approach, cases must be selected carefully. Cases should either 
produce similar results or produce contrasting results, but for predictable reasons.87 Burnham 
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et al. emphasizes that the selection of cases directly affects the quality of the comparative 
research. In a multiple-case study/comparative research design, the number of cases selected 
should first be dependent on how many suitable cases exist in regard to the research 
question.88  In addition, Lijphart argues that the selection and the analysis of each case 
should be motivated by the potential contributions to theory-building.89. For the purposes of 
this thesis, several case studies are available. The United Nations increasingly addressed 
human security issues. Since the beginning of the 1990s, a number of negotiations within the 
UN framework have dealt with human security issues. As mentioned previously, the concept 
of human security encompasses a wide array of issues from disarmament to environmental 
issues, human rights and organized crime. However, this thesis focuses on a restrictive 
definition of the concept. Human security issues are defined as issues that focus primarily on 
the protection of civilians from violent threats. Following the use of this definition of human 
security, the number of cases that are available for analysis is reduced. Therefore, cases of 
UN negotiations regarding issues such as the environment, social or political or economic 
rights or health will not be considered in this thesis. 
 
Several criteria must be considered when selecting cases. Cases selected should reveal if the 
independent variables have an effect on the dependent variable. To accept the hypotheses, 
the effect on the dependent variable should be the similar across all the cases selected.90 
Furthermore, cases should not be selected on the dependent variable, as there would be no 
theoretical possibility of variance on the dependent variable. Burnham et al. argue that 
“unless cases are included that are different with respect to the dependent variable,” it is 
difficult to derive any conclusions from a multiple-case study. 91  
 
In this thesis, the concept of “effectiveness” is measured according to the success of reaching 
an agreement at the UN level (external effectiveness) in negotiations on human security 
matters. Thus, cases of successful and unsuccessful negotiations should be selected. 
Furthermore, cases selected must also vary with respect to the “internal effectiveness” of the 
EU; that is, the willingness of the EU Member States to act collectively at the UN and to 
reach agreement on a common position.  
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For the purpose of this thesis, three case studies have been selected: 1) the ban on anti-
personnel landmines; 2) the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons; and 3) the 
involvement of children in armed conflict.  
 
The choice of these case studies was based on a number of factors. First, all three cases 
selected were cases of negotiations that focus primarily on the protection of civilians from 
violent threats. Second, there was some evidence to suggest that at least some if not all EU 
Member States actively took part in negotiations at the international level (that is at the UN). 
Third, the EU’s internal and external effectiveness varied across the cases. Fourth, the choice 
of the case studies was also based on the prior hypothesizing of different type of conditions 
which may affect the EU’s effectiveness and the desire to have cases covering each type of 
conditions.92 For example, in all these three cases, a coalition of NGOs was created to 
campaign on the specific issue discussed at the international level. 
 
1 – The ban on anti-personnel landmines 
The first case study examined negotiations surrounding the ban on anti-personnel landmines. 
Following the end of the Cold War, the fight against landmines became a central issue of 
discussions at the UN. At the international level, several EU Member States were involved in 
promoting the ban on landmines and actively working with other UN member states and the 
International Campaign to Ban landmines (ICBL),a coalition of NGOs created to achieve an 
international ban on anti-personnel landmines. The landmines issue was also discussed at the 
EU level throughout the 1990s: several EU joint actions on landmines were adopted during 
this period. When the UN review conference of the 1980 United Nations Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons’ Protocol II on landmines opened in 1995, a minority of EU 
Member States supported the idea of a comprehensive ban on landmines. Yet, by the end of 
1997, a landmark treaty prohibiting landmines, the Ottawa Convention93 (or mine ban treaty) 
was supported by all the EU Member States and signed by all EU Member States except 
Finland.  
                                                                                                                                          
91 Ibid., Box 3.5, p.76. 
92 On this rationale for choosing cases, see Yin, op.cit., pp.52. 
93 The Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel 




This thesis acknowledges the fact that technically most negotiations leading to the mine ban 
treaty took place in the Ottawa Process and were, therefore, removed from the UN 
framework. However, the Ottawa Process was born out of UN negotiations regarding the ban 
on landmines and was given a seal of approval by the UN.  UN agencies and the UN 
Secretary-General completely endorsed the Process.: UN representatives were present and 
active at each of the conferences of the Process occasionally acting in the role of an 
“éminence grise”.. In addition, the diplomatic framework established for the negotiations of 
the treaty was based on the UN Assembly rules of procedures. The Secretary-General of the 
United Nations was also designated as the Depositary of the Ottawa Convention.  
  
2 – The illicit trade in small arms and light weapon (SALW) 
At the end of the 1990s, an estimated 500 million of small arms and light weapons (SALW) 
were in circulation around the world. Civilians are most often the victims of these arms. The 
enormous proliferation and sale of millions of illegal SALW became an urgent concern.  By 
the late 1990s, the UNGA began to discuss the need to convene an international conference 
on the illicit trade of arms. Small arms and light weapons had also become a significant 
CFSP issue. The EU had already adopted several specific measures to address the problems 
of SALW including a programme for the prevention and combating of the illicit trafficking 
of conventional arms and several Joint Actions. The EU’s efforts to address the SALW were 
also supported by a coalition of NGOs, the International Action Network on Small Arms 
(IANSA).  
  
In July 2001, the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons was convened at the United Nations in New York. The EU insisted on the 
implementation of export controls and export principles and the development of an 
international instrument on marking and tracing. In contrast, the United States clearly stated 
their opposition to constrain the legal trade and legal manufacturing of SALW. At the end of 
the conference, to the EU’s disappointment, no legally binding document was adopted. The 
conference did produce a Programme of Action, but the EU’s efforts to introduce specific 
export criteria were unsuccessful. Furthermore, in 2006, a Review Conference of the 
Programme of Action was organized in New York. Again, negotiations were unsuccessful: 
after two weeks of negotiations no substantial agreement was adopted.  Negotiations on the 
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illicit trade in small arms and light weapons are still on-going at the UN. For practically 
reason, the case study only covers negotiations conducted between 1997 and 2006.  
 
3 – The involvement of children in armed conflict 
While the two other case studies dealt with disarmament and arms control issue, the third 
case study explores negotiations on the issue of child soldiers. The problem of child soldiers  
can be considered a human security issue as it concerns the security of individuals (in this 
case, children) and is linked to disarmament, development and human rights issues.  
 
In 1999, as more than 300 000 children were used as combatants in conflicts, the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1261 which condemned the use of child soldiers and 
urged the implementation of stronger measures to stop the practice. In May 2000, after six 
years of negotiations and intense lobbying by NGOs, an international treaty on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict was unanimously adopted by the UN General 
Assembly.  The treaty, which is an Optional Protocol94 to Convention of the Rights of the 
Child, sets the minimum age for compulsory recruitment at eighteen. While several EU 
Member States were engaged in the international efforts to achieve prohibition of any 
recruitment of children in hostilities, EU Member States failed to agree on setting eighteen as 
the minimum age for all forms of military recruitment, voluntary as well as compulsory. 
Furthermore, this case is also interesting because, during the negotiations of the Optional 
Protocol, the EU adopted several CFSP instruments which referred to the problem of child 
soldiers, but never directly addressed the issue. A unified EU approach to the problem of 
child soldiers only emerged in 2003 (that is three years after the adoption of the Optional 
Protocol) when the Council adopted Guidelines on children and armed conflict.95  
 
 
                                                 
94 See UNICEF/ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Guide to the Optional Protocol on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, New York: UNICEF, 2003. 





Data Collection Methods 
 
Case studies involve at least two or more methods of data collection. In order to investigate 
the EU’s effectiveness in human security negotiations, this research project relied on three 
qualitative methods: documentary analysis, elite interviewing and non-participant 
observation.  As mentioned previously, one of the strength of case studies is the use of 
different sources of evidence as this gives a more comprehensive account of the phenomenon 
studied.96  
 
a) Documentary Analysis 
Documentary analysis can be a vital contribution to the understanding of contemporary 
events: the use of documents can corroborate information and augment evidence from other 
sources.97 For this research project, primary, secondary and tertiary document were used. 
Each document was assessed on the basis of its quality using criteria such as authenticity, 
credibility, and representativeness.98 Ideally, most of the data analysed in this project would 
have originated from primary sources. Primary sources consist of evidence that was 
produced at the time of the event and was often intended for internal or restricted circulations 
only.99 However, as negotiations in international organisations are often conducted in closed 
circles and information about the negotiations remains confidential, the access to certain 
documents was restricted. 
 
For the purpose of this research project, administrative documents produced by EU 
institutions were collected.  These included Declarations/Conclusions from the Council, 
Joint Actions, Common Positions and Common Strategies, statements of the Presidency and 
Commissioners, etc...Documents produced by the United Nations, such as session 
documents, resolutions, decisions and progress reports, were also examined. This thesis also 
used reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and coalitions of NGOs as they 
                                                 
96 C.Hakim, Research Design, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 2000. 
97 Yin, op.cit., p.81. 
98 See J.Scott, A Matter of Record- Documentary Sources in Social Research, Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1990, pp.30-31. 
99 Burnham et al., op. cit. p.165. 
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offered a different perspective on the negotiations. Finally, documents and statements 
produced by various ministries/departments of EU Member States were also examined. 
 
b) Elite Interviewing and non-participant observation 
Interviews with key actors involved in the negotiations and non-participant observation were 
two supplementary techniques that were used to collect data. These two techniques provided 
information that could not be found in documents. Indeed, official documents are often the 
final results of the negotiations; they may indicate whether the partners could or could not 
agree on a common view, but they do not reveal the whole story. Elite interviewing and non-
participant observation were valuable tools to obtain a more comprehensive account of the 
negotiations and, therefore, to identify the variables that influence the EU’s effectiveness. 
 
Elite interviewing is an effective way to collect information about decision-making 
processes.100 This form of interviewing gathers information from people who took part in or 
witnessed the events being studied or who have direct knowledge of the phenomenon. This 
type of interviewing is particularly appropriate when the interviewees are considered to be 
experts on the questions studied.101 For the purpose of this thesis, semi-structured interviews 
were carried out in New York in June-July 2006, Brussels in October 2007, and Geneva in 
April 2008 (see Appendix I– Research Notes and Appendix II).  
 
Interviews were conducted with officials from various EU Member States’ Permanent 
Representation/Mission to the UN (in both New York and Geneva). Officials from the 
European Commission were also interviewed. Furthermore, several interviews were carried 
out with NGO representatives. As Leech stresses, activists, while not “elites” in the 
socioeconomic sense of the term, are experts in their field and should be considered as 
such.102 NGOs personnel that had participated in the negotiation process or lobbied EU 
governments were thus considered as “elites”.  
 
                                                 
100 Burnham et al.,op.cit., p.205. 
101 See B.Leech, “Interview Methods in Political Science” Symposium, Political Science and Politics, 
vol.35, no.4. Dec. 2002, pp.663-688.  
102 Ibid., p.663. 
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Semi-structured interviews were used to help prevent imposing a static framework on the 
interview. Indeed, semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to attain “a delicate 
balance between covering the topics that are considered significant by the interviewer and 
allowing the respondent to open new routes on topics without taking unrelated tangents”.103 
Most of the information gathered during the interviews was “not for attribution”, meaning 
that the information could be used and quoted provided that the individual giving the 
information would not be directly identified as the source of the information.104  
 
In addition to elite interviewing, non-participant observation was also used to study the EU 
as an actor at the UN in human security negotiations. Non-participant observation can be 
described as “a situation in which the observer observes but does not participate in what is 
going on”.105 Observational evidence can offer additional information about the topic being 
investigated. As another source of evidence, direct observations contribute to making the 
research project more robust. Non-participant observation was conducted during the United 
Nations Small Arms Conference in New York from 26 June-7 July 2006 (see Appendix I- 
Research Notes).  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the concept of effectiveness (the dependent variable). It has 
argued that, in order to answer the research question, effectiveness should be defined in two 
ways: internal effectiveness and external effectiveness. The chapter also provided eight 
testable hypotheses. Each hypothesis considered the relationship between the dependent 
variable and a specific independent variable (or condition). This chapter hypothesized that 
the EU’s effectiveness will increase if there is: a high degree of EU’s commitment to 
multilateralism; a majority voting rule in negotiations; a positive US position; a high level of 
involvement on the part of the Council Presidency; a high level of participation of the 
Commission; a high level of French, German and British support; a unified position in EU 
governments; and the presence of influence of NGOs and international coalitions of NGOs. 
 
                                                 
103 Burnham et al.,op.cit., p.213. 
104 K.Goldstein, “Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviewing”, Political Science 
and Politics, vol.35, no.4, 2002, p.671. 
105 A. Bryman, Social Research Methods, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.167. 
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This chapter has also introduced the research methods used to answer the research question. 
It suggested that a multiple-case study approach is the preferred research strategy to 
investigate the EU’s effectiveness in human security negotiations. In the following chapters 
(Chapter 4, 5, and 6), this thesis will examine the three cases selected: 1) the ban on anti-
personnel landmines; 2) the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons; and 3) the 
involvement of children in armed conflict. Each case study will be examined using a 
multilevel approach to track both the dependent and independent variables and test the 
hypotheses. Chapter 7 will offer a comparative analysis of the three case studies: the 





Working towards “Freedom from Fear”: The EU and the Ban 
on Anti-Personnel Landmines 
 
4.1 Introduction  
It is estimated than up to 110 millions anti-personnel landmines (APL) were in place in more 
than sixty-four countries at the end of the Cold War.1 Anti-personnel landmines were 
identified as a direct threat to human security and to the enjoyment of “freedom for fear”. 2 In 
the early 1990s, NGOs working with landmines victims and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) pressed the international community to adopt a total ban on 
landmines. When the issue of landmines first emerged on the international agenda, divergent 
points of view on the issues were present in the EU with only a minority of EU Member 
States supporting the idea of a comprehensive ban. However, by the end of 1997, after years 
of negotiations, a landmark treaty prohibiting landmines, the Ottawa Convention, was 
welcomed by the European Union and signed by all EU Member States except Finland. 
 
This chapter is divided in four main sections. The first section examines the emergence of 
the issue on the international agenda. The three following sections analyze different phases 
of negotiation leading to the adoption of a comprehensive ban on anti-personnel landmines 
(see Table 4.1). The first phase of negotiations covers those within the UN Conference on 
Disarmament in 1995-1996. Negotiations at the beginning of the Ottawa Process (December 
1996-May 1997) form the second phase of negotiations. The third phase of negotiations 
includes the last months of the Ottawa Process (Spring 1997- December 1997).In each phase, 
all three levels of negotiations- international, EU and domestic- are examined.  
                                                 
1 U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers: the Global Landmines Crisis, Washigton D.C., U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1994, p.1. 
2 P. Cornish, Anti-Personnel Mines- Controlling the Plague of « Butterflies », London, Royal Institute 
of International Affairs ,1994., p.19. 
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4.2 The emergence of the issue on the international agenda 
 
Inexpensive to produce and capable of having devastating effects on the enemy, anti-
personnel landmines have been used in conflicts since the 19th century. However, the First 
and Second World War witnessed the most extensive deployment of this weapon. APL are a 
distinctive type of weapon mainly because of their target: they are designed to kill or injure 
an enemy soldier walking alone. In addition to the physiological damage, the psychological 
effect of this type of weapon can be ravaging: first, the type of injury inflicted by APL can 
greatly increase the level of fear; second, there is an almost certainty of severe injuries if the 
APL detonates; third, there is no possibility to fight back against this type of weapon.3 The 
humanitarian consequences of the use of these weapons were first acknowledged at the end 
of the 1960s, especially with the increased number of civilian victims during the Vietnam 
War. APL are rarely removed once the fighting has ceased. Demining activities are complex 
and extremely costly, thus these weapons continue to cause casualties long after the 
hostilities are over.4 The majority of the victims of APL, however, are no longer soldiers but 
have become civilians.  
 
Despite the early recognition of the deadly effects of APL on civilians, discussions on the 
issue only began to monopolize the international agenda with the end of the Cold War. 
Several factors explain this: First, major changes in international context at the end of 1980s 
rendered potential discussions and agreements on disarmament and arms control issues more 
plausible. Second, in the early 1990s, peacekeeping operations were established in countries 
such as Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique. UN peacekeeping missions were 
often confronted with the presence of millions of landmines that directly affected their work. 
The international community became extremely aware of the need to address APL issues. 
 
Discussions on various ways to minimize the ravages caused by the use of these weapons 
first emerged in regional and international organizations. The involvement of the United 
Nations in mine clearance programmes began in 1988, with UN-sponsored mine clearing 
                                                 
3 See T. Gaulin, “A Necessary Evil: Reexamining the Military Utility of Antipersonnel Landmines” in 
R. Matthews, B. Mcdonald and K.R.Rutherford (eds.), Landmines and Human Security, Albany, State 
University of New York Press, 2004, pp.212-213. 
4Cornish, op.cit., p.20. 
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programmes in Afghanistan. These activities were regarded as humanitarian operations and 
paved the way for the establishment of similar demining programmes in various other parts 
of the world.5 As with other sectors of UN activities, the organization turned to other 
international organization and NGOs to help implement the diverse programmes.  
 
Not surprisingly, NGOs and other organizations involved in mine action activities such as 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were the first actors to appeal to the 
international community to address APL issue. In October 1992, six NGOs6 decided to form 
a coalition and created the International Campaign to Ban landmines (ICBL). The aim of the 
campaign was to achieve an international ban on anti-personnel landmines. The United 
Nations was rapidly identified as the forum in which this total ban could be achieved. The 
ICBL argued that, in order to minimize the deadly effects of APL, states that, produced, used 
and exported landmines needed to accept to act globally on the matter and to stop the use of 
such weapon.7 
 
At the time of the creation of the ICBL, an international convention addressing the issue of 
landmines already existed: the 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW). Protocol II of this Convention not only defined the term “landmines”, but 
more importantly prohibited their use on civilians. Thus, the first efforts to achieve a total 
ban on landmines were concentrated on the revision of this Convention and its Protocol II. 
Discussions on potential revision of the CCW would have to take place within the most 
important multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament agreement: the United Nations 
Conference on Disarmament (CD).   
 
France was the first country to ask the United Nations to convene a revision conference of 
the CCW: during a visit to mine infested Cambodia, in February 1993, the French President 
                                                 
5 Programmes were established in Cambodia (1992), Mozambique (1993), Somalia (1994), Angola 
(1995) and in the Balkans region. These operations were supervised by the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DKPO). 
6 Handicap International (France-Belgium), Human Rights Watch (United States), Medico 
International (Germany), Mines Advisory Group (United Kingdom), Physicians for Human Rights 
(United States), Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (United States) all joined together in the 
effort to ban landmines 
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François Mitterrand announced that France had asked the UN Secretary General to rapidly 
convene an international conference on the review of the CCW Convention.8 France’s 
initiative was enthusiastically supported by two other EU Member States, Sweden and the 
Netherlands. However, at this point, few EU Member States showed interest in the issue of 
landmines. Several EU Member States such as the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy were 
important landmines producers and had no interest in the introduction of an international ban 
on landmines. Nevertheless, the fight against landmines received another strong boost from a 
major UN player: the United States. In 1992, the US became one of the first countries to 
adopt a one-year export moratorium on anti-personnel landmines. The American President, 
Bill Clinton also became one of the first world leaders to call for the “eventual elimination” 
of landmines.9  All these appeals culminated, at the end of 1993, in the adoption of a series 
of UNGA resolutions on landmines including a resolution calling upon states to agree on a 
export moratorium on anti-personnel mines. In January 1994, another resolution officially 
requested UN member states to convene a conference to review the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons.10 A series of four governmental experts sessions were organized in 
Geneva in 1994 and early 1995 to prepare the Review Conference. The first session of 










                                                                                                                                          
7 J. Williams and S. Goose, “ The International Campaign to Ban Landmines “, in M. Cameron, R .J. 
Lawson and B.W. Tomlin (eds), To Walk without Fear- The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press , 1998, p.22. 
8See Allocution de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République Française, Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia, 11/02/1993.  
9 M. Wareham, “Rhetoric and Policy Realities in the United States” in M.A. Cameron et al., To Walk 
Without Fear. The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press 
Canada, 1998, p.213. 
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Table 4.1 APL Case: Phases of negotiations  
Phases of Negotiations  
Phase 1: Negotiations in the 
Conference on Disarmament 
 1995-1996 
 
25 September- 13 October 1995: In Vienna, Austria, the First 
session of CCW Review Conference is held. 
 
15-19 January 1996: In Geneva, Switzerland, the Second session of 
the CCW Review Conference is held.  
 
 22 April-3 May 1996: In Geneva, Switzerland, the Third Session of 
CCW Review Conference is held. On 3 May, agreement is reached on 
a series of amendments to Protocol II of the CCW.  
 
Phase 2: The Ottawa 
Process (Part I) 
October 1996-May 1997 
3-5 October 1996: In Ottawa, Canada, the Canadian government 
calls on the international community to negotiate and sign a 
convention banning anti-personnel landmines by December 1997. 
 
12-14 February 1997: In Vienna, Austria, 111 states participate in 
first formal discussions of draft anti-personnel mine ban convention. 
 
Phase 3: The Ottawa 
Process (Part II): spring 
1997-December 1997 
 24-27 June 1997: In Brussels, Belgium, 97 countries sign the 
Brussels Declaration pledging their support for a convention to ban 
anti-personnel mines no later than December 1997.  
 
1-18 September 1997: In Oslo, Norway, the Convention text is 
negotiated over the course of three weeks. 
 
 
 2-4 December 1997: In Ottawa, 122 countries sign Convention on 
the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-
personnel mines and on their destruction (the Ottawa Convention). 
 
 
4.3 Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (September 1995-
May 1996) 
 
All EU Member States participated to the first session of the Review Conference. At the time 
of the first session, the CD had around sixty members including ten EU members: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, and Portugal thus participated to 
negotiations as observers.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
10 See UNGA Resolution A/RES/48/79 
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• Level I  
 
When negotiations began in Vienna, there was a wide consensus on the urgent need for the 
revision of the CCW and its Protocol II; however, there was a lack of agreement on which 
amendments to include. At the first session of Review Conference, Spain, speaking on the 
behalf of the EU, stated that the European Union desired that the Review Conference 
focused on four main issues: to extend the scope of application of the Protocol to non-
international armed conflicts; to strengthen restrictions or prohibitions concerning anti-
personnel mines; to establish an effective verification mechanism; and to include provisions 
concerning technical assistance for mine clearance.11 Several EU Member States expressed 
their full support for the EU priorities in their own national statements. The Spanish 
Presidency’s statement, however, did not mention the question of a comprehensive ban on 
landmines. This omission was the result of the divergent positions of EU Member States on 
this question. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and Denmark all voiced their 
support for a comprehensive ban. France supported the ban on the production and trade of 
anti-personnel mines, but not the prohibition of the weapons’ use. The United Kingdom 
considered anti-personnel landmines as legitimate means of defence and only favoured the 
idea of a ban, but only on non-detectable anti-personnel mines. While Finland “recognized 
the total elimination of anti-personnel landmines as an ultimate goal towards which states 
could move most effectively as both militarily and economically viable alternatives were 
developed”12, it was opposed to a comprehensive ban because it remain sceptical that all 
states would adhere to it. It also strongly expressed its “legitimate defence needs”.13 
 
After three weeks of difficult negotiations in Vienna, states faced an impasse: no consensus 
could be reached on potential amendments to the Protocol. At this stage, only a small 
minority of states supported the idea of a comprehensive ban on APL. As the Conference on 
Disarmament operates on a consensus basis, the Review Conference was suspended until 
January 1996.  
                                                 
11 See United Nations, Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Final Document, Part II, Documents and Summary 
Records of the Conference, Geneva, CCW/CONF.I/16, 01/01/1996, p.299. 
12 Ibid., p.319. 
13 See ICBL, Landmines Monitor Report 1999 – Toward a Mine-Free World, New York, Human 




The following sessions of the Review Conferences in January 1996 and in April-May 1996 
followed a similar pattern of discussions: negotiations concentrated on specific technical 
issues rather than on controversial idea of a comprehensive ban on APL. For example, two 
major landmines producers, the United States and the United Kingdom, insisted on the 
development of “smart” mines that automatically self-destruct rather than the adoption of 
comprehensive ban.14 Interestingly, prior to the last session of the Review Conference, both 
countries had reiterated their support for an eventual ban on landmines, while maintaining 
their rights to use some types of mines. Indeed, in April 1996, President Clinton publicly 
declared that the US would lead a global effort to ban landmines; however, the US reserved 
its rights to use and produce “smart mines”.15 A few days later, the UK also announced that 
it would work actively toward a total world-wide ban on anti-personnel mines, but also 
maintained its right to use particular types of landmines.16 Despite strong American and 
British pressure at the Review Conference, the US-UK proposal was not supported by a 
majority of states and was later dropped.17 Furthermore, during the negotiations, India, China 
and Russia repeatedly voiced their opposition to many of the proposed amendments and 
objected to initiating any discussions on an eventual ban on APL. The few countries that did 
support the idea of a potential ban on anti-personnel landmines at conference also 
acknowledge that the ban could be only achieved in the future but not immediately.18  
 
An amended Protocol II was finally adopted in May 1996. If there were improvements, the 
Protocol still permitted the use of some types of landmines. The results of the Review 
Conference left many actors dissatisfied. In its closing statement, Italy, speaking on behalf of 
the European Union, stated that results of the Conference were disappointing in comparison 
to the goals set by the EU in a number of important as aspects such as reaching an agreement 
                                                 
14 D. Hubert, The Landmine Ban: a Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy, The Thomas J. Watson Jr.  
Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper #42, Providence, Brown University, 2000, p.13 
15 See ICBL, op.cit. 
16 See Hansard, 22 April 1996, Column 28. 
17 See M. Dolan and C. Hunt “Negotiating in the Ottawa Process: the New Multilateralism” in M.A. 
Cameron et al., To Walk Without Fear. The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, Don Mills, Ontario, 
Oxford University Press Canada, 1998, p.401. and Hubert, op.cit., p.13. 
18 Dolan and Hunt, op.cit., p.401. 
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on an effective verification mechanism. It also declared that “the European Union would 
strive to meet the goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines”.19  
 
The disappointing results of the Review Conference, prompted many states to join the 
emerging pro-ban movement. By mid-1996, several EU Member States were willing to 
support a total ban on landmines. Following the results of the Review Conferences, the 
European Union issued a declaration that acknowledged that “significant steps forward” had 




• Level II 
 
The European Parliament was the first EU institution to publicly denounce the use of 
landmines. As early as December 1992, the Parliament adopted a resolution21 on the ravages 
caused by landmines. However, most EU Member States only became interested in the issue 
when it was on the UN’s agenda. Within the EU, anti-personnel landmines were perceived as 
development and humanitarian issues as well as a trade issue. Early on, the humanitarian 
aspect of problem was integrated into the EU’s discourse on APL. However, because 
landmines are weapons, discussions on APL quickly focused on matters of arms control and 
national security. It became apparent that any negotiation on APL would be subjected to the 
intergovernmental procedures of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
  
Within the CFSP structure, the landmine issue was initially discussed at the Council of 
General Affairs. The Council Working Group in charge of discussing arms control issues, 
CODUN, was responsible for preparing most of EU debates on APL. However, some 
member states strongly questioned any basic involvement of the EU on the APL issue. 
Indeed, several EU Member States visibly preferred the landmines issue to remain a national 
                                                 
19 United Nations, op.cit., p.433. 
20 European Union, Declaration by the European Union on anti-personnel landmines. 1922. Council 
General Affairs 13/05/1996. 
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question. Yet, from 1995, the APL was firmly added to the EU’s agenda; through the mid-
1990s, several states holding the EU Presidency would advocate for the need to address the 
issue at the EU level.  
 
France, who held the EU Presidency in the first-half of 1995, had been an early campaigner 
for the fight against landmines and the need to review the CCW’s Protocol II. Shortly after 
raising the issue at the United Nations, France convinced its EU colleagues to support the 
initiative and to introduce strong measures to minimize the effects of APL. During the 
French Presidency, in May 1995, the first EU Joint Action on APL was adopted. The Joint 
Action (95/170/CFSP) established a common moratorium on the exports of non-detectable 
and non-self-destructive landmines and called for the member states to work actively at the 
CCW Review Conference toward the strengthening of Protocol II. Even if EU Member 
States had agreed on the Joint Action, their opinions of the most effective approach to the 
landmines issue strongly diverged.  While Austria, Belgium and Sweden clearly supported 
the idea of a comprehensive ban on landmines, most other EU Member States were reluctant 
to endorse the idea of a comprehensive ban.  
 
Despite their division on the issue of a total ban, EU states were united in their 
disappointment of the amendments introduced in Protocol II. Italy, which was holding the 
EU Presidency at the time of the last Review Conference, publicly showed its dissatisfaction 
with the results of the Review Conference. During their presidency, the Italians intensified 
their diplomatic efforts to promote more restrictive measures against landmines.22 The Italian 
frustration with the outcome of the Review Conference also led to adoption of the EU’s 
declaration that deplored the modest results of the Review Conference and stated that the 
outcome felt short of the EU’s expectations. In May 1996, the Development Council, under 
the Italian Presidency, also addressed the question of anti-personnel landmines. In its 
conclusions, the Council recognized the linkage between emergency aid, rehabilitation and 
long term development and emphasized the need for the EU to adopt an integrated and 
coordinated approach on problems such as APL.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
21 See European Parliament, Resolution on the injuries and loss of life caused by mines, B3-1744/92, 
17/12/1992. 
22 See ICBL, op.cit. 
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Even though the EU Member States were divided over the adoption of a comprehensive ban, 
the European Commission continued to work closely with the UN and fund mine-related 
activities. In fact, the European Commission began funding mine-related programmes as 
early as 1992 in countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia and Bosnia. In the early 1990s, 
ECHO developed a strong partnership with the ICRC for demining projects.23 At the time of 
the Review Conferences of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, the European 
Commission was already spending some 50 million of ECU from the European Community 
budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) on APL actions. This money was used to 
fund mine-clearance activities in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and for other types of 
APL actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Iraq, Laos and Afghanistan.  
 
Furthermore, in a working paper on the fight against anti-personnel landmines, the European 
Commission identified the CODUN working group as the best mechanism for coordination 
of horizontal policy aspects of the anti-personnel landmines issue between the Commission 
and the Member States. The Commission, which recognized the importance of the 
development aspect of the question of APL, also emphasized the need to develop a 
coordination mechanism for this specific aspect.24 With this working paper the Commission 
signaled its desire for the European Union to have a cohesive approach towards the question 
of APL which would include a prominent role for the Commission. The Commission 
recognized the central role the CODUN but wished to increase its coordination with this 
body of the Council; negotiations in CODUN were crucial to determine the position of the 
EU towards the Review Conferences of the CCW. Although the Commission was welcome 
to attend the Council meetings where the APL was discussed, it was not directly involved in 
the development of the EU’s APL policy.25  
 
 
                                                 
23 G. Van Orden et R. Cox, “The European Union’s Role in Overcoming the Tragedy of Anti-
Personnel Landmines” in UNIDIR  Newsletter- Special Issue, 3, 1997, p.28. 
24 Commission of the European Communities, The Fight against Anti-personnel Landmines (APL): 
Proposal for an Integrated and Coordinated Approach, Commission Staff Working Paper,  Brussels, 
SEC(96) 2035, 05/11/1996.  
25  D. Long, “The European Union and the Ottawa Process to ban landmines”, Journal of European 




• Level III  
 
Domestic politics played an important role in bringing the issue of landmines on both the 
agenda of United Nations and of the European Union. As previously discussed, France was 
the first country to publicly appeal to the international community to act on the issue of 
landmines. Mitterrand’s appeal to the international community followed numerous efforts by 
the French NGO Handicap International to attract the attention of the French authorities. 
During the 1995 presidential electoral campaign, Handicap International, supported by the 
ICBL, questioned all the presidential candidates on the issue of APL. Although the landmine 
issue did not become part of the electoral debate, Jacques Chirac, the soon-to-be-elected 
President, assured Handicap International that he would encourage global efforts to ban the 
use of APL. Another leading pro-ban advocate in the French government was the new 
Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs, Xavier Emmanuelli. Once in office, Emmanuelli 
made the fight against APL one of his priorities. At the commencement of the first session of 
the Review conference in Vienna, Emmanuelli declared that France would stop the 
production and trade of anti-personnel landmines and begin to destroy its stocks. 
Nevertheless, at this stage, the French government remained deeply divided on the issue of 
APL. Indeed, the French Ministry of Defence defended the use of anti-personnel landmines 
for the protection of soldiers and installations. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
favoured the adoption of national unilateral ban over the implementation of an international 
comprehensive ban on APL.26  
 
The German government was less divided on the idea of a comprehensive ban on landmines. 
The ICBL, which included as one of its founding member the German NGO Medico 
International, quickly targeted Germany for being a leader in the development of APL since 
the Second World War.  This NGO gave impetus to a broader German NGO campaign, 
which mobilized German public opinion.27 In 1994, the German government adopted a 
unilateral moratorium on exports of anti-personnel landmines. At the international level, 
                                                 
26 See P. Chabasse, “The French Campaign” in M.A. Cameron et al., To Walk Without Fear. The 
Global Movement to Ban Landmines, Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press Canada, 1998, 
pp.60-67. 
27 See D. Long and L. Hindle, “Europe and the Ottawa Process: An overview” in M.A. Cameron et al., 
To Walk Without Fear. The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford 
University Press Canada, 1998, p.254. 
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Germany also began to support the idea of a comprehensive ban. Italy, another major 
producer and exporters of landmines, had also begun to modify its landmine policy and 
support a comprehensive ban. By the time it took over the EU Presidency in 1996, Italy had 
already stopped authorizing the exports of anti-personnel landmines (in 1993), adopted a 
unilateral moratorium on the production and trade of anti-personnel landmines (in 1994) and 
ratified Protocol II of the CCW (in 1995). The changes in the Italian policy were driven by 
the economic crisis expected in this sector, the introduction of stricter legislation on the 
general arms trade. Intense debate in Italian parliament also put pressure on the government: 
in 1995-1996 seven bills were introduced by different political groups calling for the Italian 
government to review its policy on landmines.28 The results of the Review Conference of the 
CCW deeply disappointed the Italians, but they remained convinced of the need to address 
the issue of landmines. They also believed that the EU could play an important role in this 
area.  
 
The Italians received support from two other EU states: Austria and Belgium. Both these 
states had already attempted to control their use of landmines. In the summer of 1995, 
Austrian Forces began to destroy all their stocks of anti-personnel landmines. In 1994, the 
Belgian Parliament, which had been fervently targeted by the Belgian Network of the ICBL, 
pressured the government to act on the landmine issue. In March 1995, Belgium was the first 
country to adopt a unilateral law that banned the production, sale, export and use of 
landmines. 29 
   
In contrast, the United Kingdom, one of the largest producers of landmines, was not initially 
attracted to the idea of a comprehensive ban. In July 1994, the British government adopted a 
national moratorium on the export of “dumb mines” citing the indiscriminate effects of the 
weapon on civilians. The UK also participated actively in the Review Conference of the 
CCW. At the Review Conference, the UK first supported the ban on non-detectable APL and 
the adoption of an international code on the transfer of mines that would still allow the 
export and use of self-destructing or “smart” mines. However, before the end of the Review 
Conference, the UK announced a major policy shift on the issue of landmines: the UK would 
                                                 
28 See “Italy” in ICBL, Landmines Monitor Report 1999 – Toward a Mine-Free World, New York, 
Human Rights Watch, 1999. 
29 Long and Hindle, op.cit., pp,254-255. 
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now work toward a world-wide ban on anti-personnel landmines, but also made it clear that 
they would only sign a treaty that had been agreed by all countries. It also declared that it 
would also only use anti-personnel landmines in exceptional circumstances. This shift in 
policy was largely due to increasing NGOs and public pressure. The British public opinion 
was not interested in the distinctions between different types of mines and therefore, did not 
fully understand the UK position of having a comprehensive ban. Both the Foreign Office 
and the Ministry of Defence were exposed to strong demands from the public to support an 
international ban.30 
 
 4.4 The beginning of the Ottawa Process: October 1996-May 1997 
 
When it became clear that CCW Review Conference would only produce disappointing 
results, a number of NGOs and delegates from the ICRC decided to organize a meeting with 
a small number of pro-ban states including EU Member States, Austria and Belgium. All 
participants to this meeting agreed to meet in October in Ottawa to discuss the best ways to 
achieve a comprehensive ban on landmines. The host country, Canada, invited all UN 
member states willing to discuss the idea of a total ban to attend this meeting.  
 
• Level I 
 
Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Denmark strongly supported the Canadian initiative. All these 
states believed that the consensus-based CD would not produced result quickly enough to 
effectively combat the effects of landmines. This view was shared by the UN Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali who condemn the slow pace of the CD negotiations and who 
passionately defended the idea of a comprehensive ban31. Several UN member states also 
showed their willingness to look for alternative forums of discussions. Most EU Member 
States as well as the majority of UN member states, however, were uncomfortable that an 
eventual ban on landmines would be discussed in a different forum than the established CD. 
                                                 
30 P. Bowers and T. Dodd, “Anti-Personnel Mines and the Policies of two British Governments”, 
RUSI Journal, vol.143, no.1, 1998, p.13. 
31 S. Brem and K. Rutherford “Walking Together or Divided Agenda? Comparing Landmines and 
Small Arms Campaign”, Security Dialogue, vol.32, no.2, 2001, pp.171-172. 
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Prior to the Ottawa Conference,32 the UN Secretary-General and a number of pro-ban states 
were consulted by the Core Group of states in charge of organizing the meeting. The Ottawa 
Conference, however, was significantly different from the UN Conference on Disarmament 
because the ICBL and several other NGOs were directly involved in the preparation of the 
meeting.  
 
A majority of EU Member States were full participants in the Ottawa Conference. Finland, 
Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK, however, decided to attend as observers. Negotiations in 
Ottawa were focused on the wording of the final declaration of the Conference. During the 
conference, important players such as France and the United States repeatedly insisted that 
negotiations on landmines should remain within the CD conference. Eventually, after 
difficult negotiations, the EU supported the final declaration of the Ottawa Conference, 
which reaffirmed a commitment to achieve a legally binding agreement to ban APL at the 
earliest possible. However none of the EU Member States were prepared for the unexpected 
invitation they received at the end of the Conference. 
 
In his final speech, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, made a surprising 
announcement: he invited all delegates to return to Ottawa to sign a comprehensive ban 
treaty by the end of 1997. With this invitation, the Ottawa Process was launched. EU 
Member States were stunned by the invitation. Axworthy had consulted the UN Secretary-
General, the Head of the ICRC and the co-ordinator of the ICBL before he made his final 
speech, but he did not discuss his project with his European colleagues. The Austrians 
quickly reacted to the statement and, without consulting the other EU Member States, 
circulated a draft version of a comprehensive mine-ban treaty.  
 
Austria, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands with Canada, Mexico, Norway, the 
Philippines, South Africa and Switzerland immediately became members of the Core Group 
of states that supported the Ottawa Process. However, Axworthy’s invitation was not 
welcomed by all states. Initially, the five permanent members of the Security Council 
criticized the Ottawa Process. France overtly disapproved of the Canadian initiative. France 
                                                 
32 The meeting was formally called the International Strategy Conference: Towards a Global Ban on 
Anti-personnel Mines (3-5 October 1996). 
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argued that the Canadians had not followed diplomatic etiquette and was concerned that the 
Ottawa Process would “replace” the CD. The UK, Italy, Spain, Greece and Finland were still 
reluctant to commit to a total ban of APL. These states were also confused and concerned 
that the EU had supported the final declaration of the Ottawa Conference33. 
 
At the start of the Ottawa Process, the EU Member States were visibly divided on the issue 
of an eventual treaty banning APL. A few days after Axworthy’s surprising statement, the 
issue of a total ban of landmines was discussed at the United Nations. Some observers 
argued that because the Core Group of Ottawa Process chose to conduct negotiations outside 
the UN, the credibility of both the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations 
would be undermined. However, both Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the new UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan were quick to support the Ottawa Process and strongly encouraged 
states to reach an agreement on a total ban.34 Pro-ban EU Member States not only worked 
with Canadians to push for the adoption of an UN resolution on the issue, but also with the 
Americans, who although they were not pleased with the Canadian initiative, still supported 
an eventual ban. On 10 December 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution 
(A/RES/51/45s) which called states to achieve an effective legally binding international 
agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of APL as soon as possible. 
The resolution did not refer to the Ottawa Process or to the CD.  The resolution was not 
opposed by any states and gathered the support of 156 UN member states. 
 
A number of meetings were planned both by civil society and the Core Group of the Ottawa 
to discuss the drawing of an international convention banning landmines. The Ottawa 
Process, in fact, involved two types of meetings. While some meetings focused on preparing 
and negotiating a treaty, others were used for wider consultations, lobbying governments and 
increasing the public support for a comprehensive ban. Between October 1996 and 
December 1997 more than a dozen conferences sponsored by pro-ban states, the ICRC, the 
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ICBL or other NGOs were organized worldwide to discuss the comprehensive ban of 
landmines.35  
 
Several EU Member States were called to play a prominent role in the Ottawa Process. At 
the Ottawa Conference in October 1996, Austria had presented an outline of a ban treaty. At 
the end of the Conference, the Canadians asked the Austrian government to expand the 
outline into a first draft of the treaty. With only a year to negotiate the treaty, the Core Group 
agreed that the text of the treaty should be kept short and that text should be borrowed from 
other relevant treaties. In late 1996 and early 1997, Austria held several consultations with 
governments and NGOs on the first version of the draft treaty. In the end, Austria produced a 
text with thirteen articles and organised an “Expert Meeting on the Text of a Total Ban 
Convention” in Vienna from 12-14 February 1997 to discuss the draft treaty. The meeting 
was open to all states as well as the UN, the ICRC and the ICBL. Some 111 states, including 
many states wary of the Ottawa Process, participated in the Vienna meeting. Following the 
meeting, the Austrians produced a second version of the draft treaty.  
 
In March 1997, the Core Group of the Ottawa Process formally met to discuss the best way 
to achieve a total ban. By that time Germany and Columbia had decided to join the Core 
Group of the process.  Members of the Core Group agreed that the negotiating process 
should rely on voting rather than consensus. Furthermore, only governments willing to 
support the idea of a comprehensive ban would be allowed to participate in negotiations. 
This would allow the Process to have a number advantages over the Conference on 
Disarmament, most importantly to make it faster process. It would also allow the Process to 
focus on drafting the treaty rather than being required to address disagreements among the 
states present at the negotiations.  
 
                                                 
35 Conferences were held in  Ottawa (Canada), Vienna (Austria), Maputo (Mozambique), Tokyo 
(Japan), Harare (Zimbabwe), Bonn (Germany), Kempton Park (South Africa), Stockholm (Sweden), 
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Movement to Ban Landmines, Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press Canada, 1998, pp.160-
184.; and F.O.Hampson, Madness in Multitude: Human Security and the World Disorder, Don Mills, 
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In April 1997, a second meeting was organized in Bonn to discuss the draft treaty, and more 
specifically, the controversial question of verification measures and compliance. Germany, 
although it was part of the Core Group of the Ottawa Process, supported a dual tracking 
approach to negotiations on APL. The German government believed that the Ottawa Process 
and the CD could complement each other. Germany’s dedication to the Ottawa Process was 
also questioned because of its strong links with the United States. In January 1997, the 
Clinton administration announced its decisions to favour negotiation within the CD rather 
than participation in the Ottawa Process36. Yet, the German support to the Ottawa Process 
was reconfirmed when this second conference on the draft text treaty. Germany’s 
involvement the Ottawa Process was critical, particularly because France and the United 
Kingdom were at first reticent to join the Ottawa Process and supported the American 
initiative to reinstate the issue of anti-personnel landmines on the CD agenda.  
 
While France was a full participant at the Ottawa Conference, it emphasized that 
negotiations about the ban of anti-personnel mines should remain within the CD. During the 
first few months of the Ottawa Process, France remained sceptical of the process and did not 
endorse it. It did, however, support the United States in their attempt to add the issue of 
landmines to the agenda of the CD. Similarly in October 1996, the United Kingdom only 
participated in Ottawa as an observer. The British believed that a comprehensive ban should 
be achieved in the Conference on Disarmament. For most of 1997, the UK supported the 
American efforts to re-establish negotiations on APL within the CD and did not fully 
participate in meetings organised by the Core Group of the Ottawa Process. The British 
government believed that only an agreement supported by all major producers, exporters, 
and users of landmines would be effective; therefore, because most major producers of APL 
did not participate in the Ottawa Process, the British refused to embrace the process. 
 
• Level II  
 
Several EU Member States openly had supported the Canadian initiative to have a 
Conference in Ottawa in October 1996 and became involved in preparation for the meeting. 
One of these supporters, Ireland, held the EU Presidency in the second half of 1996. Ireland 
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insisted on the importance that the EU have a united front at the Ottawa Conference. The 
Irish, therefore, persuaded the other EU Member States to adopt a Joint Action 
(96/588/CFSP) just prior to the Conference. The Joint Action reflected the division of the EU 
Member States. The EU Member States not only agreed to work actively toward a ban of 
anti-personnel landmines, but also stressed the importance of the universal adherence to the 
CCW. This Joint Action was ambiguous as it did not mention the Ottawa Conference and 
allowed the member states to pursue their preferred approach to the landmines issue. The 
Joint Action reflected the decision of Italy, Spain, Greece and more importantly the United 
Kingdom not to be full participants to the Conference but only attend as observers. 
 
After challenging negotiations at the Ottawa Conference, the EU Member States agreed to 
support the Conference’s final declaration. If any sense of cohesion had been felt with the 
adoption of the Joint Action and during the Ottawa Conference, this soon disappeared with 
Axworthy’s unexpected invitation. In fact, Axworthy’s surprise announcement “completely 
blew apart what was carefully constructed but already fragile consensus [within the EU]”.37 
Upon the conclusion of the Ottawa conference, there were tense discussions in the CODUN 
about the Ottawa proceedings as well as what the EU had committed to when it agreed to 
support the final declaration of the Conference.  
 
During the first months of the Ottawa Process there was no agreement within the EU on a 
common policy on APL. The Core Group of the Ottawa Process, which included Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands, rapidly realized that the EU should be used 
as a forum to influence other EU Member States to join the Ottawa Process.  Other EU 
Member States reiterated their position that any discussions on landmines should remain in 
the UN Conference on Disarmament. States such as Germany and Luxembourg supported a 
dual-tracking of both approaches. These divisions of opinions were especially visible when 
some states suggested that the EU support the American initiative to reinstate the issue of 
landmines on the CD agenda. This angered pro-ban EU Member States, which considered 
the American initiative as a “delaying and distracting tactic”.38 By the end of the Irish 
Presidency, a consensus on the question had not been reached.  
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With the Ottawa Process still in progress, the Netherlands, another pro-ban state, assumed 
the EU Presidency and made several tentative steps to pressure its European colleagues to 
address the APL issue. However, the Dutch Presidency was mostly preoccupied by the 1997 
Intergovernmental Conference of Amsterdam and the landmines issue was not give a 
prominent place on the Presidency’s agenda. Nevertheless, the Dutch did maintain the 
landmines issue in EU discussions including in the CODUN meetings they were chairing. 
The Dutch Presidency encouraged the two opposing blocks to reach an agreement, but both 
blocks resisted vigorously to any change in their position. In May 1997, the CODUN finally 
recommended that the EU consider the Ottawa Process as an option, but maintained that it 
should continue to negotiate within the CD.39  
 
• Level III  
 
Several EU Member States that strongly supported the Ottawa Process adopted national 
legislation reflecting their support for a comprehensive ban.  Ireland, one of the first EU 
Member States to call for a comprehensive ban on landmines and the EU Presidency in the 
second-half of 1996, had cooperated with national NGOs to promote the ban. The Irish 
Campaign to Ban Landmines was launched in March 1994. In the following July, the 
Campaign was invited to do a presentation at the next meeting of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Parliament and to discuss the matter with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.40 
Irish NGOs intensively lobbied both the government and the opposition and, in 1996, a 
private bill was introduced in parliament for a unilateral ban on anti-personnel landmines. 
Initially, the government opposed the bill, but following further pressure from NGOs and 
public opinion, a legislative ban on anti-personnel landmines, the Explosive (Land Mines) 
Order, was adopted in June 1996. The Order prohibited the manufacture, sale or import of 
landmines, but did not apply to Irish Defence Forces. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Defence 
was asked to draft a review on the potential effects of the adoption of a ban on the use of 
anti-personnel landmines by the Defence Forces.41 Subsequently, the Irish government 
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agreed to support the comprehensive ban of landmines and became a member of the Core 
Group of the Ottawa Process. 
 
By the beginning of the Ottawa Process, two other states Belgium and the Netherlands were 
committed to a global comprehensive ban of landmines and strived to campaign for the 
Ottawa Convention in various international and European forums.42 By the end of 1996, 
these two countries adopted strict regulations regarding landmines. In Belgium, the early 
support of the government for a comprehensive ban on landmines had been opposed by the 
Ministry of Defence, which felt that by adopting such a strict position, Belgium would 
become isolated from its NATO allies. However, following the publication of studies 
questioning the use of landmines and suggesting theoretical arguments refuting the necessity 
of the use of APL, the Belgian Minister of Defence, Leo Delcroix agreed to support the 
comprehensive ban. Delcroix also believed that Belgium could become a symbol in the 
international community and gave his full support to the pro-ban stance of the Belgian 
government. 43  
 
During its EU Presidency, the Dutch government attempted to convince its EU colleagues to 
support the Ottawa Process. In the mid-1990s, both the Dutch Parliament and the Dutch 
Campaign to Ban Landmines had exerted strong pressure on the government to modify its 
policy on landmines. In August 1995, prior to the first session of the Review Conference, the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Defence, and for Development Cooperation stated in a letter 
to the Parliament that a comprehensive ban of landmines was, at this time, unrealistic due to 
the lack of international support.44 They also noted that the use of landmines by the military 
was still justifiable. However, a few months later, the government finally surrendered to 
mounting parliament pressure: the Ministry of Defence was asked to review the Dutch armed 
forces’ need of landmines. The findings of the review convinced the government to ban the 
use of landmines. In March 1996, the Netherlands adopted a comprehensive ban on the use 
and possession of landmines.  
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Prior to the first Ottawa Conference, Germany had made clear statements that supported a 
comprehensive ban on landmines. First, in April 1996, the federal Armed forces totally and 
unconditionally relinquished the right to use anti-personnel landmines; German stocks were 
destroyed immediately. In July 1996, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel 
introduced a “Seven-Point Action Program on Anti-personnel Mines” that  inter alia called 
for an international ban on APL. Germany’s early support for a comprehensive ban was 
facilitated by a number of factors. First, Kinkel personally campaigned for a total ban and 
maintained close relations with the Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy. Second, Kinkel’s 
party, the Free Democratic Party, which was part of the coalition forming the German 
government, was also openly pro-ban. Third, in contrast with many other EU Member States, 
the Germany Ministry of Defence had not opposed the idea of a comprehensive ban.45 
 
With the disappointing results of the Review Conference, the French government had also 
been pushed by public opinion to review its position. Before the beginning of the Ottawa 
Conference in October 1996, France announced that it would ban the use of anti-personnel 
landmines except in cases of absolute necessity to protect its armed forces.46 
 
At the end of the Review Conference, the UK had endorsed a major policy shift: it would 
support a ban on the use of anti-personnel landmines rather than restrictions on the use. Yet, 
it also made clear that it would only sign a mine ban treaty that was agreed by all members 
of the UN. The UK thus remained reticent to support the Ottawa Process arguing that the 
Conference on Disarmament was the most appropriate forum to develop an international 
instrument to van the use of these weapons. In January 1997, the debate on anti-personnel on 
landmines returned to the forefront of British politics. The media widely reported on a visit 
of Diana, Princess of Wales, to mine-infested regions of Angola for the British Red Cross. 
This visit as this was seen as an endorsement of the Labour party to support an international 
ban on landmines. While the Princess’ involvement in the landmines issue and her 
subsequent endorsement of the a worldwide ban on landmines was applauded by the Labour 
party, the NGO community and the Core Group of the Ottawa Process, a number of 
Conservative backbenchers criticized the Princess’ visit and statement by saying that the 
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position of the British government had been extremely careful and that her comments were 
not aligned with government policy.47 Throughout 1997, the Princess continued to work on 
the landmines issues with the British Red Cross and the Halo Trust, a UK NGO that 
specialized in the removal of anti-personnel landmines. While the Princess’ commitment to 
help landmines victims did not have a direct impact on the position of the Conservative 
government, it had two effects. First, with Diana’s visit to Angola and the criticism that 
followed, the difference between the policy of the Conservative party and the Labour policy 
on a comprehensive ban were highlighted. Second, British public opinion became 
increasingly aware of the debate regarding the ban on landmines and the British 
government’s position. In fact, “the Diana effect” brought exposure to NGOs such as the 
Halo Trusts and how their work would be made more effective by the adoption of a world-
wide ban on landmines.48         
4.5 En route to Ottawa: spring 1997-December 1997 
 
In April 1997, the EU remained divided as to a comprehensive ban on landmines. However, 
by June 1997, France and the United Kingdom had shifted their position toward the Ottawa 
Process. Both these states were now full participants in the next meeting of the Ottawa 
Process organized in Brussels.  
 
• Level I  
 
In late spring 1997, Austria produced and disseminated another version of the draft treaty to 
the ever increasing number of states that formed the Core Group. By June 1997, France and 
the United Kingdom as well as Portugal had agreed to join the Core Group of the Process. 
Brazil, Malaysia, New Zealand, Slovenia and Zimbabwe had also decided to support the 
Ottawa Process. From 24-27 June 1997, Belgium hosted an international conference where 
approximately 153 states rallied to the support a treaty banning landmines. The ICBL 
pressured the government to accept a treaty with no exceptions, no reservations, and no 
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loopholes. All 15 EU Member States were present at the Brussels Conference, with only 
Finland participating as an observer. At the end of the Conference, the Brussels Declaration 
was adopted by 97 states. The Declaration welcomed the convening of an international 
conference in September by Norway to negotiate a treaty banning landmines based on the 
Austrian draft treaty. Thirteen EU Member States signed the declaration at the end of the 
conference and agreed to go to Oslo. Finland and Greece were the only two EU Member 
States not to sign the Brussels declaration.49  
  
By the end of the Brussels Conference, several states that had favoured the Conference on 
Disarmament rather than the Ottawa Process began to reconsider their positions as little 
progress had been made in the Conference. Yet, a major actor, the United States, remained 
convinced that the treaty should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. The US 
had attended all Ottawa process meetings, but only as an observer. The United States 
remained convinced that the treaty should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. 
Although the US was present in Brussels in June 1997, it did not participate in the Brussels 
Conference, nor sign the Brussels declaration. The American delegation, in fact, held various 
bilateral meetings during the Brussels Conference in the attempt to persuade several states to 
focus on the Conference on Disarmament rather than the Ottawa Process. However, these 
efforts seemed to be vain as several states including four important EU Member States, 
France, the UK, Italy, and Spain decided to join the Ottawa Process in Brussels. The success 
of the Brussels Conference prompted the US delegation to realize that the Ottawa Process 
might actually succeed. On 18 August 1997, after difficult domestic negotiations, the United 
States announced their intention to officially join the Ottawa Process. While the Americans 
stated that while they would work “with the other participating nations to secure an 
agreement that achieves our humanitarian goals” at Oslo, they would also make sure that 
national security interests were protected.50  
 
When negotiations opened in Oslo on 1st September 1997, 87 states began negotiations on 
the final version of the ban treaty. For the first time in the Ottawa Process, the ICBL was 
permitted to have a delegation and to participate as an observer. The ICBL had been present 
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at all the meetings of the Ottawa Process, but was often only allowed to attend only the 
public sessions and was required to leave the room when formal negotiations began. Despite 
the opposition of a number of states, the Norwegian government, which was hosting the 
conference, decided to allow the ICBL representatives to participate as observers; this 
granted them the right to speak during the negotiations. 
 
The Oslo Conference began with the election of Jacob Selebi, the South African ambassador 
to the UN in Geneva, as the chairman of the Conference. Furthermore, participants agreed 
that decisions should be based upon a two-thirds majority vote.  As elected chair of the 
Conference, Ambassador Selebi decided not to spend time on opening statements. He wished 
that the first week of negotiations focused on reviewing the Austrian draft treaty and 
pointing out the contentious issues. He also asked the participants to deliver their proposed 
amendments in the first three days of negotiations. Following that working plan, more 
detailed negotiations were scheduled for the second week. The third week would be spent 
finalizing the text. 
 
Negotiations were difficult at Oslo. This was particularly due to the presence of the United 
States. During the first week of negotiations, the Americans made several propositions for 
changes and exceptions to the treaty. First, they desired a treaty that would not only include a 
geographical exception for the use of landmines in Korea, but also a change of in the 
definition of landmines that would allow the use of mixed-system anti-tank mines. Second, 
the US delegation also asked for a deferral period for compliance with certain provisions as 
well as the right to withdraw during certain armed conflicts.51 While some of amendments 
were supported by states such Australia and Japan, most of the American proposals were 
dismissed by the end of the second week of negotiations. 
 
At the beginning of the last week of the Oslo Conference, once the treaty had already been 
negotiated, the American delegation asked for a twenty-four hour delay to see if a 
                                                                                                                                          
50 See Wareham, op.cit., pp.234-235, and US Decision to Join Ottawa Process on Landmines, US 
Statement, “United States to join Ottawa Process”, Statement by White House Press Secretary, 18 
August 1997, in Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue no.17, July-August 1997. 
51 See  Wareham, op.cit., pp.234-235 
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compromise could be found.  Many pro-ban actors including the ICBL feared that states 
would succumb to the pressure of the superpower.52 This fear was accentuated when Canada, 
which had instigated the Ottawa Process, supported the American request. There was also an 
apprehension that the United Kingdom would support the Americans. However, the UK 
delegation remained silent on the issue. Most EU Member States fiercely defended the 
position that the treaty should not include any exceptions. The US delegation was unwilling 
to compromise on three specific issues: the right of withdrawal, the deferral period and the 
right to use anti-tank systems. Despite intense discussions between the American President 
Bill Clinton and the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, a compromise could not be 
reached on these issues. The American amendments were eventually withdrawn.53 On 17 
September 1997, after three weeks of intense negotiations, a Convention that 
comprehensively banned landmines was adopted by delegates without a vote.  
 
In December 1997, to the surprise of many states, of the ICBL and other NGOs, 122 states 
including 14 EU Member States signed the Convention on the prohibition of the use, 
stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction (the 
Ottawa Convention).54 Finland was the only EU Member States not to sign the Ottawa 
Convention but declared that it would not object to the Ottawa Treaty. Nevertheless, the 
Finnish delegation declared that it wished the treaty would soon enter into force. It also 
reiterated that it wished to eventually comply with the Ottawa Convention.55  
 
• Level II  
 
In the summer of 1997, it became clear that the Americans and their supporters would be 
unsuccessful in their endeavour to include the landmines issues on the CD agenda.56 Both 
France and the UK had now joined the rank of the pro-ban states. The shift in their position 
                                                 
52 NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security with  the cooperation of the UN Department 
for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Department of Public Information, The Future of Disarmament. 
Banning Nati-Personnel Land Mines: The Ottawa Process and Beyond, Edited transcripts of the Panel 
Discussion at the United Nations 21 October 1997, United Nations, New York, 1998. 
53 See ICBL, Landmines Monitor Report 2000 – Toward a Mine-Free World, New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 2000. 
54 On the Ottawa Convention, see ICRC, Banning anti-personnel mines: The Ottawa treaty explained, 
Geneva, ICRC, 1998. 
55 Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release, No.352, December 1997 
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was confirmed when, in May 1997, the German, French and British Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs jointly stated that they would give priority to the early conclusion of a legally-
binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of 
landmines57. Following the change in the UK and French position, Italy and Spain, which 
had been lukewarm toward the Ottawa Process, considered joining the process and attended 
the Oslo conference. However, Greece and Finland maintained their stance against a 
comprehensive ban on landmines.58  
 
With the opening for signature of the new ban-treaty approaching, Luxembourg, which now 
held the EU Presidency, suggested the adoption of a new reinforced Joint Action on 
landmines. Luxembourg argued that the EU could not afford to remain silent toward the 
Ottawa Process. The pro-ban Luxembourg, contrary to the last two presidencies Ireland and 
the Netherlands, had supported a dual-tracking approach of the Ottawa Process and the CD. 
This position made it easier for Luxembourg to discuss with the two camps. The pro-ban 
states saw an ally in Luxembourg. Conversely, Finland and Greece agreed to hold 
discussions with Luxembourg as they felt that it would not coerce them to adhere to the 
Ottawa Process. On a few occasions during the CODUN meetings, Luxembourg supported 
the EU Member States more reluctant to the ban to ensure that these states would at least still 
be part of a dialogue.59  
  
Shortly after the end of the Oslo Conference, Greece agreed to sign the Ottawa Convention. 
This left Finland as the only EU Member State that did not support a comprehensive ban. 
Finland, usually considered as a state highly involved on humanitarian and development 
assistance issues, felt pressured by its European colleagues to shift its position. However the 
Finns insisted that it was pointless to sign a treaty that they could neither ratify nor respect. 
In addition, they would not agree to support an EU joint action that they could not comply 
with. Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of consensus being reached within the EU, 
                                                                                                                                          
56 See Wareham, op.cit., pp.227-228. 
57 Long, op.cit.,p.436. 
58 See P. Chamberlain and D. Long, “Europe and the Ottawa Treaty: Compliance with Exceptions and 
Loopholes” in R. Matthews, B. Mcdonald and K.R. Rutherford (eds.), Landmines and Human 
Security, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2004, pp. 81-84. and  Z. Lachowski,  “The CD 
and the Ottawa Process: Rivals or Partners”, UNIDIR Newsletter, Special Issue on Landmines, 3, 
1997, pp.10-14. 
59 Long and Hindle, op.cit.,pp.260. 
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Finland made efforts not to undermine the EU’s attempts to find a cooperative solution on 
the APL question.60     
 
A few days before the opening of the Ottawa conference to sign the Ottawa Convention, the 
EU agreed to adopt three Joint actions regarding landmines. Two of the Joint Actions, 
97/818/CFSP and 97/819/CFSP were adopted to support activities of the Southern Africa 
Development Conference (SADC) and of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). But it was the Joint Action 97/817/CFSP that truly reflected that the EU Member 
States were still unable to find a common voice on the Ottawa Process. This Joint Action 
extended the moratorium already in place, but it did not prohibit the use or stockpiling of 
anti-personnel landmines. However, the adoption of this Joint Action ensured that even the 
potential non-signatories would be bound to respect the extended moratorium. In addition, 
although the EU welcomed the Ottawa Convention, it did not make any reference to the 
endorsement of the Ottawa Process and its resulting ban-treaty. Due to Finland’s opposition 
to a comprehensive ban and Greece’s reluctance to sign the ban treaty, the Joint Action may 




• Level III 
 
Luxembourg, which held the EU Presidency in the last few months of the Ottawa Process, 
played a significant role in creating a rapprochement between EU Member States that 
supported the Ottawa Process and those that favoured the CD. Luxembourg was neither a 
producer nor an exporter of anti-personnel landmines and in April 1996, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Poos and the Minister of Public Forces, Mr. Bodry, announced their 
support for an immediate ban on the production, stockpiling, export and use of anti-
personnel landmines.61  Luxembourg fully participated to the Ottawa Process but remained 
convinced that the Conference on Disarmament could produce tangible results.   
                                                 
60 Ibid., pp.260-261. 
61See “Luxembourg” in  ICBL, Landmines Monitor Report 1999 – Toward a Mine-Free World, New 




The role of Luxembourg in negotiations at the EU level should not be overlooked; however, 
there was a turning point in the negotiations when the United Kingdom and France joined the 
Ottawa Process in spring 1997. A number of domestic factors explain why both countries 
agreed to endorse the comprehensive ban. 
 
The British General Election of May 1997 brought a major shift in the UK’s position. Prior 
to the election, the Labour Party strongly affirmed its commitment to a comprehensive ban. 
But it was the Conservative government’s reservation about the Ottawa Process and a 
comprehensive ban that came under public scrutiny during the election campaign. Although 
in the last few months before the election John Major’s government had taken a number of 
steps toward a total ban, such as the adoption of a comprehensive moratorium on the export 
of landmines and the destruction of the British armed forces’ stocks of “dumb” mines, it was 
still reluctant to join the Ottawa Process.62 
 
With the Labour’s victory in May 1997, British policy on landmines rapidly shifted. A 
number of Labour MPs strongly supported the Ottawa Process and comprehensive ban on 
landmines including the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affair and the Commonwealth 
Robin Cook and the new Secretary of States for International Development, Claire Short 
(who had actively worked in the UK pro-ban campaign). At the end of the Brussels 
Conference, the UK agreed to attend the Oslo Conference and encouraged other states 
including its EU partners to join the Ottawa Process.  Contrary to what many had suspected, 
the British did not support the American position that the convention should include some 
exceptions. This was also surprising as the British Armed Forces and some voices within the 
Ministry of Defence continued to insist on the military utility of landmines63. Nevertheless, 
in December 1997, the United Kingdom signed the Ottawa Convention.  
 
Lastly, the shift in the French position was shaped by two events in the spring of 1997. 
Firstly, the fact that the newly elected British government supported not only the 
comprehensive ban, but also the Ottawa Process could not be ignored by Matignon and the 
                                                 
62 Long and Hindle, op.cit., p.237. 
63 Bowers and Dodd, op.cit., pp.11-17. 
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Élysée. Secondly, in June 1997, the Socialist Party won the parliamentary elections. Initially, 
the new Prime Minister Jospin had been a pro-ban supporter. In 1995, the Socialist party had 
introduced a draft to act toward a comprehensive ban. The new government included several 
pro-ban supporters which were placed in key posts such as in the Ministry of Defence and in 
the Ministry for Cooperation and for Development.64 Three weeks after the elections, France 
announced that it would sign the international treaty banning landmine and in Oslo, France 
strongly defended the comprehensive ban, especially against the United States’ attempts to 




This first case study suggests that the EU struggled to achieve internal effectiveness and thus 
had little external effectiveness. Up until the last phase of negotiations, division on the issue 
of a comprehensive ban was clearly visible. Although all EU Member States except Finland 
signed the Ottawa Convention, the EU member failed for a long period of time to agree on a 
common policy on landmines. In the end, all EU Member States, even the non-signatory, 
gave their support to the Ottawa Convention.  
 
This case study also revealed factors affecting the EU’s effectiveness at three different levels 
of negotiations. This analysis has shown that a number of factors increased the European 
Union’s effectiveness. The position of France, Germany and the UK regarding the ban had a 
sharp influence on the EU’s effectiveness: Germany’s early support for the Ottawa Process 
was considered crucial by the pro-ban movement. In addition, once the UK and France had 
joined the Ottawa Process in June 1997, several EU Member States that had been more 
reluctant to join the Process, decided to give their full support for the adoption of a 
comprehensive ban. The role of the ICBL and the pressure of public opinion on governments 
to change their landmines policy certainly also had an effect on the EU’s effectiveness. 
 
                                                 
64 Chabasse, op, cit., p.66. 
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This chapter has also revealed factors that hindered the EU in being united in negotiations on 
landmines. First, the fact that the Conference on Disarmament was based on consensus 
represented a clear obstacle for the pro-ban EU Member States. Second, the position of 
United States may explain why the EU did not initially support to the Ottawa Process: some 
EU Member States strongly supported the US initiative to revive negotiations on landmines 
in the Conference on Disarmament. Third, this case has revealed that opposition of the 
ministry of defence to support a comprehensive ban played a key role in shaping the position 
of several EU governments. 
  
This case has shown a small number of EU Member States, including Austria, Belgium and 
the Netherlands, were deeply committed to achieving a comprehensive ban and worked 
actively within the UN, but also in the Ottawa Process to encourage other EU Member States 
to take a stance on the issue. However, ultimately, the European Union’s role as an actor was 
quite limited in the negotiations on the ban on landmines. The successful completion of an 
agreement which prohibited landmines should be attributed to the work of specific EU 





The Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Missed 
Opportunity for the EU?  
5.1 Introduction 
 
Following the success of the international efforts to ban landmines, various international 
actors including the United Nations, numerous EU states, and NGOs believed that the 
international community should use the momentum to ban landmines and to address another 
pressing human security problem: the proliferation of small arms and light weapons 
(SALW). In contrast to the case of landmines, the positions of the EU Member States on the 
SALW issue seemed to converge. In fact, the EU and its Member States had been active on 
SALW issues since the late 1990s. In 1997, the EU adopted a Programme for Preventing and 
Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. A year later, the EU Code of 
conduct on Arms export that covered SALW exports was introduced. When the issue of 
SALW was introduced on the UN agenda, the EU was one of the most vocal actors to 
support UN action taken to reduce the proliferation of this type of weapon: the EU supported 
the idea of strong international guidelines to limit the spread of SALW. However, since 
1997, the international community has failed to adopt any legally binding agreement on this 
issue or even to agree to international guidelines in this area.   
 
This case study examines the factors that have influenced the EU’s effectiveness as an actor 
in UN negotiations regarding the illicit trade in SALW. This analysis is divided into four 
sections. First, the emergence of the question of SALW on the international agenda and the 
initial response of the EU to this new challenge is examined. Then two different phases of 
negotiations on the question of SALW at the United Nations are analyzed (see Table 5.1).  
This first phase of negotiations will be examined in two parts: the first section covers the 
first years (1998-2001) of the international campaign to address the problem of SALW. 
Negotiations during the UN Small Arms Conference of 2001 constitute the second part of 
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this phase. The second phase of negotiations that will be analyzed also includes two parts. 
The first section examines the various negotiations (from 2001 to 2006) that followed the 
UN Small Arms Conference. The second section of this phase covers the UN Review 
Conference of 2006. In each phase, all three levels of negotiations- international (Level I), 
EU (Level II) and domestic (Level III)- are considered. The chapter concludes by identifying 
factors that might have influenced the EU’s effectiveness as an actor on the issue of SALW. 
Table 5.1 SALW Case: Phases of Negotiations 
 
Phase of Negotiations  
Phase 1: Negotiations 
from January 1998 to 
June 2001 (Part I)  
and 
2001 Small Arms 
Conference (Part II) 
 
 
 May 1998, February and July 1999- The Group of Governmental 
Experts on Small Arms holds three formal sessions. 
 
28 February-3 March 2000: First session of the Preparatory Committee 
for the 2001 Small Arms Conference 
 
8-19 January 2001: Second session of the Preparatory Committee for 
the 2001 Small Arms Conference 
 
19-30 March 2001: Third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 
2001 Small Arms Conference.  
 
 9-20 July 2001: The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects is held in New York. The 
Programme of Action (PoA) is adopted. 
 
 
Phase 2: Negotiations 
from January 2001 to 
June 2006 (Part I) 
and  
the UN Small Arms 





7-11 July 2003: First Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the 
Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its 
Aspects is held in New York. 
 
11-15 July 2005: Second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the 
Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its 
Aspects is held in New York. 
 
9-20 January 2006: The Preparatory Committee of the 2006 Review 
Conference meets in New York. 
 
26 June-7 July 2006: The UN Small Arms Review Conference is held in 





5.2 The Global challenge of small arms and light weapons 
 
The concerns for the spread of the SALW attracted the international community’s attention 
only at the beginning of the 1990s. Small arms and light weapons constitute the types of 
armament that are most frequently used in conflicts. SALW are responsible for the majority 
of armed conflict deaths and are used in more than 40% of homicides worldwide.1 SALW 
are commonly used by armed forces and police forces in most countries and can also be 
legally owned by private citizens in several states. In contrast to other types of armaments 
such as nuclear warheads, the exact number of SALW in circulation in the world is difficult 
to establish. In 2006, the estimated number of SALW in existence was around 640 million.2 
However, estimations of the number of SALW are constrained because of the lack of data 
available.  
 
Although they are the most frequently used weapons since 1945, SALW were almost 
completely left out of the disarmament agenda during the Cold War. Krause argues that there 
are three main reasons why these weapons were overlooked. First, the effects of SALW were 
limited to certain conflict zones and not regarded as a global problem. Second, most 
disarmament instruments during the Cold War were developed to responded to nuclear 
threats and other weapons of mass destruction, threats that appeared more urgent than the 
SALW problem. Third, conventional weapons were not considered as a proliferation issue: 
the right to self-defence included the right to possess conventional weapons such as SALW. 
Furthermore, small arms were legally used by civilians and the question of regulation was 
considered a national question3. However, with the end of the Cold War and the changing 
dynamics in world politics that followed, the problem of SALW started to generate an 
interest in the international community. The fact was that small arms were massively used in 
the internal conflicts that erupted in the 1990s and even directly contributed to the expansion 
of these conflicts. The effects of small arms and light weapons could no longer be ignored. 
                                                 
1 See Small Arm Survey, Small Arms Survey 2006 – Unfinished Business, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2006. 
2 Ibid. 
3 K. Krause, The Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 3rd International Security Forum and 
1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institute, 
“Networking the Security Community in the Information Age”, Workshop 5D: Arms Control and 




The global trade of SALW exploded after the end of the Cold War. Many ex-satellite states 
of the two superpowers were left with a large surplus of weapons accumulated as a 
precaution to possible war. These amounts often surpassed basic security needs and many 
countries, especially those from the former Soviet bloc, began selling their arms surplus to 
other states and to non-states actors. Furthermore, during the Cold War, the global arms trade 
was conceived in geo-political terms. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, arms 
producers and suppliers could no longer rely on their traditional clients and struggled to find 
new markets to sell their products. The law of supply and demands dictated the arms trade, 
which lead to the depoliticization and to the increased commercialization of this trade. In the 
end, the combination of these two phenomena produced weaker controls and loosened the 
tacit Cold War agreement that arms should be sold only between states.4  
 
The SALW issue became part of the wider human security agenda that emerged at the 
beginning at the 1990s. As in the landmines case, NGOs and international organizations 
were confronted daily with the effects of the use of SALW.  In the early 1990s, several UN 
peacekeeping and peace-building operations in states such as Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina were directly affected by the spread of SALW. In a report in 1999, the UN 
Institute for Disarmament Research identified the spread of weapons among combatants and 
non-combatants entities as a major source of instability in societies, causing internal conflicts 
and providing an obstacle to long term stability and peace.5 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) has highlighted the following features of SALW to explain why these 
weapons have played such a major role in internal conflicts. First, SALW enjoy a higher 
durability than other weapons and yet require minimal maintenance. These weapons are easy 
to handle and do not require logistical support or elaborate training. Second, SALW are easy 
to transport and can be carried by individuals. Third, SALW are legitimately used by armed 
and police forces in most countries but may also be legally owned by individuals. Fourth, the 
production of small arms for military, policy and civilians use has meant that the number of 
suppliers has burgeoned; the wide availability of these weapons has also caused the prices to 
                                                 
4 J. Spear, “Arms and Arms Control” in B. White, R. Little and M. Smith (eds.), Issues in World 
Politics, 3rd ed., Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp.105-106. 
5 See M. Donowaki, “Prologue” in L. Lumpe (ed), Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues, 
Aldershot, UNIDIR-Ashgate Publishing Limited, May 1999,  p.xvi. 
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fall below the cost of production. Finally, the technology advancements in the arms industry 
have meant that a single weapon can become a lethal threat to society.6  
 
These factors played a role in the emergence of the SALW issue on the international agenda. 
The issue of global arms trade was first addressed at the UN in the 1960s and the 1970s. Ten 
years later, during the Third Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament 
(SSOD III), the question of “demand and supply” of conventional weapons was also 
discussed. At this Special Session the Federal Republic of Germany in a statement on behalf 
of the twelve Member States of the European Community7  joined other actors such as the 
UN Secretary-General and the League of Arab States in requesting the international 
community to examine the role of the production and transfer of conventional weapons in 
international security problems. These actors also emphasized the need for international 
cooperation to control the proliferation of these weapons8. 
    
A few months later, at the Forty-Third Session of the General Assembly, the first UN 
resolution on arms transfer9 (A/RES/43/75-I) was adopted. Based on resolutions introduced 
by Italy and Columbia, this resolution expressed the conviction of the international 
community that all aspects of arms transfers deserved serious consideration. For the first 
time, the UN member states recognized that arms transfers had potential effects in areas 
where tension and internal conflict threatened international peace and security and had 
potential negative effects on the process of peaceful social and economic development of 
populations. The resolution also highlighted the increasing impact of the illicit trafficking of 
arms.  
 
Following the First Gulf War in May 1991, President Bush was the first world leader to 
appeal to major suppliers of conventional arms, which included all the permanent members 
                                                 
6 ICRC, Arms availability and the situation of civilians in armed conflict: a study presented by the 
ICRC, Geneva, ICRC Publication, 1999, p.6. 
7 See UNGA Document, A/S-15/43 
8 G. Uribe de Lozano “The United Nations and the Control of Light Weapons” in J. Boutwell and 
M.T. Klare (eds.), Light Weapons and Civil Conflict. Controlling the Tools of Violence, Lanham, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999, p.163. 
9 See UNGA Resolution A/RES/46/36 
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of the UN Security Council, to observe a general code of responsible arms transfer10. A few 
months later the UN Register of Conventional Arms was established with the adoption of a 
resolution entitled “Transparency in armaments”. The Resolution also reaffirmed the vital 
role of the United Nations in encouraging efforts to reduce the proliferation of the illicit 
trafficking of conventional arms.  
  
At the beginning of the 1990s, the issue of the illicit trade of conventional arms, more 
particularly of small arms and light weapons, was becoming increasingly present on the UN 
agenda. More states including the members of the Security Council began to encourage the 
international community to act to control the spread of SALW. Concrete efforts to achieve 
international agreements on the illicit trade in small arms were to be revitalized in 1995 
when the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali became involved in the efforts to 
find solution to the problem of SALW. In the Supplement to Agenda for Peace, the 
Secretary-General highlighted the importance of addressing the issue of what he calls 
“micro-disarmament,” which he defined as the “practical disarmament in the context of the 
conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light 
weapons, which are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands.”11  
 
Following the Secretary-General’s appeal in the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace and due 
to growing concern for the negative effects of the SALW on peacekeeping operations, the 
UNGA adopted a resolution that requested the Secretary-General to create a panel of experts 
to examine the effects of SALW and to investigate “the ways and means to prevent and 
reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light 
weapons, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflicts.”12  
 
The Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms released its report in August 1997. The 
report was a comprehensive study of the causes and effects of the increasing stocks of 
SALW and gave specific recommendations for the prevention and reduction of the negative 
effects of the increasing weapon accumulation. One of the most important recommendations 
of the Panel was that the United Nations “should consider the possibility of convening an 
                                                 
10 US Department of State, Dispatch, vol. 2, no. 22, 03/06/1991. 
11 See UNGA Document A/50/60 – S/1995/1, Paragraph 60. 
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international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects.”13 In December 1997, only 
a few days after the opening for signature of the Ottawa Convention, the UNGA asked the 
Secretary-General to create a new group of governmental experts on SALW and to start 
planning an international conference on the illicit trade of small arms.14  
    
5.3 Negotiations from 1997 to 2001 and the 2001 UN Conference on the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects 
 
It would take several years of negotiations before the UN member states would agree on the 
modalities of a UN conference on the illicit trade of SALW. Several rounds of intense 
negotiations were required to find consensus among the UN member states on what issues 
should be addressed in the conference. During this preparation period, several international 
actors, including the European Union, strongly advocated the need to adopt international 
guidelines to curb the spread of SALW. Finally, a UN Conference on Small Arms was 
convened in July 2001. During the two weeks of intense negotiations in New York, the EU 




• Level I 
 
Part I: Negotiations from January 1998 to 2001 
 
The year 1997 was an eventful year for advocates of human security issues. The international 
efforts to ban the use of one conventional weapons, anti-personnel landmines, had lead to 
creation of an international convention that was signed by more than 120 countries in Ottawa 
in December 1997. The issue of landmines and SALW having a number of similitudes, 
                                                                                                                                          
12 See UNGA Resolution A/RES/50/70 B 
13 See UNGA Document A/52/298, p.23 
14 See UNGA Document A/52/38J 
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SALW were already considered as the next human security issue that the international 
community should address.  
 
Several countries and NGOs involved in the Ottawa process began envisaging a similar type 
of process to tackle the SALW issue. In fact, during the signing ceremony of the Ottawa 
Convention, NGOs delegates held a working session on SALW and circulated the idea of an 
Ottawa process in this field. However, in contrast to the landmines case, the idea of the 
adopting of a comprehensive ban of SALW was not considered. Indeed, small arms were 
used by armed forces, police forces and, in several states, legally owned by civilians. The 
international community quickly realized that to respond to the SALW issue, the approach 
would need to be much broader and address multiple SALW-related issues. 
 
A few months after the Ottawa Process, a group of like-minded states (including Austria and 
Belgium) that had worked actively on the landmine issues organized three meetings on 
SALW issue: the meetings took place in Norway (July 1998), in Canada (August 1998) and 
in Belgium (October 1998). Several EU Member States including France, Germany and the 
UK were actively involved in these meetings. At the United Nations, in April 1998, the 
Secretary-General appointed a new group of governmental experts, the Group of 
Governmental Experts on Small Arms. One of the first tasks of the new Group of experts 
was to consult UN member states regarding the convening of an international conference on 
SALW. In fact, in December 1998, the UNGA had agreed to convene an international 
conference on the illicit arms trade by 2001.15 The Group of Governmental Experts on Small 
Arms held three formal sessions: one in May 1998 and two other sessions in February and in 
July 1999. The Group not only considered the views of UN member states regarding an 
international conference on small arms, but also consulted with academic experts, NGOs 
delegates, and representatives from the arms industry.  
 
In April 1999, Germany presented the EU position to the Group of Experts. The European 
Union believed that “[t]he conference should address both the preventive and reactive 
aspects of the small arms problem and envisage effective ways and means to combat and 
contribute to ending the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms; to contribute 
                                                 
15 See UNGA Resolution A/RES/53/77 E 
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to the reduction of existing accumulations of these weapons to levels consistent with the 
legitimate security needs of countries; and to help solve the problems caused by such 
accumulations.”16 Furthermore, in the EU’s view, the objective of the conference “could be 
politically binding guidelines or a legally binding instrument. The conference should equally 
adopt a programme of action encompassing all areas of possible international cooperation in 
small arms.”17 A few months later, the Netherlands took the presidency of the UN Security 
Council and initiated a debate on the issue. Both France and the UK in their addresses to the 
UNSC highlighted the need for the international community to act on the problem.18    
 
The EU clearly favoured an international conference on SALW that would achieve strong 
commitments. The European Union, supported by several states including Japan and Canada, 
also believed that the Conference should address broader questions of arms holding, inter-
states transfer and assistance to countries in conflict19. The EU’s position was also supported 
by the creation of IANSA, the International Network on Small Arms in May 1999. The main 
aims of IANSA were to raise awareness about the impact of small arms and to convince 
governments to adopt specific measures to tackle the spread of SALW20. IANSA gave its full 
support to the UN initiative to convene an international conference on SALW and encourage 
the adoption of strong international commitments.  However, a number of UN member states 
were apprehensive about the conclusion of international agreements on the issue. Several 
Latin American, Asian and Middle Eastern states wanted to limit the mandate of the 
Conference to combat of the illicit trade in small arms.   
 
The United States was also reluctant to give its full support to an international conference 
that might address issues such as national legislation or transfer to non-states actors. The US 
had been very active in the early 1990s in acknowledging problems caused by the spread of 
small arms. In 1995, prior to the 50th General Assembly, President Clinton stressed the 
importance of addressing the issue of “grey markets” that equipped terrorists and criminal 
                                                 
16 See UNGA Document A/54/260 
17 Ibid. 
18 See UN Security Council Document S/PV.4048. 
19 Small Arms Survey “Chapter 5- Reaching Consensus in New York: the 2001 UN Small Arms 
Conference” in Small Arms Survey 2002- Counting the Human Costs, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p.210. 
20 See www.iansa.org 
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with firearms.21 From 1996 to 1999, the US developed a comprehensive approach to tackle 
the proliferation of SALW including the adoption of a statute on arms brokering and of 
amendments to its Foreign Assistance Act to gain more control of arms exports.22  However, 
this approach also included “red-lines” that defined areas that should not be discussed with 
regards to conventional weapons. These areas were mostly delimited to respond to the 
demands of the powerful arms industry and the pro-gun lobby.23 In contrast to the EU’s 
position, the US and other key actors emphasized that they privileged national or regional 
approaches rather than the adoption of international guidelines to respond to the spread of 
SALW. 24  
 
In August 1999 the Group of Governmental Experts of Small Arms presented its report25 in 
that it recommended that the conference should concentrate on developing international 
efforts to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all aspects. The Group 
argued that the main objectives of the Conference should include the development and 
strengthening of norms and measures at the international, regional and national level to 
prevent and to combat the illicit trade of SALW.  The Group stressed that the Conference 
should mainly focus on the issue of the illegal arms trade, but also acknowledged the link 
between the legal transfers of SALW and the illicit trafficking of SALW and urged the 
Conference to consider this connection. Despite the reticence of some UN member states, in 
December 1999, a UNGA Resolution confirmed that a United Nations Conference on the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects would be convened in 
June/July 2001 and established a preparatory committee that would hold at least three 
sessions.26 
 
The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) held three tumultuous sessions between February 
2000 and March 2001.  The first session of the PrepCom  (28 February-3 March 2000) 
                                                 
21 “Remarks by the President to the U.N. General Assembly”, 22 October 1995, The White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, New York - http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/other/unspeech.html  
accessed on 01/10/2006. 
22 See L. Bondi “U.S. Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons”, Naval War College Review, Winter 
2006, vol.59, no.1, pp.123-124: and L. Lumpe “U.S. Policy and the Exports of Light Weapons” in J. 
Boutwell and M.T. Klare, Light Weapons and Civil Conflict. Controlling the Tools of Violence, 
Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999, pp.65-87. 
23 Bondi, op.cit., p.123., 
24 See Small Arms Survey, op.cit., p.209. 
25See UNGA Document A/54/258 
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achieved little as most of the robust discussions surrounded the procedural aspects of the 
conference including the participation of NGOs. Nevertheless, the states were invited to 
explain their position regarding a proposed programme of action (PoA) that would constitute 
the conference outcome document. States agreed on the need to adopt measures to address 
the illicit arms trade such as stronger border controls, effective enforcement of the UN arms 
embargoes and the development of measures in marking and tracing of SALW. All states 
also agreed that states had the right to acquire, export, and use SALW. However, issues such 
as national legislation and the transfer to non-state actors remained controversial.  
 
At the second session of the PrepCon in January 2001, negotiations on the text of the 
programme of action began.  A first draft of the PoA was issued a month before the session 
and outlined measures  to be taken in areas such as the illicit manufacturing, acquisition, 
stockpiling and transfer of small arms, the collection and destruction of illicit and surplus 
small arms, civilian possession, post-conflict situations and transparency and exchange of 
information.  A number of delegations including the United States expressed their objections 
at the inclusion of some of these issues. The document was also criticized for being too 
complicated and repetitive.27 
  
In December 2000, the EU adopted a Plan of Action on small arms28 hoping that most of its 
elements would be integrated in the PoA. The Plan of Action clearly reflected the priorities 
of the EU with regard to the Conference and the eventual programme of action.  These 
priorities included a commitment to international law and human rights, an emphasis on the 
link between security and development, the promotion of strict national legislation to 
sanction the illicit possession of SALW and the adoption of global standards for marking of 
SALW. The EU also suggested convening a “Review Conference” of the programme of 
action in 2005. The EU Plan of Action was not completed soon enough to be integrated in 
the first draft of the PoA; however, some of the EU’s priorities were fully integrated into the 
second draft of the PoA proposed in February 2001.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
26See UNGA Resolution A/RES/54/54 
27Small Arms Survey, op.cit., p.208. 
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During the first two session of the PrepCom, the European Union intensely campaigned for 
the introduction of stringent international commitments on SALW, commitments that would 
be consistent with the policies already adopted at the EU level. Other countries such as 
Australia and South Africa adopted a more reserved approach to the PoA, while some 
countries argued that the adoption of commitments at the international level might overlook 
the specific needs of various regions. Frictions between the EU and several states of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) became apparent during the PrepCom. 
A number of SADC countries including South Africa openly opposed the EU’s suggestion to 
include strict international commitments in several areas, including export controls. 
 
The second draft of the programme of action was more concise and received an encouraging 
reception at the third session of the PrepCom. The global support for the PoA, which was 
mainly due the removal of most contentious issues contained in the first draft, was noticeably 
present in few months prior to the UN Small Arms Conference.29 Negotiations at the 
Conference were nevertheless difficult and extremely demanding of certain actors, including 
the European Union. 
 
 
Part II: The 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects  
 
The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All 
Aspects began in New York on 9 July 2001. During the last session of the PrepCom, states 
had agreed that the first week of the Conference would be reserved for statements at the 
ministerial level. On the first day of the Conference, Belgium, speaking on behalf of the EU, 
stated the EU’s priorities for the Conference: concrete results should be achieved in the 
implementation of exports controls and exports principles, in the development of an 
international instrument on marking, tracing, and brokering. The EU also believed that issues 
of management of stockpile and surpluses and their destruction, of the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, and of assistance with the 
                                                 
29 Small Arms Survey, op.cit.., p.208. 
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implementation of the measures adopted should also be addressed. Finally, the EU also 
insisted on the importance of a follow-up to the Conference.30 This strong position of the EU 
on a number of issues, particularly on export controls, arms brokering and transparency in 
arms exports and imports was warmly welcomed by numerous states as well as NGO 
delegates present at the Conference. 
 
The reception given to the US statement given by John Bolton, the US Under-Secretary for 
State for Arms Control and International Security, a few hours later could not have been 
more of a contrast. Bolton was extremely critical of the programme of action and listed a 
number of aspects of the draft PoA that the United States could not support. Bolton clearly 
stated that the United States would not support a document that contained measures 
regarding the legal trade and legal manufacturing of SALW, the promotion of international 
advocacy activity by international organizations or NGOS, measures that would prohibit 
civilian possession of SALW (Bolton even evoked the American Constitutional right to bear 
arms) and measures limiting trade in SALW to governments. The United States also opposed 
a mandatory Review Conference or any legally binding instruments on SALW. 31 On most 
issues the EU and US positions were diametrically opposed.    
  
During this first week of the Conference, the President of the Conference, the Colombian 
Ambassador Camilo Reyes Rodriguez, gave states the opportunity to comment on the latest 
version of the draft PoA. The President felt that only a new draft could achieve consensus.32 
On Monday 16 July, the President offered a first revised version of the draft PoA.33 This new 
version integrated some issues reviewed during the first week of negotiations. However, a 
number of contentious matters remained in the document, including the civilian possession 
of small arms, export controls, the transfer to non-state actors, and a follow-up to the 
Conference. This revised version would be the centre of intense negotiations during the 
second week of the Conference. Agreements on a number of paragraphs had not been 
                                                 
30 See Statement by Louis Michel on behalf of the EU at the Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects. New York, 09/07/2001. 
31 Statement by John R. Bolton, US Under-Secretary for State for Arms Control and International 
Security, UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects, 
09/07/2001.  
32 Small Arms Survey, op.cit., p.218. 
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achieved by Thursday, 19 July and on the last day of the Conference, President Reyes 
presented a series of proposals that suggested using new language for problematic issues.34  
 
The EU, which at beginning of the Conference had fervently defended its position, gradually 
agreed to abandon some of its priorities. The EU as well as Canada, Costa Rica, and several 
African countries had argued that the link between the illicit trade of SALW and the 
violation of human rights and international humanitarian law should be recognized in the 
programme of action. This position, however, was disregarded when it was fiercely opposed 
by a  number of states including China which would not support an outcome document that 
contained a reference to human rights violations.35 The EU also supported the adoption of 
strict exports criteria and suggested a set of criteria inspired by the EU Code of Conduct on 
Arms Transfer. The Arab League states and China vigorously opposed this set of criteria that 
were perceived as potentially restricting their access to SALW exports.36 Finally, the term 
“export criteria” was not included in the final version of the programme. The EU and Canada 
supported a follow-up to the Conference that would not only review the implementation of 
the programme of action, but also examine the adoption of new measures. Again, this 
suggestion faced strong opposition and was not included in the PoA.37 However, it was two 
other priorities of the EU, civilian possession and transfer to non-states group that became 
the most important obstacles to the achievement of consensus. This clear absence of 
consensus led to the prolongation of negotiations to the 21st July. 
 
Indeed, negotiations on the programme of action continued late on the night of the 20th as 
obvious impasse remained on two major issues: transfer to non-state actors and civilian 
ownership. The Americans, who from the beginning tenaciously refused to support a 
programme of action that would cover these issues, offered to allow a follow-up conference 
in exchange for the removal of these two issues from the Programme. This offer did not 
please the African bloc, the region most affected by the proliferation of SALW, which 
                                                                                                                                          
33 See United Nations, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in All its Its Aspects, New York 9-10 July 2001, New York, United Nations, 
A/CONF.192/L.5, 2001. 
34 See I. Berkol La Conférence des Nations Unies de juillet 2001 sur les armes légères – Analyse des 
processus et de ses résultats, Bruxelles, GRIP, 2001, p.25.     
35 Small Arms Survey, op.cit., p.221. 




refused to delete the two paragraphs. At 6.00 am on Saturday 21 July, the African countries 
submitted and accepted the deletion of the paragraphs on civilian possession and the sale to 
non-states actors. In exchange, they requested a strong statement by President Reyes that 
would explain their decision. In its final statement, President Reyes expressed his 
“disappointment over the Conference’s inability to agree, due to the concerns of one state, on 
language recognizing the need to establish and maintain control over private ownership of 
these deadly weapons and the need for preventing sales of such arms to non-state group.” He 
also added that Africa “had agreed only with the greatest reluctance to the deletion of 
proposed language addressing these vital issues” and that they did so “strictly in the interest 
of reaching a compromise the world community to proceed with the first steps at the global 
level to alleviate this common threat.”38 The Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects39 was 
formally adopted by consensus in the afternoon of Saturday, 21 July.   
 
• Level II  
 
As soon as the issue of SALW emerged on the international agenda, the European Union 
rapidly became an important advocate of the need to address this issue. EU activities in the 
area of development assistance, humanitarian aid, and conflict prevention were directly 
affected by the proliferation of SALW. More importantly several EU Member States were 
among the largest producers of SALW and quickly recognized that an increasing portion of 
their small arms production were being “recycled” and illegally sold on the global arms 
market.  Discussion among EU Member States on the issue of small arms had been initiated 
in the late 1980s. Like the case of landmines, EU actions on small arms and light weapons 
would fall under the Common Foreign and Security Policy; the production and export of 
small arms remained within the competence of the EU Member States.40 During the 1970s 
and 1980s, a number of measures regarding arms exports had been agreed in the European 
                                                                                                                                          
37 Small Arms Survey, op.cit., p.227. 
38 See United Nations, Annex- Statement by the President of the Conference after the adoption of the 
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Political Cooperation framework including decisions to establish arms embargoes.41  
However, the first step in addressing the small arms issue at the EC/EU level was taken in 
1991, following the end of the Gulf War. The EC Council adopted seven criteria to be 
considered by Member States when governing arms exports. An eighth criterion was adopted 
in June 1992. These criteria covered issues such as the internal and regional situation in the 
country of final destination, the country’s human rights record, its behaviour with regards to 
terrorism and the economic effects of the export on the purchasing country.42   
 
The growing international awareness of the SALW at the international level in the mid-
1990s influenced EU discussions on the issue. At the EU level, the Netherlands who, during 
its Presidency, drafted several proposals on how the EU should tackle the illicit arms trade, 
took the first concrete initiative.  In June 1997, the EU Council of Ministers finally adopted a 
Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arm.43 This 
programme was a political declaration and not a legally binding agreement. Nevertheless, it 
provided a framework for addressing the SALW issues. It also reiterates the EU’s support for 
international processes tackling the illicit arms trade and more specifically, for several UN 
initiatives in this area. 
 
A few months later during its presidency of the EU, the United Kingdom convinced its 
European colleagues to agree to a code of conduct on arms exports. In February 1998, the 
United Kingdom, supported by France, proposed a first draft of the Code. Three months of 
intense negotiations followed in the COARM working group.44 The EU Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports was formally adopted by the General Affairs Council in June 1988. The Code 
of Conduct stemmed from the eight criteria agreed to by the EU Member States in 1991 and 
                                                                                                                                          
40 See I. Anthony, “Appendix 8C- European Union approaches to arms control, non-proliferation and 
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41 Ibid., p.609. 
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1992 and is a politically, rather than a legally binding agreement. The Code includes two 
main sections: The first section capitalizes on the eight criteria adopted in 1991 and 1992 and 
sets guidelines that should govern arms exports by EU Member States. The second section 
proposes operative measures for notification and cooperation between the EU Member States 
on the grant of export licenses. It also suggests that each Member State should circulate a 
confidential annual report on its defence exports and on its implementation of the Code of 
Conduct to other EU partners.45    
 
In December 1998, under the Austrian presidency, a “Joint Action on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons” 46 was adopted. This Joint Action suggested objectives and measures to combat 
the destabilizing accumulation and spread of SALW. It states that the EU “shall aim at 
building consensus in the relevant forums [e.g. the UN] for the realisation of […] measures 
to prevent the further destabilising accumulation of small arms”. The Joint Action proposed 
the establishment of national inventories of legally owned arms owned by the authorities of 
EU Member States, the establishment of strict national arms legislation with regards to 
SALW and measures to increase transparency and openness. The Joint Action also provided 
financial and technical assistance to specific actions in the field of SALW including 
programmes and projects conducted by the United Nations.  
 
With the adoption of these agreements, the EU developed a more harmonized approach to 
SALW. When the Panel of Experts began consultation on a programme of action in 2000, 
the EU had already defined a strong and united position regarding measures to combat the 
illicit trade of SALW.47 Many elements of the various EU agreements were incorporated in 
the EU Plan of Action that was adopted under the French presidency in December 1999.  
France also ensured that the SALW was on the agenda of two summits with international 
partners. In December 1999, at the EU-US Summit, the EU and the United States issued a 
statement on the adoption of common principles on SALW and on an action plan. The EU 
                                                 
45 European Union, EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Council document 8675/2/98 Rev.2, 
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and the United States pledged to enhance their cooperation and to support the UN 
Conference on Small Arms.48  A few days earlier, the EU and Canada had established a joint 
working group on SALW and had agreed to work closely to ensure that the UN Conference 
on Small arms would bring about “effective guidelines or legally binding instruments as well 
as a Programme of Action encompassing all areas of international cooperation in small 
arms”.49 
 
A few weeks prior to the beginning of the UN Small Arms Conference, the European 
Commission with the support of the Swedish Presidency published a report called Small 
Arms and Light Weapons- The response of the European Union.50 The report stated the EU’s 
objectives for the UN Small Arms Conference and was produced with the plan to distribute it 
during the meeting in New York. 
 
 
• Level III  
 
Several EU Member States are important exporters of small arms and light weapons. In 
1995, when the UN Secretary-General appealed for the address of the small arms issue, the 
EU accounted for 33% of total arms export.51 During the 1990s, the debate on the trade of 
small arms materialized in various EU Member States. This debate was fuelled by various 
elements including studies showing that large quantities of arms were smuggled through the 
EU and brokered by EU companies and individuals. According to a study undertaken by the 
NGO Saferworld in 1998, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom were the EU counties 
most implicated in this illicit trade in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa.52 The study revealed 
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that several Belgian companies and individuals were brokering illicit deals and that Belgian 
seaports and airports were used as transit points for the illicit trade. It also argued that arms 
manufactured in France and the United Kingdom were used in Sudan and French 
manufactured arms also found their way to Rwanda and Zaire. In addition to this increasing 
awareness of the negative effects of the illicit trade of SALW, domestic controls also 
increased in several EU countries during this period.  
 
In the United Kingdom, following the killing of children and a teacher in Dunblane, Scotland 
by a lone gunman in March 1996, the British government considered the adoption of the ban 
of private ownership of handguns. In February 1997, the Conservative government passed a 
law banning private possession of handguns greater than .22 calibre. A few months later, the 
newly elected Labour government went even further and a comprehensive ban of handguns 
was passed by both the House of Commons and the House of Lords in November 1997.53  
 
Additionally, as early as 1994, a number of NGOs based in the United Kingdom, including 
Saferworld, British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the World 
Development Movement began to develop a Code of Conduct on arms trade based on the 
eight common criteria agreed by EU Member States in 1991 and 1992. Four years later, 
during its EU presidency, the UK proposed a similar Code of Conduct that would ultimately 
be adopted in the summer of 1998.  A few months earlier, in February 1998, the Labour 
government organized a meeting with customs and intelligence officers to discuss 
approaches in the fight against the illicit trade of SALW and to examine areas wherein 
potential cooperation, regional and international, would be achievable. In May 1998, the 
British government also helped organize a conference in South Africa to discuss ways to 
implement the new EU Programme on SALW in the southern area of Africa.54  
 
Belgium and the Netherlands, two Member States that held the EU presidency and the 
Presidency of the Security Council during the negotiations prior to the UN Conference on 
Small Arms also introduced national measures to combat the illicit trade of SALW. In 1997, 
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an interministerial coordinating committee to combat illegal transfers of small arms was 
created in Belgium. This committee was to provide a framework for coordination between 
the government ministries (including the Foreign and Defence ministries) and also facilitate 
the exchange of information. From 2001, Belgium annually destroyed an average 12,000 to 
13,000 of small arms that were 95% illicitly owned and had been seized during police 
operations. In 2002, Belgium was also the first EU country to incorporate the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports into domestic law55.  In the Netherlands, the establishment of 
similar type of committee as the Belgian initiative was also considered. The Dutch 
government also began to destroy their surplus weapons.56 
 
During the same period, France adopted stronger transparency measures towards arms 
export. Control over arms exports, including SALW exports came to the forefront of French 
domestic politics with the “Quiles” Commission established in 1998 to investigate the role of 
France in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994. The Commission was organized due to the 
pressure of French civil society, including several NGOs, members of the media and the 
academic community. The Commission strongly criticised the lack of transparency regarding 
French arms exports including SALW exports.57 Following the publication of the 
Commission’s report, the French government adopted several measures to enhance the 
transparency of arms exports. In 2002, the French government also adopted stricter 
regulations that require brokers operating in France to be registered and keep records of their 
activities. The French government’s priority to strengthen control of arms exports and 
brokering was strongly voiced at the EU level.  In addition, in the few months prior to the 
UN Small Arms Conference, France worked in partnership with Switzerland to develop of 
global instruments for marking and tracing. 
 
Germany has been described as the most transparent SALW exporter in the European 
Union.58  SALW exports remain a sensitive issue in German domestic politics. Germany has 
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often been regarded as a front runner in applying strong control over arms exports. This can 
be explained by the Germany’s “constitutional and political-cultural legacy as a defeated 
aggressor in the Second World War” that meant that “the reconstruction of an arms industry, 
let alone and export-based industry, was viewed with great apprehension both domestically 
and amongst its neighbours”.59 Germany early on encouraged other EU Member States and 
the EU to adopt stronger transparency measures on arms exports.  
 
5.4 Negotiations from 2001 to 2006 and the UN Small Arms Review 
Conference 2006 
 
After several years of preparation and two weeks of challenging negotiations, the 2001 UN 
Small Arms Conference had produced a politically binding document that suggested 
approaches to reducing the illicit trade of SALW. Several international actors including the 
EU welcomed the adoption of the Programme of Action, but also insisted that stronger 
commitments and efforts were needed from the international community to truly stop the 
proliferation of SALW. Soon after the conference, it became clear that a Review Conference 
of the PoA would constitute a crucial opportunity for the UN member states to strengthen 
their commitment on SALW. Negotiations on the preparation of a Review Conference were 
difficult. Until the commencement of the Review Conference, the EU multiplied its efforts to 
convince other states to adopt strong international commitments. The Review Conference 
opened in New York on 26 June 2006. Spirits were high at the beginning of the Conference 
as many international actors believed that the adoption of a strong outcome document could 
be beneficial to the fight against the illicit trade of SALW. However, the Review Conference 
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• Level I  
 
Part I:  Negotiations from August 2001 to June 2006 
 
In August 2001, after the end of the UN Small Arms Conference, the UN Security Council 
held a second open debate on SALW. During the debate, Kofi Annan as well as 36 other 
states openly deplored the lack of any legally binding international instrument to control the 
illicit SALW trade. At the debate, Belgium spoke on behalf of the EU and recalled two of the 
EU’s priorities, arms brokering and marking and tracing. Belgium argued that UN Small 
Arms conference had opened the way to start negotiations on these issues. The EU, Canada, 
and Norway gave support to international export criteria that would be based on the respect 
for human rights and international humanitarian law.60 
 
In the course of its 56th session, the First Committee of the UNGA also addressed the SALW 
issue. The Committee asked the Secretary-General to organize a Review Conference in 2006 
at the latest. 61 The resolution supported cooperation with civil society, the destruction of 
SALW surpluses, international cooperation on brokering as well as the establishment of a 
group of experts to evaluate the feasibility of an international marking instrument. More 
importantly, this resolution also confirmed the establishment of meetings to consider the 
implementation of the PoA. Section IV of the Programme of Action had outlined measures to 
the 2001 Small Arms Conference. The most important measure was the organization of 
Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) that would consider implementation, at the national, 
regional and international level, of the Programme.62  
 
The First Biennial Meeting of States was held from 7 to 11 July 2003 and was chaired by the 
Japanese Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi. Fewer delegations attended the First BMS than the 
2001 Small Arms Conference. The 138 delegations that did participate included not only 
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enthusiastic players such as the EU, but also more reluctant actors such as the United States, 
India, China and Russia. This First BMS was based mostly on thematic discussions on issues 
regarding the implementation of the Programme of Action. The first few days of the 
Conference were focused on the national implementation of the POA. Several international 
actors used the opportunity to present their expectations of the meeting. For some countries 
and organizations including the EU, the meeting represented a chance to review and improve 
the PoA. In its statement, Italy, on behalf of the EU, affirmed that EU believed that the 
meeting should “adopt an ambitious approach” and that the discussions should also give 
consideration “to starting to work on unresolved and newly relevant issues”63. The Italian 
Ambassador also emphasized that the EU believed the thematic discussions should focus on 
“crucial elements such as export controls, marking and tracing, brokering activities and the 
relationships between small arms and development”.64 The statement reflected the consensus 
reached within the EU on many on these issues that had been formalized with the adoption 
of the Joint Action in June 2002 and of a common position on arms brokering in June 2003 
(see Level II). The European Union also showed its interest in presenting its candidature for 
the chairmanship of the 2005 BMS meeting.  
 
On July 10th, thematic discussions were regrouped under six “clusters”: 1) weapons 
collection and destruction, stockpile management and disarmament; 2) capacity-building, 
resource mobilisation and institution building; 3) Marking and tracing; 4) Linkages 
(terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals); 5) Import/export 
and illicit brokering; 6) Human development, public awareness and culture of peace, and 
children, women and elderly.  The EU made a formal written contribution to all the thematic 
discussion “clusters”. The EU also made a specific contribution on the issues of marking and 
tracing and strongly encouraged the adoption of a legally binding multilateral instrument on 
SALW brokering. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001. 
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By the end of the conference on July 11, Ambassador Inoguchi had compiled a summary of 
the meetings.  The Ambassador had circulated a first draft of the summary on July 10, the 
day of the thematic discussions. The draft attracted criticism: some states deplored the fact 
that the summary did not reflect the positions initiated in the thematic discussion. Several 
states also expressed concerns the summary discussed issues beyond the mandate of the 
Biennial Meeting of States.65 At the closing of the Conference, the summary was not 
integrated in the main text of the report, but only included as an appendix.66 The summary 
also clarified that it was the sole responsibility of the Chairperson and that it did not cover all 
the issues discussed. 
 
Although the First Biennial Meeting of States had not produced any formal agreement or 
improvement of the PoA, it did reflect a certain commitment on the part of the international 
community to address the issue of SALW. 67 Parts of the discussions held at the meeting 
were fruitful:  a few months after the meeting, the UNGA adopted a resolution that 
established an open-ended working group to negotiate an international instrument for 
marking and tracing SALW.68  For the EU, the First BMS represented another occasion to 
reiterate its commitment to curtail the spread of SALW. The EU used the meeting to 
advocate issues that the EU Member States had already achieved consensus at the EU level. 
The EU also attempted to convince other states to adhere to international standards on 
SALW. 
 
If the First Biennial Meeting of States had reestablished the SALW issue on the international 
agenda, it would not, however, lead to the adoption of legally binding standards that the EU 
desired. A month before the beginning of the Second Biennial Meeting of States, and after 
six weeks of difficult negotiations, the Open-ended Working Group on Tracing Illicit Small 
Arms and Light Weapons produced the first instrument negotiated within the PoA: the 
International Tracing Instrument. This new instrument, although welcomed by the 
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international community, was a politically and not legally binding agreement.69 This did not 
meet the expectations of many international actors on the SALW including the EU.  
 
The Second Biennial Meeting of States was held from 11 to 15 July 2001 in New York. The 
Finnish Ambassador Pasi Patokallio was nominated Chair of the meeting. The Ambassador 
chose to retain the same thematic clusters defined at the first BMS. Prior to the meeting, he 
strongly encouraged states to debate the strength and weaknesses of the PoA in an attempt to 
generate useful debate on the upcoming Review Conference of the Programme of Action.70  
The Finnish Ambassador was supported in his request by the British Ambassador, John 
Freeman, who spoke on behalf of the EU at the beginning of the meeting. The British 
Ambassador stated that the EU believed that the meeting should be “ambitious and forward 
looking” and hoped that the discussions would help states to consider areas of further work 
as so to improve the usefulness of the 2006 Review Conference.71 Yet again, the EU 
proposed written contributions to all the six thematic “clusters,” reiterating its stance on the 
issues of import/exports controls and brokering.  
 
Considering the controversial character of the summary produced during the First BMS, it 
was agreed that no such document would be included in the final report of the Second BMS. 
Nevertheless by the end of the Conference, states began to discuss the central issues that 
would be addressed at the 2006 Review Conference and would instigate informal 
consultations organized by the Committee in charge of preparing the Review Conference. 
 
Considering the evident reluctance of certain major players to discuss the review PoA at the 
two BSM, it became clear that negotiations at the Preparatory Committee of the Review 
Conference in January 2006 would be challenging. The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) 
met in New York form 9 to 20 January 2006.  Prior to the meeting, the Chair, Ambassador 
Rowe from Sierra Leone held several informal consultations in New York and Geneva. The 
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Ambassador decided to continue with the format of interactive thematic debate and defined 
six “clusters” that would include a number of issues derived from the PoA and the 
discussions at the First and Second BMS. However, the list of issues presented was not 
exhaustive. The Ambassador emphasized that this would give delegations the opportunity to 
raise other issues that in their view were relevant. The six clusters covered the following 
issues: 1) Human/humanitarian, socio-economic and other dimensions; 2)Norms, regulations 
and administrative procedures; 3) Excessive accumulation, misuse and uncontrolled spread; 
4) International cooperation and assistance; 5)  Communication; and 6) Follow-up and 
reporting mechanisms.   
 
At the PrepCom, the EU presented its Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking 
of SALW and their ammunition that had been adopted by the European Council in 
December 2005 (see Level II). The Strategy was in direct response to the PoA. Its main aim 
was to facilitate the implementation of the PoA at the EU level. The Strategy included an 
Action Plan with specific measures defined at the international, regional levels and within 
the EU. In the framework of the PoA, the Strategy supported the adoption of a legally 
binding international agreement on the tracing and marking of SALW, the creation of a 
group of experts on brokering, the strengthening of exports control and the inclusion of 
minimum common international criteria and guidelines for controls on SALW transfers in 
the PoA72. This Strategy restated the EU’s commitment to the UN process initiated to 
address SALW. Nevertheless, the EU was well aware that the Review Conference would not 
initiate a renegotiation of the PoA and with the US and the League of Arab States, insisted in 
its statement that the “goal of Review Conference [was] not to renegotiate or re-open the 
existing Programme of Action,” but rather to complement or enhance the PoA and its 
implementation73.  
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During the PrepCom negotiations, the EU made a formal written contribution to all six 
clusters and placed particular emphasis on the need for brokering controls, transfer control 
and transfer to non-state actors, and a focus on ammunition. Although the EU presented a 
common strategy at the Conference, several EU Member States also had their own priorities 
that they regarded as vital. These priorities often reflected issues that had been addressed and 
had become main interests at the domestic levels. France and Germany presented draft 
elements on ammunition for a Final Document of the UN SALW Programme of Action 
Review Conference 2006 that emphasized the need to combat the illicit trade of 
ammunition.74. On the other hand, the Netherlands and the UK presented a working paper 
“addressing the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit manufacture, 
transfer and circulation of SALW and their excessive accumulation” and recommended that 
the link between SALW and development be clearly spelled out in the final document of the 
Conference.75 
 
There was a general consensus at the PrepCom that the Review Conference would not 
renegotiate the PoA. The Review Conference would rather produce an outcome document to 
supplement and reinforce the PoA. Despite this general agreement, negotiations remained 
difficult at the PrepCom with a number of states including the United States, Iran, Israel and 
Egypt refusing to compromise on certain issues. Although the United States stated that the 
PoA was a useful tool, it also said that the positions that it clearly defined during the 
negotiations of the PoA remained unchanged. The United States, therefore, was not willing 
to negotiate on issues such as domestic regulations, ammunition or a ban on transfer to non-
state actors.76 The unwillingness of some major players to discuss several of the relevant 
issues became a major obstacle for a successful conclusion to the PrepCom. 
 
Negotiations ended on the 20th January without agreement on a draft final to forward to the 
Review Conference. The Chairman produced a conference room paper, but was unable to 
gain support for its incorporation into the final document77; only texts of an organizational 
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nature were adopted. Ambassador Rowe deplored the fact that some delegations were not 
aware of the “gravity of the problem or the urgency of the action that was required to defeat 
it” and warned the states that they still had “a long, long way to go” in the fight against the 
spread of illicit SALW.78 
 
Part II- The UN Small Arms Review Conference 2006 (26 June- 7 July 2006) 
 
The fact that the Preparatory Committee did not achieve agreement on a document to 
forward to the Review Conference meant that the work of the President for the Review 
Conference would be even more crucial. The President of the Review Conference, 
Ambassador Prasad Kariyawasam of Sri Lanka began consultations with various delegations 
immediately following the PrepCom. In February 2006, Kariyawasam circulated a first non-
paper for informal consultation purposes. Another version of the non-paper was produced in 
May 2006. This latest version still included highly contentious issues, which suggested that 
negotiations at the Review Conference would be extremely challenging.  
 
The 2006 United Nations Conference to Review the Implementation of the UN Programme 
of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in all its Aspects opened in New York on 26 June. In his opening statement to the 
Conference, Ambassador Kariyawasam called upon the Member States to show “flexibility 
and political will to take this conference towards a successful conclusion.”79 However, even 
before the Review Conference, there was controversy surrounding the meeting – particularly 
in the United States. The powerful American group National Rifle Association (NRA) had 
launched a campaign of mass mailing to the UN to denounce the United Nations attempt to 
deny the rights of Americans to gun ownership80. This campaign prompted the Secretary-
General to reaffirm at the start of the Conference, that the Review Conference was not 
negotiating a “global gun ban” or trying to “deny law-abiding citizens their right to bear 
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arms in accordance with their national law.”81 Even before negotiations began at the Review 
Conference, it was clear that the negotiations on certain aspects of the Programme of Action, 
including on several EU’s priorities, would be difficult.   
 
The Review Conference followed the same type of programme of work as the 2001 UN 
Small Arms Conference. The first week was reserved for high-level statements. Austria, on 
behalf of the EU, was the first state to make its statement. Hans Winkler, the Austrian State 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, acknowledged that “[a]ddressing this important forum as the 
first speaker implies some responsibility for the European Union” and that “the fight against 
the illicit trade in SALW has become even more urgent in the context of intensified 
international action against terrorism”. 82 The EU had twelve different priorities for the 
Review Conference.83 Austria summarized the EU’s priorities in its statement: “the European 
Union is convinced that the United Nations’ efforts to control SALW have to be intensified 
in particular in those crucial areas where significant obstacles to full implementation persist. 
We believe these are transfer controls, marking and tracing, brokering regulations, 
ammunition and the integration of small arms measures into development assistance. In 
addition, the question of how to structure the follow-up to the Review Conference is central 
to the EU in ensuring progress in the further implementation of the Programme of Action.”84 
Several EU Member States including UK, Germany and the Netherlands also made 
statements supporting the EU’s priorities. 
 
If at the beginning of the Review Conference, the EU promoted the adoption of strong 
international commitments, other states made it clear that they were not willing to negotiate 
on certain issues of the Programme of Action. The American position remained unchanged 
from previous meetings. In his statement, Robert Joseph, the Under-Secretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security, made the US position very clear: although the 
United States did believe strongly in the agreed Program of Action, it would not accept 
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certain actions.  The United States would not agree to any provisions restricting civilian 
possession, use or legal trade of firearms inconsistent with US laws and practices. The US 
position also remained unchanged on two other issues: 1) ammunition, which were perceived 
as beyond the mandate of the Review Conference; and 2) the transfer to non-states actors.85 
A number of other states including India and China also expressed their reservations to 
negotiate on a number of issues of the PoA. 
 
On the second day of the Conference, Ambassador Kariyawasam produced a non-paper that 
was submitted to the states. The non-paper became a working paper during an informal 
meeting on 29 June and the President asked states to forward their proposals and 
amendments to the working paper. On 30th of June, a side event entitled EU Action in the 
Area of SALW was organized to present an overview of the EU’s activities. Representatives 
from the Presidency, the Council Secretariat/Office of the High Representative for CFSP’s 
Personal Representative on non-proliferation and the European Commission presented the 
EU SALW policy and the instruments put in place to achieve the objectives set out in the EU 
Strategy. With this side-event the EU wished to reaffirm its priorities for the Review 
Conference. 
 
 On July 3rd, the President circulated another non-paper for consultation that had integrated 
some state proposals. Furthermore, the Chair appointed three facilitators (Colombian 
Ambassador, Swiss Ambassador and Japanese Ambassador) to address specific contentious 
issues including: development assistance and small arms, and follow-up mechanisms. 
Formal negotiations on the draft final document were only initiated on the 5th of July as the 
High-level segment of the Conference extended beyond the scheduled time. However, a 
number of informal meetings were held between the 30th June and 7 July to negotiate draft 
outcome document. Because the conference was based on consensus and had time 
constraints, many states rapidly realized that most of their efforts should be concentrated on 
convincing less enthusiastic states to support the final document. Negotiations were 
complicated by the fact that the US delegation sent various versions of the draft outcome 
document to Washington. This considerably slowed the negotiations.  
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During the negotiations, the EU Presidency, Austria in the first week and Finland in the 
second week held several coordination meetings to achieve an EU common position on the 
key issues of the PoA. The Finnish delegations also organized two meeting with European 
NGOs. Despite these coordination efforts, it soon became apparent that several EU Member 
States were advocating their own priorities. France and Germany wanted the document to 
include a reference to ammunition. Because the United States insisted that ammunition 
should not be included in the final document, France and Germany focused their efforts at 
the Review Conference on reaching a compromise with the Americans on this specific issue.  
 
The UK was also an extremely active actor during the Review Conference. Supporting the 
Transfer Control Initiative (TCI) and the Arms Trade Treaty, the UK was perceived capable 
of leadership at the Review Conference. The UK made several proposals on transfer controls 
and also attempted to persuade the American delegation to support the inclusion of several 
issues such as transfer controls. However, the UK’s initiatives were criticized by other EU 
Member States. First, some states felt that the UK was too close to the United States to adopt 
strict positions on the more contentious issue. Second, the UK made several proposals and 
suggestions to the President of the Conference, especially on transfer controls, without 
consulting its EU partners.  This was especially apparent in the last hours of the Conference 
when the UK suggested a text on transfer control without consulting its EU partners.  
 
The UK’s initiative on another issue was also faced strong criticisms. The Netherlands and 
the UK advocated for the link between fight against the spread of illicit SALW and 
sustainable development to be recognized. This time, the opposition came from a number of 
states from the Non-Aligned Movement including India and Indonesia and the Caribbean 
States that raised concerns about the idea of conditionality on development aid and the 
possibility of resources from the donor countries being diverted from development projects 
to SALW projects.  The UK and the EU failed to convince key partners on the link between 
development assistance and the adoption of international measures on SALW. Furthermore, 
other states also criticized the EU for focusing on the coordination of the EU position rather 
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than forming potential allies, including the African states. This was seen as particularly 
problematic as Africa is the most affected region by the scourge of SALW.  
 
On 7th July, in the final hours of the Conference, confusion surrounded the negotiations. 
With the deadline of 6pm rapidly approaching, it became clear that a consensus could not be 
reached on an outcome document. Some delegations hoped that the Review Conference 
would be extended for a few hours to find a similar agreement as the one reached at 2001 
Small Arms Conference.  However, around 5.30pm, Ambassador Kariyawasam began the 
procedures to close the conference and adopted a procedural document; the final outcome 
document stated that the Conference was not able to agree to conclude a final document.86 
EU Member States were perceived as having played a part in the swift conclusion of the 
Review Conference. Some EU Member States, such as France, urged the President of the 
Review Conference to begin the closing procedures as it was clear that no consensus could 
be found. The United Kingdom also pushed the President of the Conference to adopt a 
consensual document with only elements that had been agreed to by most countries. But this 
created further confusion as a number of agreements had been made in informal meetings 
rather than in the formal process of negotiations.87 With the mounting divergent pressure and 
the visible lack of consensus, the President decided to bring the Conference to a close. 
 
Many national delegations and NGOs representatives were extremely disappointed by the 
result of the Conference; some states even described the Conference as a failure. 
Ambassador Kariyawasam in his closing remarks said that a consensus on the final 
document had been “within grasp.”88 He believed that despite the lack of consensus on a 
final document, the Review Conference had been successful in attracting the interest of the 
international community. In its final statement at the Conference, Finland on behalf of the 
EU, stated that “the European Union, committed to effective multilateralism, [was] deeply 
disappointed by the lack of results of the Conference”. It also said that the “conference has 
been a missed opportunity to make a real difference in our common fight against the scourge 
of illicit small arms and light weapons. The European Union regrets that some delegations 
have not been willing to make significant progress” and that it was “regrettable that the 
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momentum created by the civil society was not matched by the flexibility by some states”. 
Despite the lack of results of the Conference, the EU remained committed to the 
implementation of the PoA. Finally Finland emphasized that “the EU will remain in the 
forefront of our common fight and practical work to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit 
trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.”89 
 
• Level II  
 
Following the UN Small Arms Conference, the EU remained extremely active on SALW. In 
July 2002, the EU adopted a Joint Action90 which replaced the 1998 Joint Action on the 
EU’s contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of SALW. Since 
the UN Small Arms Conference, Germany and France had strongly campaigned among their 
EU partners to address the issue of SALW ammunition. The new version of the Joint Action 
reflected the German and French position as it acknowledged the role of ammunition in 
conflicts affected by the negative consequences of SALW. With the adoption of this Joint 
Action, EU Member States reaffirmed their commitment to combat the proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons. Furthermore, in June 2003, under the Greek presidency, the EU 
adopted a Common Position on the controls of arms brokering, which included some 
provisions on small arms and light weapons. This Common Position established a clear legal 
framework on arms brokering and requested from the EU Member States to adopt of 
necessary national measures to control arms brokering activities on their territory91. 
  
During its EU Presidency, the UK took several initiatives to address the SALW issue at the 
EU level. First, the General Affairs Council in October 2005 supported the idea of an 
international treaty to establish common standards for the global trade in conventional arms. 
It also highlighted that the United Nations was the only forum that could deliver this treaty 
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and called for the start of a formal process at the UN at the earliest opportunity.92  The idea 
of an international Arms Trade Treaty was first initiated by a group of Nobel Peace 
Laureates in 1995 who sought to limit the spread and misuse of conventional arms including 
small arms and light weapons. The ATT would create legally binding controls and 
international standards on arms trade. In 2003, the global Control Arms Campaign was 
launched by three UK-based NGOs, Oxfam, Amnesty International and International Action 
Network on Small Arms (IANSA).93 Shortly thereafter, the UK with the Control Arms 
campaign and the British NGO Saferworld organized a meeting in Brussels to discuss the 
ATT with representatives from EU Member States, the European Commission and the 
European Parliament as well as various European NGOs.94 The ATT rapidly gained support 
among the EU Member States; in fact, the ATT would introduce international standards 
similar to the EU Code of Conduct and therefore ensure that EU arms manufacturers would 
not be disadvantaged.95  
 
Second, with the PrepCom approaching, the UK realized the need for a strong united EU 
position on SALW. It was clear from the two previous Biennial Meetings of States that 
negotiations would be difficult at the PrepCom as certain states were reluctant to change 
their views on a number of issues. The EU Strategy to combat illicit Accumulation and 
Trafficking of SALW and their Ammunition96 was therefore adopted by the European 
Council on 15-16 December 2005, just a few weeks before the beginning of the PrepCom. 
The Strategy, which is linked to the 2003 European Security Strategy, is presented as a 
guidance tool for all EU activities in the field of small arms. The Strategy outlines measures 
to be taken at the international level, but also within the EU. At the EU level, the Strategy’s 
Action Plan calls for an effective response to the accumulation of small arms and the 
problems posed by the availability of existing stocks, but also for the establishment and 
development of the necessary structures within the EU to deal with the issue. This includes 
the strengthening of the Council Secretariat’s capabilities to ensure a coherent application of 
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the strategy by working in close cooperation with SALW experts from the Commission and 
Member States.  The Strategy also promotes for greater horizontal coordination and 
exchange of information between the Council’s experts groups both geographical and 
thematic (CODUN, COARM, etc). The Strategy also stresses the need to ensure consistency 
between the Council decisions in the CFSP framework and actions implemented by the 
Commission in the field of development aid. The EU’s Strategy on SALW was adopted with 
the expectation that the EU would play a crucial role at the Review Conference. With major 
players, particularly the United States, insisting that they would not compromise on certain 
issues, the EU needed not only to be united at the Review Conference, but also to clearly 
define issues of vital concern for the EU. 
 
The EU Strategy on Small Arms also acknowledged the role of another EU institution: the 
European Commission. After the 2001 Small Arms Conference, the Commission became 
increasingly active in this field. It created several small arms-related programs using 
different lines of budget and programs, such as the European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR). The Commission also  used the European Development Fund 
(EDF) to fund small arms related assistance in ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) 
countries and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT). The European Commission 
supported a wide-ranging research project on “Strengthening European Action on Small 
Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War”.97 The study was carried out by 
the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The final report of the study covered 
small arms related activities funded under the different institutional branches. It also 
highlighted some of the areas where the Commission might play a greater role. Although the 
European Commission increased its activities on small arms, it never became a significant 
player in negotiations on small arms at the EU level. In fact, small arms and light weapons 
never became a “development” issue at the EU level.  Thus, the role of the Commission 
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• Level III  
 
Following the UN conference on Small Arms, the UK increased its involvement on SALW 
issue and between 2000 and 2005 became one of the most vocal international actors on 
SALW. As early as July 2000, the British Government established the Global Conflict 
Prevention Pool that was managed jointly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the 
Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence. The British 
government decided to include a strategy on SALW in this resource pool. The UK SALW 
strategy aims to coordinate existing programmes managed by the three departments under a 
single set of objectives and resources. The Department for International Development 
became the administrator of the SALW strategy with the help of a small steering group of 
officials from both the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. The aim of the Strategy 
is to control and reduce the supply availability and demand for SALW by producing policy-
focused research, by raising international and regional awareness on the need for stronger 
controls, by implementing concrete measures such as arms collection and the management 
and destruction of surpluses, and by integrating SALW controls into a wider perspective on 
conflict prevention and development assistance. The UK SALW strategy also included 
support for partnership with UN agencies and civil society.  
 
In addition to the SALW strategy, the British government in 2002 adopted the Export 
Control Act that introduced a strong revision of its export control legislation98. The UK also 
remained extremely active in the area of transfer controls.  In January 2003, a Conference on 
Strengthening Export Controls was held at Lancaster House. The Conference, which 
involved representatives of 49 countries and of various NGOs, considered measures to 
implement controls on arms transfer. A few months later, during the First BSM, UK 
organized side meetings to discuss the strengthening of export controls. In July 2003, the UK 
with support from France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, launched the Transfer 
Control Initiative (TCI) that focused on strengthening controls over the export, import and 
transit of small arms in countries.99 Reinforcing transfer controls of SALW became a top 
priority of the UK government.  
                                                 
98 Biting the Bullet and IANSA, op.cit., p.105. 
99 See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department of Trade and Industry, Department for 
International Development and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Control- 




Germany was another country that reiterated its commitment to curbing the negative effects 
of SALW and began to actively destroy their surplus and illicitly owned SALW. In 
Germany, between 1990 and 2004, the Federal Armed forces destroyed more than 1.7 
million surplus SALW.100 The question of SALW ammunition also became a priority for the 
German government, especially during the 2006 Review Conference. The massive amount of 
ammunition that had been accumulated on German soil had become particularly problematic 
for the German Government. Indeed, with the end of the Cold War, more than one million 
SALW, ammunition and explosives were decommissioned in Germany. The German 
government advocated that the issues of ammunition and of surplus be addressed by the 
European Union and the international community.  
 
Between the 2001 Small Arms Conference and the 2006 Review Conference, national NGOs 
and IANSA developed strong partnership with several EU governments For example, the 
UK, in partnership with IANSA campaigned for the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty 
(ATT). Within the UK government, the ATT had a prominent supporter, Jack Straw, Foreign 
Minister at the time. In March 2004, Straw announced that the UK supported the idea of an 
international treaty on the arms trade.101 The Arms Trade Treaty was also supported by the 
British Defence Industry including the British Defence Manufacturers Association (DMA) 
that regroups 550 defence companies, and key trade unions.102  During its EU presidency, the 
UK convinced its other EU partners of the need to support this initiative; the Control Arms 
campaign gained momentum when the EU Member States supported the ATT during the 
European Council in October 2005. Another EU State, Austria, which held the EU 
Presidency in the first-half of 2006, was intensely lobbied by a national NGO campaign to 
implement the Programme of Action. The pressures on the government resulted in the 
adoption in May 2005 of a new Foreign Trade Act that addressed transfer control.103 
                                                 
100 Biting the Bullet and IANSA, op.cit., p.105. 
101 European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, The role of the European Union..., 
p.6-7. 
102 See Control Arms. Parliamentary Briefing. 2006- a crucial year for controlling the global arms 








In contrast to the anti-personnel landmines case, the EU Member States showed immediate 
internal effectiveness in SALW negotiations. At the UN level, several EU Member States 
were actively involved in the negotiations. Some of these Member States, such as Finland 
and the UK, were directly involved in the organization of several international meetings. At 
each of the formal meetings, the EU Presidency not only made a statement on behalf of the 
EU, but also formally contributed to each of the “clusters” of the thematic discussions. 
Furthermore, during the preparatory meetings of both the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference 
and the 2006 Small Arms Review Conference, the EU circulated an EU document stating its 
priorities (the EU Plan of Action in 2001 and the EU Strategy on Small Arms in 2005).  
 
However, during the 2006 Small Arms Review Conference, the EU’s internal effectiveness 
gradually dissolved. Negotiations on SALW did not address “one” issue as did discussions 
on the mine-ban treaty. To have a treaty banning the use, production, and transfer of SALW 
was unrealistic. Negotiations on SALW at the UN, therefore, focused on several issues that 
could curtail the spread of SALW and addressed multiple complex issues such as civil 
ownership, transfer controls and transfers to non-state actors, and development assistance. It 
was difficult for the EU to maintain a common position on the issue of SALW: EU Member 
States were apparently more interested in pursuing their own priorities rather than in 
reaching a strong EU position, which resulted in a situation where “in attempts to take 
stronger positions on a number of themes, several EU Member States spoke on behalf of 
their individual governments, rather than allowing the moderate joint EU statements to 
represent them.”104 Yet, the “moderate” EU position attracted much more support at the 
Conference than the stricter positions of certain EU Member States.  
.  
                                                 
104 C. Buchanan, The UN Review Conference on small arms control: Two steps backwards? Available 
at www.hdcentre.org.  accessed on  20/11/06 
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Lastly, the EU was not as vocal as it should have been in key moments during the 
negotiations. The EU entered the negotiations with several specific issues that it wanted to 
appear in the final document, but was willing to compromise. Throughout the negotiations, 
the EU, through the Austrian and the Finnish delegations, reaffirmed its commitment to 
reaching a consensus on the final document, even if it failed to meet their priorities. Indeed, 
during the negotiations, the EU seemed to be one of the most flexible actors around the 
negotiating table. Furthermore, a number of EU Member States were also frustrated by the 
lack of good will of certain countries to reach consensus and believed that another number of 
hours would not have made a significant difference.105 Ultimately, the EU was unable to 
achieve its objectives and lacked external effectiveness.    
 
                                                 









In the 1990s, pictures of child soldiers in various conflicts around the world increasingly 
emerged in the media. The trend of using children as soldiers was facilitated by the 
uncontrolled spread and accessibility to small arms and light weapons since the end of the 
Cold War. Indeed, arms such as the AK-47, or “Kalashnikov”, are light enough to be carried 
and simple enough to be used by young children and can have deadly consequences.1 
Although Africa was (and remains) identified as the region with the highest number of child 
soldiers (children have participated in wars in Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone Somalia, Sudan and Uganda),  children have also 
been used in other world regions such as Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. 
Afghanistan, India, Myanmar, Iraq, Guatemala, Colombia are also countries that have seen 
thousands of children involved in armed conflict.2  
 
The issue of child soldiers started to attract the international community’s attention including 
the European Union. In December 2003, the European Union presented its EU Guidelines on 
Children in Armed Conflict.3 These guidelines were developed in close collaboration with 
the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed conflict at the time, Olara Otunnu, 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and a number of non-governmental 
organizations They were adopted to highlight the problem of children in armed conflict, to 
emphasize EU actions in this area and to persuade non EU-countries and non-state actors to 
                                                 
1 Machel, op. cit., p.7. 
2 For a complete lists of  countries where children are used as soldiers see http://www.child-
soldiers.org 
3 See Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict,  Document 
15634/03, Brussels, 4 December 2003. 
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implement effectively international legislation in this area.  With the adoption of the 
guidelines, the EU wished to project an image of an effective and unified actor, who worked 
closely and supported the United Nations. Yet, less than three years before, EU Member 
States had struggled to adopt a unified position at the UN regarding this particular issue. 
Indeed, from 1994 to 2000, EU Member States were involved in arduous negotiations on an 
optional protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child that addressed the 
involvement of children in armed conflict. Consensus on the optional protocol was only 
reached at the last minute, but divisions in the EU camp were clearly apparent throughout the 
negotiations. Ultimately, in May 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict (OP-AC).   
 
This chapter examines the internal and external effectiveness of the European Union in 
negotiations that occurred at the UN to develop the Optional Protocol to complete the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child of 1989. Negotiations on the Optional Protocol at the 
United Nations mainly took place within the Committee of the Rights of the Child of the 
Commission on Human Rights.4 This chapter is divided in four main sections. It begins with 
a brief overview of the issues of children in armed conflict and international law. The 
chapter then focused on two phases of the negotiations on the Optional Protocol: 1) 
negotiations from October 1994 to December 1998; and 2) negotiations from January 1999 
to January 2000. Again, this case study will analyze three levels of negotiations- 
international (Level I), EU (Level II), and domestic (Level III). Finally, a conclusion will 
examine the results of the research. 
 
6.2 Child soldiers in International Law 
 
It is estimated that around 300 000 children – boys and girls under the age of 18 - are 
involved in over than 30 conflicts around the world. Most of these children are considered 
child soldiers. A child soldier is defined as any person under the age of 18 who is part of 
government armies, paramilitary groups and rebel forces and who is used as a combatant, 
                                                 
4 The Commission on Human Rights was replaced by the Human Rights Council in March 2006.  
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messenger, water carrier, cook, or sexual slave. Child soldiers can be compulsorily, forcibly 
or voluntarily recruited and used by armed forces or groups. Poverty, abuse, discrimination 
are identified as possible causes that can lead children to become a member of military 
groups. Children may also join armed groups to avenge the violent acts they or their families 
have suffered or because they believe that becoming a member these groups will help protect 
their families. Most of these child soldiers are adolescents, but a growing number are 10 
years of age or younger.5  
 
The issue of child soldiers was first raised at the United Nations during the negotiations of 
the Convention of the Rights of the Child at the end of the 1980s.  At that time, the issues of 
participation and recruitment of children in armed conflict were within the Additional 
Protocols I  
 
Table 6.1 OP-AC Case: Phases of Negotiations 
Phase of Negotiations  
Phase 1: Negotiations from 




 31 October-11 November 1994 and 9 February 1995: First session 
of the Working Group on the involvement of children in armed conflicts is 
held in Geneva. 
 
15-16 January and 21 March 1996: Second session of the Working 
Group on the involvement of children in armed conflicts is held in 
Geneva. 
 
20-30 January 1997: Third session of the Working Group on the 
involvement of children in armed conflicts is held in Geneva. 
 
 2-10 February and 19 March 1998: Fourth session of the Working 
Group on the involvement of children in armed conflicts is held in 
Geneva. Negotiations reach an impasse and are adjourned early. 
 
 
Phase 2: Negotiations from 




 January 1999: Fifth session the Working Group on the involvement of 
children in armed conflicts is held in Geneva for only one day. 
 
10-21 January 2000: Sixth and last session the Working Group on the 
on the involvement of children in armed conflicts is held in Geneva. The 
final text of the Optional Protocol is approved by consensus. 
 
25 May 2000: the UN General Assembly adopts the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict. 
 
                                                 





and II to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.6  The two Protocols emphasized the need to 
offer protection of children in both international and non-international armed conflicts. Both 
Protocols set the minimum age for armed group recruitment and the participation of children 
in armed conflict at fifteen years.7 Several governments felt that the Protocols were not 
adequately extensive and believed that should be reinforced by the inclusion of the issue of 
children in armed conflict in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child that 
was negotiated at the end of the 1980s.  
 
Some governments, such as Sweden, that joined the EU in 1995, suggested that the age of 
recruitment and participation should be raised from 15 to 18. On the other hand, France, the 
United Kingdom and the United States were more reluctant to support this position as they 
felt that this could become a problem in times of hostilities. The United States believed that 
only children below the age of fifteen should be protected against war services and pressured 
the other delegations to accept their formulation.  This position was also supported by other 
countries that recruit volunteers under the age of 18 including the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom.8 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted in November 1989 by the UN 
General Assembly and became the first legally binding document that recognized children’s 
rights. It defined a child as every human being below the age of 18 years unless under the 
law applicable, majority is attained earlier (Article 1). Ultimately, Article 38 of the 
Convention that specifically addressed the problem of children in armed conflict did not 
                                                 
6 The Four Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1949 and aimed to protect people who do not take 
part in the fighting (civilians, medics, aid workers) and those who can no longer fight (wounded, sick, 
shipwrecked troops and prisoners of war) See ICRC, The Geneva Conventions: The core of 
international humanitarian law,  http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions 
accessed  on 16/06/07 
7 See M.T. Dutli and A. Bouvier, “Protection of children in armed conflict: the rules of international 
law and the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross”, The International Journal of 
Children’s Rights, vol.4, no.2, 1996, pp.181-188. 
8 R. Bartlett, “Child Soldiers: law, politics and practice”, The International Journal of Children 
Rights, vol.4, no.2, 1996, pp.117-118. and  A. Sheppard, “Child Soldiers; Is the optional protocol 
evidence of an emerging “straight-18” consensus?”, The International Journal of Children 
Rights,vol.8, no.1, 2000, pp.44.  
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raise the age of recruitment and participation to 18. This Article simply restated the 
provisions of Protocols I and II of the Geneva Conventions: states should ensure that persons 
who are not 15 do not take part in hostilities and should also refrain from recruiting any 
person who has not attained the age of 15 in the armed forces. Article 38 became the only 
article in the Convention that did not to apply to all children under the age of 18.9  
 
Article 38 of the Convention attracted strong criticism both from states and from NGOs .The 
issue of children in armed conflict was brought up in the first session of the Committee of 
the Rights of the Child that had been established as a monitoring mechanism of the 
Convention. The Committee decided to have a general discussion on the issue during its 
second session in October 1992. The Committee “recognized the need for a continuous 
response to the outstanding and complex question of children in armed conflict” and 
suggested various measures to address the issue. These measures included the completion of 
general studies on certain aspects of the problem and the drafting of a future optional 
protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child that would increase the age of 
recruitment of children into the armed forces to 18.  
 
The Committee also decided to establish a working group composed of some members who 
would evaluate these measures.10 In its next session and following an oral report of the 
working group on children in armed conflict, the Committee recommended to the General 
Assembly to request the Secretary-General to conduct a study of ways and means of 
improving the protection of children from the adverse effects of armed conflicts.11  A few 
months later,  Graça Machel, a former Minister of Education and Culture of Mozambique, 
was appointed as the expert to undertake a comprehensive study on the issue of children in 
armed conflict as well as to examine existing standards and recommend ways of improving 
the protection of children in armed conflict.12   In March 1994, following a special appeal of 
the World Conference on Human Rights, the Commission of Human Rights decided to 
establish an open-ended (that is, open to all states) inter-sessional Working Group to 
                                                 
9 R. Harvey, Children in Armed Conflict. A guide to international humanitarian and human rights 
law, Wivenhoe Park/Montreal, Children and Armed Conflict Unit, University of Essex and 
International Bureau for Children’s Rights, 2003,  p.12 and p. 25. 
10 See UN Document CRC/C/10  
11 See UN Document CRC/C/16 
12 See UNGA Resolution A/RES/48/157 
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elaborate a draft optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The first 
session of the Working Group would occur in the fall of 1994.  
 
 
6.3- October 1994 to December 1998: Reaching an impasse 
 
 
Some 40 countries and around 30 UN bodies and agencies, international organizations and 
NGOs attended the first session of Working Group in Geneva in the fall of 1994. While all 
the participants affirmed their commitment to protect children in armed conflict, it rapidly 
became clear that consensus on an optional protocol on child soldiers would not be easily 
reached. 
 
• Level I  
 
During its first session, the Working Group held 19 meetings from 31 October to 11 
November 1994 and on 9 February 1995. EU member states, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, which were states members of the Commission, were joined 
by their EU colleagues Denmark and Greece and the future EU Member States Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden. During the first meeting of the Working Group, Nils Eliasson of 
Sweden was elected Chairman-Rapporteur. Sweden had been extremely active during the 
negotiations of the Convention of the Rights of the Child and an early supporter of the 
position of increasing the age of recruitment and active participation to 18 years. The 
Swedish government became a fierce supporter of the idea of an optional protocol that would 
supplement Article 38 of the Convention. The Swedish government was supported by two 
influential NGOs, Rädda Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) and the Swedish Red Cross. 
Sweden’s position was clear: “it cannot be acceptable that persons who in every other sense 
are regarded as children under the Convention are recruited into armed forces and permitted 
to participate in armed conflicts”. The Swedish government considered that the only solution 
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was that the age limit for recruitment be raised to 18 and that states commit themselves to 
preventing children under 18 from participating in hostilities.13    
 
At the time of the first meetings of the Working Group, Sweden was soon to become an EU 
member state. Most EU Member States participating to the sessions of the Working Group 
did not share the Swedish position. Indeed, right from the first session of the Working 
Group, there were strong divergences between the positions of the Member States. During 
negotiations of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, France and the United Kingdom 
emphasized that they objected to increasing the age of recruitment and participation in 
hostilities. Other EU Member States were more ambivalent: Germany, while regretting the 
fact that Article 38 still allowed 15 years olds to participate in hostilities as soldiers, believed 
that compulsory military service should be possible and admissible if there was a desire to 
enter military service before the age of 18.14   
 
 
These various positions of EU Member States mirrored the different camps that formed 
during the negotiations. A first group of states insisted that the minimum age of recruitment 
should be set at 18 years. Other participants argued that raising the age limit for recruitment 
did not protect children from involvement in armed conflicts. Several delegations felt that 
their national legislation, which under certain conditions and in certain circumstances 
allowed the recruitment of persons below the aged of 18 in their armed forces, would 
unavoidably be in conflict with the provisions of an optional protocol that would follow the 
“straight-18” principle.15 This position reflected the national legislation of at least two EU 
Member States: the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
 
A number of other contentious issues were discussed at the first session. These issues 
included the distinction between direct and indirect participation in hostilities, voluntary 
versus compulsory recruitment into armed forces, recruitment of children by rebel groups 
and other irregular armed forces, and the status of children enlisted or admitted into military 
                                                 
13 See UN Document E/CN.4/1994/WG.13/2/Add.2 
14 See UN Document E/CN.4/1994/WG.13/2/Add.1 
15 See UN Document E/CN.4/1995/96. 
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schools.16 At the first session of the Working Group France, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom were among the states that reiterated the position that the limit of 18 years should 
not be applied to voluntary recruitment and the recruitment of students of military schools.17 
This position was shared by another important actor, the United States. At the end of the first 
session, the Working Group adopted a revised draft of the Optional Protocol. This draft 
would be basis for the  second session of Working Group negotiations in January and March 
1996.  
 
Several substantive issues remained controversial during the second session including age 
limits, the question of direct or indirect participations in hostilities, and the issue of 
compulsory and voluntary recruitment into either governmental or non-governmental armed 
forces.18 EU Member States were divided on most of the substantive issues. Belgium, 
Finland and Sweden advocated for the “straight-18”position. The Netherlands, Denmark, the 
United Kingdom, while more reluctant to support this strong position, were willing to 
compromise to reach a consensus. When the Working Group discussed which age – 17 years 
or 18 years – should be included in the contentious Article 1 (that dealt with the question of 
participation in hostilities), Finland, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Belgium supported that it remain 18 years. The United Kingdom favoured the age of 17 
years was willing to agree with the majority if consensus was reached on the age of 18 years. 
In contrast, the delegations of the United States, Pakistan and Cuba wanted the age to be set 
at 17 years.19  
 
On the issue of recruitment, almost all the parties agreed that the minimum age for 
conscription should be set at 18 years. However, states such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Australia argued that voluntary recruitment should be considered different 
from compulsory recruitment. These states main arguments focused on “opportunities for 
minorities and economically disadvantaged teenagers, especially in education and training” 
that voluntary recruitment in the armed forces offered and that could not be found in civilian 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., especially para. 90, 91, 92 and 113 
18 See UN Document E/CN.4/1996/102, para. 17 
19 See UN Document E/CN.4/1996/102 
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life.20 The United Kingdom and the United States also pointed out that in many countries 16 
and 17 years olds entered the workforce. Voluntary recruitment as a career opportunity, they 
argued, should therefore be available to these young people.21  
 
Dissensions on the majority of substantive issues led the Chairman-Rapporteur to organize 
an informal drafting group to speed up the negotiations. The group held 12 meetings from 16 
to 24 January.22 Despite these meetings, the Working Group still were unable to reach a 
consensus on most of the substantive issues. Furthermore, the question of the political nature 
of the Optional Protocol was also discussed during the second session. Two main positions 
dominated the debate. Some delegations preferred to negotiate a “protocol of a compromise 
nature that could subsequently be ratified by a maximum of States,” other states, as well as 
members of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, supported a stronger protocol that 
would only be acceded to by states able to abide by its provisions. 23 Several delegations 
expressed the view that the Commission on Human Rights should take the final decision on 
the political nature of the protocol.24  
 
While little progress had been made since the previous session, a number of initiatives had 
brought the issue of children in armed conflict on the forefront of the agenda of the 
international community in recent months. In August 1996,  Graça Machel submitted to the 
General Assembly her final report entitled “Impact of armed conflict on children”. In this 
landmark report, Machel recommended the establishment of a Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on children in armed conflict. The report also recommended that the age 
of recruitment and participation in the armed forces be raised to 18 years.25 Consultations 
prior to the drafting of the report occurred in several regions, including in Europe in June 
1996. The report also stressed the urgency for the international community to address the 
issue of children in armed conflict. 
 
                                                 
20 M.J,. Dennis “Newly Adopted Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child”, The 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 94, no.4 2000, p.790.  
21 Ibid. 
22 See UN Document E/CN.4/1996/102, para. 15. 
23 Ibid., para. 46 
24 Ibid., para. 51 
25 See UNGA Document A/51/306, 
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The third session of the Working Group was held from 20-30 January 1997. At this time, the 
divisions in the Working Group were openly acknowledged.   Machel was invited to present 
her report and participate in the discussions. Despite  Machel’s appeal to raise the age of 
both participation and recruitment to 18 years, many states remained reluctant or even 
unwilling to adopt a “straight-18” protocol. On the question of the minimum age for 
participation in hostilities, no consensus could be found. Most states represented in the 
Working Group, including most EU Member States, favoured 18 years. The UK remained 
the only EU Member States to support a minimum age of 17 years, but also said that, for the 
sake of consensus, it would join the majority. The US along with Pakistan and Cuba refused 
to support this position and still favoured a minimum age of 17 years.26 With the negotiations 
to a stalemate, many participants became frustrated. Several parties expressed their 
disappointment that the draft protocol had not been finalized in previous sessions. One 
delegation even suggested that it would not be useful to meet again without having first held 
multilateral and bilateral high-level consultations to achieve significant progress.27  
 
A few weeks after the third session, in February 1997, the General Assembly recommended 
to the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for children and armed 
conflicts.28 In September 1997,  Olara A Otunnu was appointed to this position.  With this 
appointment, the issue of children in armed conflict and particularly of child soldiers 
attracted even more interest  and pressured states to reach a consensus on the optional 
protocol. When the Working Group met again in February 1998 for the fourth session of the 
Working Group, a number of informal meetings, in the form of open-ended consultations 
with the Chairman, were again organized to accelerate the drafting process.  While 
participants did agree that the key issue was that of the age of limit for participation in 
hostilities, no consensus could be reached on this question. A vast majority of states 
expressed their support for designated limit of 18 years for participation and favoured that 
this limit be applied to both direct and indirect participation. However, several delegations 
argued that the establishment of the limit of 18 years could not be considered as a practical 
proposal acceptable to all.  Some states suggested that 17 years should be designated as the 
minimum age for participating in hostilities. Differences among parties also became evident 
                                                 
26 See UN Document E/CN.4/1997/96, para. 76 and  para. 78 
27 Ibid., para. 55 to 60. 
28 See UNGA Resolution A/RES/51/177 
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on the question of recruitment and some countries suggested that the minimum age should be 
set at 16 years.  
 
By February 1998, an increasing number of EU member states were more inclined to support 
the ‘straight-18’ position. Sweden, Finland and Belgium had early on favoured a minimum 
age of 18 years for participation and recruitment, but some of their EU colleagues also began 
to support this stance. Although most EU Members States were willing to accept the 
increased age of participation as 18 years, the question of the minimum age for recruitment, 
however, remained a sensitive issue for a number of EU Member States. Austria, Germany, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands still spoke in favour of the 17 years option for voluntary 
recruitment. However, these states also expressed their willingness to find a compromise on 
the issue. Denmark gave its support for the age limit of 18 for any form of participation for 
compulsory recruitment and indicated that it would join consensus on 18 years also for 
voluntary recruitment. The United Kingdom was the most reluctant EU member states to 
support a “straight-18” position, preferring the age of 17 for participation and 16 for 
voluntary recruitment. However, the United Kingdom expressed that although the 
“Chairman’s perception” paper did not mirror all the British delegation’s preferences, it 
would not have blocked the consensus on the terms outlined in the Chairman’s perception 
paper.29   
 
Other states including the United States, the Republic of Korea and Kuwait deemed the 
option of 18 years for Article 1 unacceptable and were unwilling to compromise on this 
issue. The American delegation stressed that there was a significant minority (at least six of 
the participating states) that preferred 17 for the age of participation. The Americans 
regretted that for many, an agreement was not acceptable unless the age was set at 18 and 
that this  “all or nothing” approach was stalling negotiations.30 The fourth session of the 
Working Group adjourned early as it became clear that it would be impossible to reach an 
agreement during the time allotted. Ultimately, the report of the February 1998 session of the 
Working Group included two different versions of the draft of the optional protocol: a rolling 
                                                 
29 See UN Document E/CN.4/1997/96., para.62 and 73 
30 UN Document E/CN.4/1997/96I., para. 65 
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text with several square brackets to indicate the issues of disagreement, and a “chairman’s 
perception” text that included text on which the chairman thought states would agree.31 
 
Throughout the fourth session, several delegations and NGOs expressed their disappointment 
in the lack of progress. Several EU member states were frustrated by the impasse in 
negotiations. The strongest criticism was expressed by Germany that suggested that this 
deadlock was due to “the positions of a very small minority of delegations unable to join an 
emerging near consensus on practically all contentious issues”. Considering this deadlock, 
Germany questioned if there was any ground for the Working Group to continue. The 
German delegation also stated that at this time, it was the responsibility of the Commission 
on Human Rights to make political decisions and to provide the Working Group with 
guidance.32 The Working Group and the Commission on Human Rights realized that there 
was an impasse, decided to adjourn the negotiations, and asked the Chairman of the Working 
Group to conduct broad informal consultations on the optional protocol. Following a 
proposal from Germany on behalf of the group of Western European and other States, 
Catherine von Heidenstam of Sweden was elected the new Chairperson-Rapporteur.33 Von 
Heidenstam was assigned to produce a report at the end of 1998 that would include 
recommendations or ideas on the best way for the formal negotiations to progress.  
 
Through 1998, the Chairperson conducted several broad informal consultations with 
representative of the states involved in the Working Group and also the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children in 
armed conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The “pause” in the 
formal negotiations also allowed a civil society movement to emerge and place international 
pressure on the parties to successfully conclude the negotiations.34 Frustrated by the lack of 
progress in negotiations, six NGOs - Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
International Federation Terre des Hommes, Jesuit Refugee Service (Geneva), the Quaker 
United Nations Office (Geneva) and the Swedish Save the Children (on behalf of 
International Save the Children Alliance) - formed the coalition that would advocate the 
                                                 
31 See Ibid., Annex I and Annex II 
32 Ibid., para. 48 
33 See UN Document E/CN.4/1998/102 Add.1 
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adoption of an optional protocol banning the recruitment and participation of children under 
the age of eighteen. On 30 June 1998, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers was 
publicly launched, with the participation of UNICEF, UNHCR and the UN Special 
Representative for children in armed conflict, at press conferences in Geneva and New York.  
 
Around the same time, at the United Nations, the issue of the children in armed conflict 
gained more international attention. On 11 June 1998, Portugal, which held the Presidency of 
the Security Council at the time, invited the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
for children in armed conflict to informally brief the Security Council. The Special 
Representative had visited several countries where children were used as soldiers, including 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sri Lanka and Kosovo. His briefing prompted the Security Council to 
formally place the issue on its agenda. On 29 June 1998, the first UN debate on children in 
armed conflict was held at the Security Council. Several states, including several EU 
member states, seized the opportunity not only to reaffirm the urgency of concluding the 
negotiations on the optional protocol, but also to restate their position on the age limit for 
recruitment and participation in hostilities. 
 
During the debate, it became apparent that the EU did not have a united position. The EU 
statement delivered by the United Kingdom confirmed the divisions within the EU on some 
of the issue of the Optional Protocol. The statement restated the European Union belief that 
the issue of children and armed conflict deserved “a particularly important place on the 
international political agenda”, reaffirmed the importance of the Convention of the Rights of 
the Child and reaffirmed its support for the inclusion in the future international criminal 
court statute of the prohibition against the use of children in armed conflict.35 Regarding the 
optional protocol, the EU remained fully committed to the aim of successfully concluding 
the negotiations on the draft protocol. However, the EU statement did not address the issue 
of the minimum age for recruitment and participation. This was not unexpected because EU 
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Member States, and more importantly the United Kingdom, were reluctant to support the 
“straight-18” position. France, in its statement also supported the prompt conclusion of the 
optional protocol, but did not address the age debate.  In contrast, Portugal and Sweden 
reaffirmed their support for the ‘straight-18’ position. Germany and Italy stressed that their 
support for 18 years as the minimum age for both direct and indirect participation.36 
The Security Council debate on children and armed conflict and the launched of the 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers had firmly placed the issue of children in armed 
conflict on the international agenda. The issue returned to the limelight at the UN in October 
1998, when the Secretary-General announced his decision to set minimum age requirements 
for United Nations peacekeepers. The Secretary-General asked contributing governments to 
send troops that would preferably be 21 years and in no case less than 18 years. He also 
requested governments not to send civilian police and military observers younger than 25 
years to serve in peacekeeping operations. The Secretary-General adopted this measure not 
only to promote the rights of the child, but also to create an example for police and military 
forces around the world. 37   
 In December 1998, after a year of informal consultations, the Chairperson of the Working 
Group on the draft optional protocol presented her report to the Commission on Human 
Rights. All parties of the Working Group agreed of the urgent need to protect children from 
becoming involved in armed conflict. The successful conclusion of negotiations on the draft 
optional protocol remained a priority. The conclusions of the report highlighted that after 
almost four years of negotiations, little progress had been made on the two main issues: 
participation, both direct and indirect, and recruitment. The Chairperson felt that she needed 
additional time and further consultations before she could formulate recommendations. If 
more time was needed, Heidenstam also stressed the urgency of the matter: parties should 
aim to finalize the draft optional protocol by the tenth anniversary of the Convention of the 
Rights of the Child in 1999.38  However, it was another year before the Working Group 
reconvened to initiate the last phase of the negotiations of the optional protocol.  
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• Level II 
 
At the time of first session of the Working Group, the European Union’s foreign policy 
regarding children’s rights, including children’s rights in armed conflicts, was practically 
nonexistent.39 In fact, prior to the adoption of the Amsterdam treaty, no specific reference to 
children rights existed in the EU treaties. While Article 29 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
provided for the first time a legal basis for intergovernmental cooperation to prevent and 
combat “offences against children,”40 emphasis was not placed on the protection of children 
in armed conflict. At the EU level, the protection of children in armed conflict was primarily 
portrayed as a development and an external human rights issue. While the EU’s external 
human rights policy can be both a first and second pillar issue, the implementation of this 
policy through international organizations such as the UN is a CFSP issue.  
 
The issue of a draft optional protocol on children in armed conflict was absent from most 
negotiations at the Council of Ministers, and at  the Council working group on human rights 
(COHOM), in the late 1990s. No specific CFSP instruments to address the issue of children 
in armed conflict were adopted between 1994 and 1998. This is perhaps not surprising as all 
the EU Member States that held the EU Presidency during the first four sessions of the 
Working Group (Germany in the second-half of 1994, France and Spain in 1995, Italy and 
Ireland in 1996, The Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1997, and the UK and Austria in 1998) 
did not support the “straight-18” position and were, at first, opposed to raising the minimum 
age for recruitment to 18 years. The United Kingdom was also strongly against increasing 
the age of participation in hostilities to 18 years. By 1998, only four EU Member States 
(Belgium, Denmark, Spain and Sweden) had a minimum age for recruitment set at 18 and 
two of these states (Denmark and Spain) at that time did not favour the “straight-18” 
principle. Furthermore, Finland and Sweden two active players in the negotiations as well as 
major supporters of “straight-18” position only joined the EU in January 1995. As “new 
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members” of the EU and as part of a minority of states advocating a stronger protocol, these 
two states were not in the best position to influence negotiations at the EU level. 
 
Nevertheless, the European Union was perceived as an influential actor in the protection of 
children in armed conflict. Indeed, Olara Otunnu, following his appointment as the Special 
Representative for children and armed conflicts, “made it a priority to establish a strong 
cooperation with the European Union and its institution” and to encourage the EU “to make 
the protection of children affected by armed conflict a significant aspect of its own 
agenda”.41 The Special Representative concentrated his efforts on two institutions: the 
European Commission and the European Parliament.  
 
Regular consultations were organized with European Commissioners, in particular the 
Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs and the Commissioner for Development as well as 
with an inter-service group of senior officials from the Directorates-General concerned with 
external relations, social affairs, development, humanitarian affairs, human rights, and the 
management of aid to non-members states. The Special Representative also encouraged the 
Commission to introduce the issue of child soldiers in its programme activities.42 
 
In November 1998, the Special Representative, on the request of the Coalition to Stop the 
Use of the Child Soldiers, addressed the European Parliament. Following this meeting, the 
European Parliament became the first EU institution to draw attention to the issue of children 
in armed conflict when it adopted a “Resolution on Child Soldiers” in December 1998. The 
Resolution supported the adoption of an additional protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child that would prohibit the recruitment and the participation of children under 18 
and called on the EU to support this initiative.43  It was also the result of a strong advocacy 
campaign launched by Human Rights Watch and other Brussels-based NGO that targeted the 
European Union and the European Institutions.  
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Strong dissensions between Member States made it difficult for the EU to speak with a 
single voice during the Working Group negotiations.  Yet, the European Union recognized 
the urgency to address the question of child soldiers. In June 1998, the EU Presidency hosted 
a symposium on children affected by armed conflicts. The symposium had a number of 
objectives:  to provide an opportunity for advocacy on the issue, to generate support for the 
work of the Special Representative, and to give another occasion to the governments to 
discuss critical issues regarding this problem.44 This symposium was particularly significant 
as the United Kingdom held the Presidency at that time. In addition, and perhaps for the first 
time, the EU was perceived as an active player on the issue of child soldiers.       
 
• Level III 
 
In the mid-1990s, the recruitment and participation in armed conflicts of person under the 
age of 18 were contentious issues in a number of EU member states. Although the issue of 
child soldiers was considered to be a human rights and development issue, the signature of 
an optional protocol on child soldiers would have a direct effect on armed forces across 
Europe. During the first phase of the negotiations of the optional protocol, few EU Member 
States supported the “straight-18” position. No Member States who held the EU Presidency 
(including France, Germany and the United Kingdom) were part of that group. Furthermore, 
some of these countries (Spain, Ireland and Luxembourg) only attended some and not all of 
the four sessions of the Working Group.  
 
When negotiation on the Optional Protocol first began in October 1994, Germany held the 
Presidency of the EU. Germany, although it did not favour the “straight-18” standard, 
pressed for increasing the age of recruitment and participation. In the early phases of 
negotiations, Germany’s stance on the issues of recruitment and participation mirrored the 
German laws on the subject. The German Law on Military Service allowed the voluntary 
recruitment of person of the age of 17. The German government also claimed that 17 year 
old children were prohibited from participating in hostilities.45 Throughout the first sessions 
of the Working Group, Germany remained committed to the issue of the protection of 
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children in armed conflict. In 1998, in a speech given to mark the 25th anniversary of 
Germany's UN membership, the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel emphasized the 
need to protect children in armed conflict and eagerly supported the idea of a supplementary 
protocol to the UN Convention on the rights of the Child that would offer better protection to 
these children.46 Germany’s commitment to the issues and its relationship with the Coalition 
to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers would reveal itself crucial in the last phase of the 
negotiations.  
 
France, the next country to hold the Presidency, also championed for 17 as the age for 
voluntary recruitment but the age of 18 for direct participation in armed conflicts. France 
believed that this was a good compromise between the “straight-18” position and the 
position of states, such as the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Iran, that wished to set the age 
of voluntary recruitment at 16 years. This position reflected French national legislation 
already in place. The recruitment of persons under the age of 17 has been prohibited in 
France since 1972. During first four sessions of the Working Group, France also introduced 
a reform of its military service and implemented a transnational proramme to fully 
professionalize its armed forces. As a result of this reform, the age of compulsory 
recruitment was set at 18 years.47 Many of the issues discussed in the Working Group were 
at also addressed at the national level in the context of the reform.48  
 
The positions of Italy and Austria, which also held the EU presidency during the first four 
sessions of the Working Group, were quite similar to their French and German colleagues. In 
fact, in most of the sessions of the Working Group Italy and Austria were with France and 
Germany as countries that held a middle position. These states were in favour of increasing 
the minimum age for participation to 18 years, but not for voluntary recruitment. However, 
on these issues, they were willing to find a compromise. The question of recruitment had 
recently been at the centre of national debate in Austria. The Austria Defense Law of 1990 
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had determined that a male citizen could not be called for military service before he turned 
18, but allowed voluntary recruitment for the age of 17. This provision was included to allow 
children who graduated from high school at 17 (instead of 18) to join the military service.49 
In Italy, while only men over 18 were liable for military service, voluntary recruitment was 
possible from the age of 17. In late 1990s, a debate about compulsory recruitment, lead the 
Italian government to propose a reform of the armed forces. A few years later, but only after 
the signature of the Optional Protocol, the reform introduced by the Italian government led to 
adoption of the prohibition of participation of under-18s in armed conflict (in 2000) as well 
the prohibition to recruit 17 years-olds (in 2001). 50  
 
 
On the issue of recruitment, the Netherlands, the EU Presidency in the first-half of 1997, 
were less willing to compromise than their Austrian and Italian colleagues. In the beginning 
of the 1990s, the Dutch military forces had begun a widespread reform. Conscription was 
suspended in 1996 and armed forces were gradually becoming all-volunteer forces. This 
move to a professional army was the reason invoked by the Dutch Government to allow a 
minimum age of 16 for voluntary recruitment. This follows the Civil Code of the 
Netherlands that permits individuals between the ages of 16 and 18 to choose their own 
employment on conditions of parental or legal permission.51 With the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands would be one of the states less willing to compromise on the issue of 
recruitment.    
Indeed, the United Kingdom’s reluctance to increase the age of recruitment and participation 
to 18 years was a significant obstacle in the negotiations of the optional protocol. The British 
government, supported by its Ministry of Defence, justified its position by stating that the 
British Armed Forces were struggling to recruit the numbers required to fulfill all their 
military commitments and that under-18s provided an important source for recruitment.52 
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The British government, however, specified that the issue of children in armed conflict 
remained one of its priorities. Soon after Olara Otunnu was nominated Special 
Representative for children and armed conflicts, the British government provided £200,000 
to support his work.53 In June 1998, the UK, which then also had the EU presidency, wished 
to show its commitment to the question of child soldiers and the United Nations work in this 
area: the British Secretary of State for International Development, jointly with the Special 
Representative for children and armed conflicts, was thus appointed chair of the symposium 
on children affected by armed conflicts. Although, the UK supported the work of the UN and 
the Special Representative, it was still perceived as one of the states responsible for the 
stalemate in the negotiations.   
 
6.4 - January 1999- January 2000: The final negotiations 
 
• Level I 
 
The Working Group on the draft optional protocol met for only one day in January 1999 as 
most participants recognized that it would be impossible to reach an agreement during this 
fifth session. At the session, the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflicts and the Vice-
Chairman of the Committee on the Rights of the Child addressed the Working Group and 
urged the parties to conclude their work quickly. The Special Representative also reiterated 
his support for raising the age limit for recruitment and participation in hostilities to 18 years 
and the Vice-Chairman of the Committee on the Rights of the Child stated that the 
Committee had been naïve to believe that because the optional character of the future 
protocol, the need for consensus would not be invoked to hinder its adoption.54 Despite the 
fact that the Working Group did not discuss the optional protocol during this session, the 
session was useful as additional pressure was placed on the states parties to find a consensus 
and to finish their work on the draft optional protocol. 
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Around this time, news stories and images of children used as soldiers in Angola, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Colombia also helped increase international pressure for the 
parties to find a consensus on the draft protocol. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers also multiplied its campaigning efforts and organized three conferences in 1999. 
The first conference, the African Conference on the Use of Children as Soldiers was held in 
Mozambique in April 1999 and was attended by more that 250 representatives of 
governments and civil society. The Conference adopted a strong declaration, the Maputo 
Declaration, which called for the rapid adoption of the legal standards and measures 
prohibiting the use of children under the age of 18 years in military services. The Maputo 
Declaration was later endorsed by the Organization for African Unity Assembly Heads of 
States and Governments in July 1999. A second conference was organized in Montevideo, 
Uruguay in July 1999. The Conference focused on the use of child soldiers in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and produced another strong declaration. 
 
A third Conference was organized in October 1999. This conference is significant for this 
case study as it was hosted by the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin and co-sponsored by 
the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). The conference attracted 180 
representatives from civil society and 35 governments including all EU Member States. This 
conference gave NGOs the opportunity to lobby those European states that continued to 
recruit children under 18, such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg 
and the UK, The Conference also highlighted one specific EU Member State: the United 
Kingdom was singled out as the worst offender in Europe for sending children under 18 into 
combat.55 The Berlin Declaration adopted at the end of the Conference called states to 
establish international standards that prohibit all participation in armed conflict of persons 
under the age of 18 years. However, the Conference was unsuccessful in achieving a 
consensus on an age limit for recruitment. Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom refused to support a call for the prohibition on 
recruitment of children under 18.56 Yet, the Conference was considered a success as for the 
first time nearly all EU Member States agreed to support the prohibition of the participation 
in armed conflicts of children under 18 years.57 Only the United Kingdom remained opposed 
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and to avoid having to abstain or vote against this provision, the UK delegation withdrew 
from the room when the issue was discussed.58 
The debate on the issue of child soldiers was reignited in June 1999 when the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted Convention 182 that defined the forced and compulsory 
recruitment of children for use in armed conflicts as one of the worst forms of child labour. 
The Convention also set 18 as the minimum age for compulsory recruitment.59 Several 
states, including Denmark, France, Italy and Spain had advocated for a broad prohibition on 
any participation in armed conflicts by people under the age of 18, but because of the 
opposition of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, the Convention 
only addressed the issue of forced or compulsory recruitment.60 Nevertheless, the ILO 
Convention was recognized as a landmark treaty as it was first international agreement to 
prohibit certain forms of involvement in military services of children under 18.61  
A few weeks later, in August 1999, the Security Council held its second open debate on 
children in armed conflict where Finland presented the view of the European Union. In its 
statement, the EU expressed that it remained fully committed to the aim of the successful 
conclusion of the work on the optional protocol and gave its full support to the work of the 
chairperson, but did not mention a minimum age for recruitment and participation.62 
Nevertheless, EU Member States felt pressured to successfully conclude negotiations on the 
Optional Protocol. Even the British delegation in its contribution to the debate declared that 
the UK would not block any consensus reached.63 At the closing of the debate, the Security 
Council adopted resolution 1261, its first resolution on the issue of children in armed 
conflict. Resolution 1261 recognized the harmful and widespread impact of armed conflicts 
on children and identified the issue has having long-term consequences on international 
peace, security, and development. It requested states “to intensify their efforts to ensure an 
end to the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of international 
law.”64 The resolution also supported the work of the Working Group on the draft optional 
protocol and expressed the hope that the Working Group would make further progress and 
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finalize its work. The resolution did not, however, address the debate on the age limit for 
recruitment or participation.  
When the Working Group on the draft protocol reconvened in January 2000, it had been 
nearly two years since the Working Group adjourned its meeting. During those two years, 
the Chairperson,  Heidenstam was extremely active. She organized several consultative 
meetings in New York and Geneva and held bilateral consultations. She accompanied the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for children in armed conflict on some visits and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Sweden to the European Conference in Berlin organized by the Coalition to Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers. The Chairperson also used international, regional and bilateral meetings, 
including the ILO Conference on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, to gather information 
and conduct consultations regarding the draft optional protocol.65 Following these various 
consultations, the Chairpersons recommended that the draft optional protocol should clearly 
address the following issues: “the setting of a minimum age of 18 years for participation in 
hostilities, 18 years for enforced and compulsory recruitment into armed forces and 18 years 
for voluntary recruitment, for an opt-out provision allowing for a minimum age of 17 years 
with reference to national legislation”. The Chairperson also believed that the issues of non-
States parties, compliance, surveillance and military schools needed special consideration.66  
The sixth session of the Working Group was held from 10 to 21 January 2000. At this 
session states parties felt the urgency to find a consensus and appeared committed to achieve 
an agreement. The UN planned to hold a Special Session on Children in 2001 and the failure 
to conclude negotiations on a draft protocol could have costly political implications.67 
Despite the willingness of the parties to finish the work, negotiations were extremely 
difficult during the session. The Chairperson presented her recommendation to the Working 
Group and also suggested to use the “Chairperson’s perception” paper annexed at the 
adjourned session of February 1998. The United States also presented to the parties its own 
version of the draft optional protocol.68  
To accelerate the negotiating process, the Working Group used both formal and informal 
meetings and appointed coordinators for nine main issues: non-state actor, compliance, 
national implementation, international cooperation and assistance, enforced recruitment, 
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participation in hostilities, voluntary recruitment, military schools and the preamble. It was 
evident from the beginning of the negotiations that the most complex issues would be 
voluntary recruitment and participation in hostilities.  A small number of countries remained 
opposed to the “straight-18” position. However, during the two years recess of the Working 
Group, progress had been achieved on the question of participation in hostilities. In previous 
session, a small minority of states including the United States had vigorously defended their 
position to allow 17 years olds to participate in hostilities and therefore, had stalled 
negotiations on this issue. In October 1999, President Clinton announced a shift in the 
American position, when at a US-Canada Summit he recognized the need to find a 
compromise and agreed to focus on the issue of deployment rather than the age of 
recruitment as the critical issue.69  
After arduous negotiations, the following compromise was agreed: state parties would seek 
all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who had not attained the 
age of 18 years did not to directly participate in hostilities. A number of states supporting the 
‘straight-18 principle, including EU Member States such as Sweden, Italy, Belgium and 
Denmark, were left dissatisfied: the use of the term “feasible” implied that a soldier younger 
than 18 years could participate in hostilities.70 Yet, in the spirit of compromise they approved 
the proposed text. 
A compromise on the issue of voluntary recruitment proved to be more difficult to find. 
There was a clear division on this question. Some delegations supported the “straight-18” 
formula, while other delegations favoured other options such as a lower minimum age; the 
opt-in/opt-out clause; or even not to include at all any reference to the age for voluntary 
recruitment in the optional protocol.71 The states that supported the “straight-18” principle 
realized that their position would not be accepted by the other delegations and again agreed 
to compromise. An article based upon the text provided by the United States was adopted. 
The article stipulated that states parties must deposit a binding declaration upon ratification 
or accession to the optional protocol that would raise the minimum age for the voluntary 
recruitment of person into their national forces from that set out in article 38 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (i.e. 15 years). States would also be obligated to 
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maintain safeguards to ensure that such recruitment is voluntary, or with the consent of the 
person’s parents or legal guardians and that the person provide reliable proof of age. On this 
issue, the protocol again failed to meet several of the EU member states expectations.  
 
Finally, the contentiousness of one article caused the negotiations to continue until the last 
half hour of the time allotted for negotiations.72 The article stipulated that states that were not 
parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (i.e. Somalia and the United States) 
would be allowed to become parties to the optional protocol. Some delegations such as 
Belgium specified that this should be an exception and not a precedent. Other states, 
including France and Sweden, reluctantly agreed to support this decision. The French 
delegation’s strong objection on the grounds of principle even threatened the adoption of the 
whole optional protocol.73 Ultimately, the article was approved. 
 
On 25 May 2000, after six years of negotiations the UN General Assembly adopted the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict. Portugal, on behalf of the EU welcomed the adoption of the 
Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict (along with the adoption 
of the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography). It 
also stated that the Protocol constituted a fundamental complement to Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and praised the work of the Working Group and “the remarkable spirit of 
co-operation and constructive approach”74 demonstrated by the participants of the Working 
Group that allowed the successful outcome of the negotiations. The Optional Protocol was 
signed by all 15 Member States of the EU in September 2000 and entered into force on 12 
February 2002.  
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• Level II 
 
Germany assumed the presidency of the EU in early 1999. In a debate on the protection of 
civilians in armed conflicts at the United Nations in February 1999, Germany declared that 
the EU considered increasing the age limit for participation in armed conflicts from 15 to 18 
as an important step to protect children in conflicts.75 A consensus within the EU regarding 
the age of participation was slowly emerging. By the time of the European conference on the 
Use of Children as Soldiers in October 1999, all EU member states with the exception of the 
United Kingdom were willing to support an age limit of 18 for participation. At the 
conference, the German Foreign Minister Fischer confirmed that the issue of the age limit for 
recruitment and participation was being considered at the EU level. He believed that all EU 
Member States, including the UK, realized the need for the EU to achieve a common 
position on this question.76 However, the German Presidency did not make any declarations 
regarding the EU’s position on the Optional Protocol. 
 
The Finnish Presidency of the European Union that followed was strongly in favour of the 
straight-18 position. While the Finns did support this position in various international arenas, 
they struggled to persuade their EU colleagues to adopt a unified position regarding the 
Optional Protocol. EU Member States only agreed to support declarations that stated that the 
EU was fully committed to the aim of the successful conclusion of the work on the optional 
protocol, but that did not mention the age debate.  Indeed, in 1999, the Council of the 
European Union in its annual report on human rights reaffirmed the need to raise the current 
minimum age limit set by Article 18 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child for the 
recruitment and participation of any person in armed conflicts. It also encouraged the early 
conclusion of the work of the Working Group on a draft optional protocol, especially in the 
view of the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention. The Council also 
highlighted the EU’s role in advocating a provision that recognized conscripting, enlisting 
and using children as war crimes.77 However, the Council did not recommend a minimum 
age for recruitment or participation. 
                                                 
75 See UN Security Council Document S/PV.3980 
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With clear dissensions in the EU camp, Finland turned to another forum to declare its 
support for a strong Optional Protocol. In August 1999, Finland, joined by two EU Member 
States, Denmark and Sweden, as well as two European States, Iceland and Norway, signed 
the Declaration by the Nordic Foreign Ministers against the Use of Child Soldiers. The 
Declaration stated that the existing international protection of children in armed conflict was 
insufficient. It stressed the “crucial importance” of the work of the Working Group and 
supported the “urgent finalization of an optional protocol on the occasion of the tenth 
anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child”. The five Nordic states also 
declared that they were determined to have an Optional Protocol that would ensure that 
persons below the age of 18 years would not be recruited into the armed forces or allowed to 
participate in hostilities.78 What Finland had achieved with its Nordic neighbours, it did not 
achieve with its EU colleagues.  
 
If the Council of Ministers remained quiet on the issue of child soldiers, both the European 
Parliament and the European Commission reiterating their commitment to the issue of child 
soldiering. In April 1999, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly adopted a 
comprehensive resolution on child soldiers.79 The European Commission also demonstrated 
its commitment to the question of children in armed conflict. In 1999, the UN Special 
Representative for children and armed conflict held regular meetings with the Commissioner 
for Development and Humanitarian affairs, Poul Nielsen. These meetings were successful as 
the European Commission announced that the protection of the rights of the child including 
those of child soldiers would be one of the five thematic priorities for 1999 of the European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The EIDHR brought together a series 
of budget headings specifically dealing with the promotion of human rights and aimed to 
complement the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives in the field of human 
rights, democratization and conflict prevention.80 In October 1999, Commissioner Nielsen 
addressed the Berlin Conference organized by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers and hosted by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Commissioner stated 
that the European Commission strongly endorsed the aim of the campaign to stop the use of 
child soldiers and reaffirmed the support of ECHO for projects that protected children in 
                                                 
78 See UN Document A/54/419 
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conflict zones.81 By this time, ECHO was already funding projects in Sierra Leone and 
Guinea that focused on war-affected children. 
 
• Level III 
 
With the creation of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, NGO involvement of 
the issue of chills soldiers intensified.  National campaigns around Europe actively lobbied 
several EU member states to adopt national measures to prevent the involvement of children 
in hostilities. Following an intense advocacy campaign, the Danish government announced 
in June 1998 that it would increase the minimum age for voluntary recruitment in its armed 
forces from 17 years to 18 years.82 In 1999, UNICEF Belgium, with the support of several 
Belgian and international NGOs, launched the Belgian Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers. Since the Belgian government was already a firm supporter of “straight-18” 
principle, the Belgian Coalition focused on raising public awareness and lobbying the 
Belgian authorities to be more proactive and campaigned on the issue at the international 
level.83 
 
The Coalition also effectively established a relationship with Germany, which held the EU 
Presidency in early 1999. In October 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany 
agreed to host the European conference on the Use of Children as Soldiers. At the 
Conference, Joschka Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed his personal support for 
the minimum age of 18 for all military recruitment and participation in armed conflict. The 
Minister of Defence, Rudolf Sharping, also attended the Conference. While he declared his 
support for a minimum age of 18 years for participation, he remained silent on the issue of 
recruitment.84 Several proposals were made in the German Bundestag to raise the age limit 
of recruitment to 18 years or to ask Germany to support the “straight-18” principle in the 
                                                                                                                                          
80 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/eidhr/eidhr_en.htm accessed 29/07/2007. 
81 See Statement by Poul Nielson, Member of the European Commission at the European Conference 
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82 Human Rights Watch, op.cit.  
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negotiations of the Optional Protocol.85 However, the German government was unwilling to 
adopt this position during the final negotiations of the Working Group.  
 
Both Finland and Portugal, which respectively held the EU presidency during the two last 
sessions of the Working Group, were supporters of the “straight-18” principle. Finland, with 
its neighbour Sweden, had initially favoured the straight-18 position. In the late 1990s, 
Finnish law still allowed the 17-year-olds to be conscripted; however, most call-ups usually 
concerned only 19 or 20-year-olds.86 Finland was therefore willing to sign a Protocol that 
would prohibit both the recruitment and the participation of under-18s. Furthermore, the 
revised Finnish Penal Code considers that a person, who in an act of war violates the 
provision of an international agreement binding on Finland, shall be sentenced for a war 
crime. The adoption of the Optional Protocol meant that the recruitment of a person under 
the age of 18 years during hostilities would be deemed a war crime.87  
 
In August 1999, Finland, with Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, signed the 
Declaration by the Nordic Foreign Ministers against the Use of Child Soldiers. This 
Declaration was perhaps the result of the extensive relationship that had developed between 
the Coalition and the Nordic States. Indeed, the Coalition had numerous and constant 
exchanges and widely cooperated with the Nordic States; these partners discussed both the 
definition of strategies and general political goals.88 Upon its signature of the Optional 
Protocol in September 2000, Finland declared that the minimum age for both the recruitment 
and voluntary service was 18 years.89 At an event organised by the Coalition in January 
2001, Finland stated that the Optional Protocol was a “compromise” and “remained far 
behind the objectives of the Finnish government.” The Finns stated that they had to 
compromise not only on voluntary recruitment, but also on participation in armed conflicts, 
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because they favoured a stronger wording and wanted a clause that prohibited any 
reservations to the Protocol”.90  
 
In contrast to Finland, Portugal did not attend all the session of the Working Group; yet, it 
was a key player in bringing the issue of child soldiers on the agenda of the Security 
Council. In June 1998, Portugal, which held the Presidency of the Security Council, was the 
first state to invite the Special Representative for children in armed conflict to speak to 
members of the Security Council. A week after the Special Representative’s briefing, 
Security Council formally had the first UN debate on children in armed conflict. Portugal’s 
involvement on the issue of children in armed conflict and its support of the “straight-18” 
position was assisted by the launch of a reform plan for the Portuguese armed forces in the 
late 1990s,. Indeed, in September 1999, a few months prior to the last session of the Working 
Group, Portugal adopted a law that provided for the transition to a fully professionalized 
army and established the minimum age for enlistment in voluntary service at 18 years. Upon 
its signature of the Protocol, Portugal declared that it would have preferred the Optional 
Protocol to exclude all types of recruitment of under-18s, voluntary or not, and stated that it 
would “apply its domestic legislation that prohibits the voluntary recruitment of persons 
under the age of 18 years.”91 
 
The United Kingdom, as one of the states less willing to adopt the “straight-18” position, 
was targeted by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. Strong pressure was exerted 
on the UK at the European Conference of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 
convened in Berlin in October 1999. The UK was singled out for not only encouraging the 
recruitment of children under 18 in their armed forces, but also as the only EU states to 
routinely send under-18s to participate in hostilities. The UK government argued that its 
position on the question of allowing under-18 to be recruited is related to the shortage of 
recruits. In 1998, almost a third of annual intake of the military forces was constituted by 
under-18s.92 During the crucial phase of negotiations of the Optional Protocol, the British 
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Ministry of Defence also defended its rights to deploy people under the age of 17 in cases to 
avoid destabilizing their units and thus undermining their effectiveness. The Ministry also 
reserved this right in cases of major international conflicts.93  Yet, the British government 
continued to actively promote the ban of the use of child soldiers in various regions of the 
world.  The British Department for International Development was especially committed to 
the issue. In March 1999, the International Development Secretary also announced that a 
portion of the British international aid budget would be allocated to support military reform 
in developing countries. Reducing the number of child soldiers would be a central aim of the 
initiative.94  
 
Due to the opposition of the Ministry of Defence to renounce recruiting and allowing under-
18s to participate in hostilities, the UK delegation in the Working Group could not easily 
offer to compromise on both issues. Nevertheless, it often reiterated that it would not block 
any consensus reached. While the UK signed the Optional Protocol on 7 September 2000, it 
also made a declaration that stated that the UK “will take all feasible measures to ensure that 
members of its armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct 
part in hostilities” but “understands that article 1 of the Optional Protocol would not exclude 
the deployment of members of its armed forces under the age of 18 to take a direct part in 
hostilities where: a) there is a genuine military need to deploy their unit or ship to an area 
where hostilities are taking place; and b) by reason of the nature and urgency of the situation: 
i) it is not practicable to withdraw such persons before deployment; or ii) to do so would 
undermine the operational effectiveness of their ship or unit, and thereby interfere with the 
successful completion of the military mission and/or the safety of the personnel.”95 NGOs 
and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers severely criticized this declaration that 
was considered as “contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Optional Protocol” and strongly 
campaigned for its removal.96 
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During the negotiations of the Optional Protocol, the EU struggled to deliver internal 
effectiveness. The EU never spoke with a single voice in the Working Group. Several EU 
Member States played an important role in achieving consensus on the issue, but the 
European Union was absent from the negotiations and failed to be effective. The EU was 
even held responsible for stalling negotiations in the Working Group. The issue of children 
in armed conflict did not become a priority for the European Union. In fact, several Member 
States that held the Presidency during the period of negotiations of the Working Group held 
more “conservative” position regarding the Optional Protocol. This partly explains why the 
European Union as an actor remained relatively absent from the negotiations. 
 
The fact that negotiations addressed questions related to national armed forces made this 
issue particularly delicate in the EU. Debates at the domestic level on the reform of armed 
forces had a significant impact on several EU Member States’ position toward the Optional 
Protocol. Through the end of the 1990s, an important number of EU Member States were 
still recruiting under-18s. This constituted a considerable obstacle for the EU to achieve 
internal and external effectiveness. Nonetheless, EU Member States did achieve their 
objectives: the UN adopted an Optional Protocol on children in armed conflicts was adopted 
by the UN.  
 
The development of a united and coherent EU approach to the issue of child soldier only 
began with the adoption of the EU Guidelines on Children in armed conflict in 2003, three 
years after the adoption of the Optional Protocol.97  In fact, the Guidelines were followed by 
the adoption on 9 December 2004 of the first EU Plan of Action on children in armed 
conflict that aimed to promote better coordination of actions between Member States, the 
Council and the European Commission. However, the implementation phase of the 
Guidelines and of the Plan of Action is, to a great extent left, to the Member States. 98  The 
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Guidelines and the Plan of Action reflect that although there is support for the EU as an actor 
to be more pro-active in this area, Member States remain key players in this area. Ultimately, 
this may hinder the achievement of a comprehensive EU approach to the protection of 













Mining the Data: Is the EU effectively promoting “freedom 
from fear”?  
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: under what conditions is the EU an effective actor 
in the policy area of human security at the UN? It uses an “interactive approach”, which 
examines the interactions between three levels of negotiations, as an analytical framework to 
explore these conditions. Three case studies of human security negotiations were examined 
to test hypotheses regarding the relationship between the dependent variable – the EU’s 
internal and external effectiveness – and independent variables: the ban on anti-personnel 
landmines (APL), the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW), and the 
involvement of children in armed conflicts. This chapter offers a comparative analysis of the 
three case studies. This comparative perspective is essential to determine the conditions 
under which the EU is an effective actor at the UN in the field of human security.  
 
Examining the EU as an actor in negotiations at the UN must be viewed as a “two-step” 
process. First, one must consider whether EU Member States act collectively and thus 
demonstrate that the European Union, and not just the Member States, is an actor in 
negotiations (internal effectiveness). Second, one must evaluate whether the European Union 
does, in fact, influence negotiations at the UN (external effectiveness). In order to investigate 
the EU’s effectiveness and the conditions under which the EU is an effective actor, one must 
consider these two dimensions of the process.  This chapter aims to revisit each of 







This thesis hypothesized that the EU’s effectiveness at the UN on human security issues 
would increase if:   
At the international level (Level I) there was: 
o Hypothesis 1: A high degree of EU’s commitment to multilateralism.   
o Hypothesis 2: A majority voting rule in negotiations   
o Hypothesis 3: A positive US position   
 
At the EU level (Level II) there was: 
o Hypothesis 4: A high level of involvement on the part of the Presidency 
o Hypothesis 5: A high level of participation of the European Commission 
o Hypothesis 6: A high level of French, German and British support  
o  
At the domestic level (Level III) there was: 
o Hypothesis 7: A unified position in EU governments 
o Hypothesis 8: Presence of influence of NGOs and international coalition of NGOs 
 
7.2 Internal and External Effectiveness 
In assessing the EU’s effectiveness at the UN in the promotion of human security, this thesis 
has defined effectiveness in two ways: internal effectiveness and external effectiveness. The 
EU was considered internally effective if the EU had a common position on (supported) a 
potential UN agreement regarding a specific human security issue. Not all EU Member 
States were required to support the agreement; however, if they did not block the European 
Union from supporting the agreement, the EU was deemed internally effective. 
 
In this thesis, the external dimension of effectiveness referred to the success of the EU in 
achieving its objectives in the field of human security. All the initiatives supported by EU 
members in the area of human security have been towards the adoption of stricter regulations 
and constraining agreements. The EU was thus deemed externally effective if the outcome of 
the negotiations on a specific human security issue mirrored the EU’s general objectives in 
the area of human security. The EU’s external effectiveness was evaluated according to 
whether the UN achieved an agreement (that would introduce more stringent regulations) on 
a specific human security issue. If the UN failed to reach an agreement on a specific human 
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security issue, then the EU was also considered to have failed to achieve its objectives. This 
research project was based on the assumption that the EU’s external effectiveness depends, 
to a considerable extent, on its internal effectiveness.  
 
Was the EU internally effective in the three cases of human security negotiations examined? 
Can the EU be an effective actor and influence negotiations dealing with human security 
issues (thus CFSP issues)? The findings of the cases studies paint a mixed picture. The three 
cases investigated show a variation in the dependent variable: the EU’s effectiveness (see 
Table 7.1) 
 
Internal effectiveness: does the European Union speak with one voice? 
 
To evaluate this aspect of effectiveness, statements or contributions delivered by the EU at 
the UN were examined in each phase of the negotiations. The first case study revealed that 
on the anti-personnel landmines issue, the EU struggled to be internally affective. During the 
first phase of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), several EU Member 
States expressed their desire that the fight against anti-personnel landmines would remain a 
domestic issue. While there was limited EU output during the negotiations in the CD, there 
was still a willingness of EU Member States to work collectively and to support the adoption 
of a Joint Action that called for the strengthening of the Protocol II of the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCW). EU Member States may have disagreed on which 
amendments should be included in the Protocol II, but they agreed that the EU should 
support international efforts to reinforce current regulations. Furthermore, following the 
results of the Review Conference and, despite not all EU Member States agreeing to support 
a comprehensive ban on anti-personnel landmines, the EU, as a collective actor, expressed 
its disappointment at the Review Conference’s results. 
 
In contrast, the beginning of the Ottawa Process saw the lowest point of collective action on 
the part of EU Member States. Not only were EU Member States divided over the Ottawa 
Process, but several EU Member States were opposed to the idea that the European Union 
should support the Process. Nonetheless, a majority of EU Member States decided to 
participate in the Process, whether as full participants or as observers. By the time of the last 
phase of negotiations of the ban treaty, almost all EU Member States had become full 
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participants in the Process. But the fact that two EU states were either reluctant to sign the 
treaty (Greece) or unwilling to sign a treaty they could not respect (Finland) prevented the 
EU from complete internally effectiveness. A few days before the signature of the Ottawa 
Convention, the European Union was unable to endorse the Ottawa Process or the 
international Convention that would prohibit the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of 
anti-personnel mines.  However, fourteen of the fifteen EU Member States signed the Ottawa 
Convention. Finland, the only EU Member States that did not sign the Convention, attended 
as an observer all the meetings of the Ottawa Process, although it did not support the 
Process. Finland remained inflexible in its opposition to a comprehensive ban if it was not 
globally accepted. Once Greece had joined other EU Member States in supporting the 
comprehensive ban, Finland was quite isolated within the EU. Furthermore, as it did support 
the idea of a global ban on anti-personnel landmines, it did not attempt to convince other EU 
Member States not to sign the Ottawa Convention. In this sense, the European Union 
achieved internal effectiveness: Finland did not block other EU Member States from signing 
the treaty or prevent the European Union from welcoming the signing of the Ottawa 
Convention. 
 
In negotiations on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, the EU displayed internal 
effectiveness. In this case, as one interviewee pointed out “the EU did its homework”1 and 
was able to adopt a common position on the issue. Early in the negotiations, the EU 
supported the conclusion of a legally binding agreement on the trade (including the illicit 
trade) in small arms and light weapons.  EU Member States also agreed to work collectively 
through the EU to encourage this agreement.  In contrast to the anti-personnel landmines 
case, the issue did not seek to ban the use or, in this case, the trade in these weapons. 
Negotiations in the small arms case focused on the best way to prevent and combat the illicit 
trade in small arms. Because the illegal proliferation of small arms is a complex issue, it 
became clear that the response of the international community would also need to be 
multifaceted. This allowed EU Member States to find a consensus on broader questions 
rather than on a single issue.  
 
                                                 
1 Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the Conference on Disarmament, 
Geneva, 22 April 2008. 
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The EU’s ability to work collectively was also aided because the EU Member States did not 
hold extreme positions on the issue of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. In a 
number of disarmament issues such as nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), the scope for negotiation within the EU is quite limited: nuclear powers (such as 
France and the UK) have to negotiate with countries (such as Ireland and Sweden) that 
belong to the New Agenda Coalition, which lobbies for a total elimination of nuclear 
weapons. The small arms case became a good opportunity for the EU to show that it could 
be internally effective, even on a disarmament issue. One interviewee noted, “On small arms, 
you have got almost the reverse effect than on nuclear and WMD side[…] Some EU 
Member States let loose on the subject of small arms and the EU started taking on many 
other issues [related to small arms].”2  
 
In the negotiations on the Optional Protocol on involvement of children in armed conflicts 
(OP-AC), however, the EU’s internal effectiveness was quite limited. EU output on the 
question of children in armed conflicts was absent during the negotiations. The Optional 
Protocol dealt with rights of children, which until the Amsterdam Treaty were nonexistent in 
the EU’s legal framework.  Indeed, the first substantial EU document on children in armed 
conflicts was only adopted three years after the adoption of the Optional Protocol. The EU 
Member States did discuss the issues of children in armed conflicts, for negotiations on child 
labour in the International Labour Organization (ILO) and on war crimes in the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) both addressed the question of child soldiers. In both cases, the 
European Union was recognized as a strong advocate for the protection of children in armed 
conflicts. Nevertheless, one must emphasize that both Convention 182 of the ILO and the 
Rome Statute of the ICC refer, respectively, to children as under-16s and under-15s. Thus 
EU Member States found it less problematic to find a consensus on the ILO and Article 8 (2) 
of the Rome Statute than on the Optional Protocol where the “straight-18” principle 
dominated the discussion.  
 
Contrary to the small arms case and, to a certain extent, to the anti-personnel landmines 
cases, the positions of Member States on the main questions discussed in the negotiations on 
the Optional Protocol were “extreme.”  It was evident from the beginning of the negotiations 
that the European Union would have to strive to be effective internally. The case of the 
                                                 
2 Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN, New York, 20 June 2006 
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Optional Protocol appeared to be similar to other disarmament issues where the scope for 
negotiation within the EU is quite narrow. Thus, some of the strongest proponents for the 
straight-18 position within the EU, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, chose to concentrate their 
efforts on building consensus with other Nordic states as this was apparently more feasible 
than achieving consensus within the EU. 
 
External effectiveness: does the EU as an actor matter?  
 
The main focus of this thesis has been to assess the EU’s role, or external effectiveness, in 
the success or failure of negotiations at the UN. However, this thesis has not sought to 
explore all the conditions that may explain why negotiations in the UN are successful or not. 
The EU may not be solely responsible for the adoption of an agreement at the UN: other 
factors or players may explain the success or failure of UN negotiations. The EU’s external 
effectiveness is only one piece of the puzzle but may be an important piece.    
 
In the case of anti-personnel landmines, the Review Conference did, ultimately, produce a 
revised Protocol II, but for the EU this document was not adequate. The fact that the revised 
Protocol II did not meet the EU’s expectations does not mean that the EU failed to achieve 
its objectives. In fact, the adoption of an amended Protocol meant that UN members were 
successful in reaching an agreement that would introduce stricter regulations. Thus, in the 
case of negotiations on the review of the CCW, the EU was both internally and externally 
effective. While the Ottawa Process led to successful results, the EU had limited external 
effectiveness in the negotiations: the EU was too divided during the Process to be considered 
a cohesive actor with clear objectives. However, during the final two conferences of the 
Ottawa Process, when the EU Member States (except Finland) agreed to sign the mine ban 
treaty, the EU was able to show limited external effectiveness. Yet, the successful 
completion of negotiations in the landmines case was largely due to the work of EU Member 
States, rather than the result of the effectiveness of the European Union.          
 
While EU Member States agreed that the proliferation of small arms needed to be controlled, 
EU Member States endorsed different approaches towards this problematic issue. This was 
particularly visible at 2006 Review Conference. The EU had a common position at the 2006 
Review Conferences: Member States entered the 2006 Review Conference presenting a 
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united front and calling for the adoption of an outcome document that would strengthen the 
Programme of Action adopted in 2001. Yet, the EU also had twelve different priorities. This 
proliferation of objectives was a barrier to the EU’s quest to be externally effective. First, the 
non-EU Member States were confused as to which of the twelve priorities were actually 
“priorities” and on which the EU would be less willing to compromise. Furthermore, the 
strong insistence on national priorities of certain EU Member States overshadowed the 
consensual priorities agreed by the EU Member States. The EU’s internal effectiveness 
deteriorated during the 2006 Review Conference, which also led to a decline in its external 
effectiveness. The fact that no outcome document was adopted at the end of the Review 
Conference was considered by most EU Member States as a “failure.”  Even if the Review 
Conference produced “good discussion and good ideas were debated…no real progress was 
made.”3 The EU’s inability to display external effectiveness, due to its crumbling internal 
effectiveness, was considered by many NGOs as a significant factor in the failure of the 
Review Conference.4       
 
Whereas several Member States were intensely involved in the negotiation on the Optional 
Protocol, the EU did not become a significant player in discussion of the Working Group and 
was held responsible for the slow progress of the Working Group. Impasse on negotiations 
of recruitment issues was one of the reasons why the role of the European Union was 
deemed by some observers as one of the major limitations to the negotiation process.5 An 
important number of Member States were still recruiting under-18s and had quite a strong 
position on maintaining the age of recruitment lower than 18. This constituted a considerable 
hurdle for the internal effectiveness of the EU and, thus, influenced its external effectiveness. 
Nonetheless, in accordance with the definition of “external effectiveness” used in this thesis, 
EU Member States did achieve their objectives: an Optional Protocol on children in armed 
conflicts was adopted by the UN. If EU Member States certainly played an important part in 
                                                 
3 Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN, Geneva, 22 April 2008 
4 Interview with IANSA delegate, New York, 10 July 2006 and Interview with IANSA delegate, New 
York, 7 July 2006. 
5 See S. Cattaneo, ‘New Multilateralism’ and ‘High Politics’: State-NGO Relations on Human 
Security Issues. Thèse présentée à l’Université de Genève pour l’obtention du grade de Docteur en 
relations internationales (science politique), Institut des Hautes études internationales, Geneva, 2007, 
p.245.; and R. Brett, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (OP/CAC), International Council on Human Rights Policy and 
International Commission of Jurists, Workshop, Geneva, 13-14 February 2005. 
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the genesis and the conclusion of negotiations on the Optional Protocol, the European Union 
as an actor was not a significant player in the successful completion of negotiations.  
 










































APL1: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 1: Negotiations in 1995-1996 
APL2: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 2: December 1996-May 1997 
APL3: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 3: Spring 1997-December 1997 
SALW1: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 1: Negotiation from 1998 to 2001 (including 2001 UN Small 
Arms Conference) 
SALW2: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 2 : Negotiation from 2001 to 2006 (including 2006 Review 
Conference) 
OP-AC1: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 1: October 1994-December 1998 
OP-AC2: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 2: January 1999-January 2000 
 
 
7.3 EU Effectiveness and Independent Variables 
 
For each of the three levels of analysis, the thesis identified hypotheses on the conditions that 
may increase the EU’s effectiveness. In total, eight hypotheses based on independent 
variables were identified. The expected relationship between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable were analyzed across the three cases. The next section aims to review 
each of the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3 to determine whether they should be accepted 




Hypotheses at the international level (Level I) 
 
At the first level of analysis (Level I), three hypotheses were identified:  
• Hypothesis 1: A high degree of EU’s commitment to multilateralism increases the 
EU’s effectiveness.   
• Hypothesis 2: A majority voting rule in negotiations increases the EU’s 
effectiveness. 
• Hypothesis 3: A positive US position increases the EU’s effectiveness. 
 
Hypothesis 1: A high degree of EU’s commitment to multilateralism increases the 
EU’s effectiveness. 
 
This thesis suggested that a high degree of EU’s commitment to multilateralism at the 
international level would increase the EU’s effectiveness. The EU’s commitment to 
multilateralism as an abstract concept, qualitative indicators were used to asses the EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism: direct contributions (statements, written contributions to the 
work of groups of experts, preparatory committees, etc.) of EU Member States and of the 
European Union to negotiations were evaluated. Three possible degrees of commitment were 
identified: 
1. A low degree of EU’s commitment meant that only EU Member States made 
contributions to the negotiations. In addition, the national contributions did not 
mention the European Union. 
2. A medium degree of EU commitment involved contributions made on behalf of 
the EU by the rotating Presidency. EU Member States also had to mention the 
European Union in their national contributions. 
3. A high degree of EU commitment meant that there were specific EU 
contributions that were submitted and that Member States referred to this 
contribution in their own national contributions. 
 
In the case of APL, the European Union displayed a medium degree of contribution during 
the negotiations of the CCW Review Conference (see Table 7.2). This medium level was 
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manifested through the repeated declarations of the Member States that the EU wished the 
adoption of a strong revised Protocol II. While EU Member States agreed that the Protocol II 
should be reinforced, they were internally ineffective when negotiations started: the EU 
could not agree on which amendments should be adopted to strengthen Protocol II. There 
were no EU contributions to the Review Conference. The EU’s level of contribution 
decreased during the Ottawa Process. The EU as an actor did not officially endorse the 
Ottawa Process or formally contribute to the Ottawa Process. The EU displayed a low degree 
of commitment during the Ottawa Process.  
Table 7.2. EU effectiveness and EU Commitment to Multilateralism 
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Notes: 
APL1: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 1: Negotiations in 1995-1996 
APL2: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 2: December 1996-May 1997 
APL3: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 3: Spring 1997-December 1997 
SALW1: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 1: Negotiation from 1998 to 2001 (including 2001 UN Small 
Arms Conference) 
SALW2: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 2 : Negotiation from 2001 to 2006 (including 2006 Review 
Conference) 
OP-AC1: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 1: October 1994-December 1998 
OP-AC2: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 




In contrast, the EU demonstrated a high degree of commitment to multilateralism in the case 
of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The European Union, and EU Member 
States, made several contributions to the work of the UN group of experts on small arms 
preparatory committees for both the 2001 Small Arms Conference and the 2006 Review 
Conference and to the Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms. A high degree of 
commitment to multilateralism impacted on the EU’s internal effectiveness and, to a certain 
extent, to its external effectiveness. The more the EU sought to contribute to the debate the 
more the EU Member States united to create an EU output. This was particularly evident 
during sessions of the preparatory committee for the 2001 Conference and the 2006 Review 
Conference. 
 
Finally, the EU’s contribution, in the case of the Optional Protocol on child soldiers, was 
limited to a low degree. In the child soldiers case, the European Union did not formally 
contribute to the debate. Formal contributions by the European Union only occurred after the 
UN General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol. Interestingly, the EU Guidelines on 
children and armed conflict refer to several documents adopted by the EU, including the EU 
Code of Conduct on Arms Export adopted on 8 June 1998. However, the documents do not 
specifically address the question of the involvement of children in armed conflicts. The low 
degree of contribution (or rather the lack of contribution) on the part of the European Union 
is linked to the limited coordination between the Member States during the negotiations of 
the Working Group. Furthermore, the Working Group on the Optional Protocol met six times 
between 1995 and 2000. The EU Member States’ participation to the Working Group was 
variable. While most of the participants in the Working Group were either from Europe and 
the Americas, with more than 35 European states represented in the negotiations, only eight 
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) of the 
fifteen EU Member States participated in all six sessions of the Working Group.  
 
The research suggests that in all cases but one (APL2) a higher degree of commitment 
increases the EU’s internal effectiveness. The results are not as conclusive for the EU’s 
external effectiveness as in two cases (APL3 and OP-AC2); the EU displayed a low degree 
of commitment and was still externally effective. Furthermore, in the case of SALW2, the 
EU was highly committed to multilateralism, but was externally ineffective.  Hypothesis 1 (a 
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high degree of commitment to multilateralism does increase the EU’s effectiveness) is thus 
partially accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Negotiations based on majority voting increase the EU’s 
effectiveness. 
 
The rules of decision-making used in negotiations are the second variable selected at the 
international level.  In our second hypothesis, a majority voting rule in negotiations increases 
the EU’s effectiveness. A nominal category was used to measure this variable:  
 -Consensus 
 -Majority voting 
 
All three cases involved at least one phase of negotiations which was based on consensus, 
the rule used in most UN regulations. Does the use of consensus appear to affect the EU’s 
effectiveness? The research reveals that consensus does influence both internal and external 
effectiveness of the EU. In fact, in the cases of the Review Conference of the Protocol II on 
landmines, the 2001 Small Arms Conference and the 2006 Small Arms Review Conference, 
three conferences relying on consensus, EU Member States invested significant efforts to 
convince other states to support a final (weak) document, rather than encouraging more 
stringent commitments. More specifically, the use of consensus influenced the failure of the 
2006 small arms Review Conference and the EU’s lack of effectiveness in the negotiations. 
While the EU Member States focused on persuading the US to change its position, China 
and Russia, two main producers of small arms, used the consensus rule to maintain their 
positions on certain issues without attracting the attention of other states. The 2006 small 
arms Review Conference combined two elements, consensus rule and time constraints, 
which made it more difficult for the EU to exert external effectiveness.  
 
The case of the Optional Protocol on child soldiers is interesting because in December 1999, 
the chairperson of the Working Group offered the option of voting to participants. However, 
this option was rejected for fear of creating a precedent in the (then) Commission on Human 
Rights.  In the consensus-based negotiations, opponents of the straight-18 position had a 
clear advantage. Negotiations based on consensus made it more difficult for the EU to be 
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internally effective. The “reformist” EU Member States (which supported the “straight-18” 
position) in the EU had to convince their EU colleagues to support their position on the 
question without jeopardizing the adoption of the draft Optional Protocol.  On this point, the 
case of Sweden is interesting: the Chairman of the Working Group was a Swedish national. 
While Sweden was a strong supporter of the straight-18 position, it could not advocate this 
position without undermining the efforts of the Chairman to achieve consensus and to 
conclude successful negotiations.  
 
In each case studied in this thesis, achieving consensus was considered to be more important 
than adopting a more stringent treaty. Despite frequent criticism, working by consensus is 
considered a cornerstone of the United Nations system.  There is evidence to show, that over 
and over again, EU Member States agreed to abandon their priorities for the sake of reaching 
consensus in the UN.6 According to the definition of “external effectiveness” used in this 
thesis, supporting consensus becomes an important aspect of the EU Member States external 
effectiveness and support of the UN work. Yet, supporting consensus may also disrupt the 
EU’s internal effectiveness by encouraging EU Member States to privilege “consensus in the 
UN” over the EU “common position.”    
 
Was the EU truly more internally and externally effective in the Ottawa Process, which was 
based on majority voting? Again, a cautious answer must be given to this question (see Table 
7.3). The Core Group of the Ottawa Process also agreed that the majority voting rule would 
be used in negotiations. Only states willing to support the idea of a comprehensive ban were 
allowed to be full participants in the Process. The Core Group designed a process that 
increased the probability of achieving their preferred outcome. Ultimately, the Ottawa 
Convention was adopted without a vote, but the rules of procedures of negotiations were 
based on majority voting. Until the final phase of negotiations, the EU strove to be internally 
effective. The case study shows that majority voting allowed the more “reformist” EU 
Member States - Member States supporting the Ottawa Process - to lobby their EU 
colleagues to support the comprehensive ban without having to worry about the failure of 
negotiations (as this would have been the case in a consensus situation). The lobbying 
                                                 
6 This view was confirmed by a number of interviewees especially  in an interview with an official 
from an EU Member State Mission, New York, 20 June 2006 and an interview with an official from 
an EU Member State Mission, Geneva, 22 April 2008.  
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proved crucial for the EU to achieve, to a certain extent, internal effectiveness during the 
final negotiations as 14 EU Member States signed the Ottawa Convention and Finland did 
not block attempts to reach consensus within the EU. Majority voting also influenced the 
EU’s external effectiveness in negotiations.  
 
Furthermore, in the last hour of negotiations, NGOs campaigners became concerned that 
intense American pressure would cause some EU Member States to change their position 
and to support the inclusion of exceptions in the treaty.  EU Member States also used the 
majority rule to refuse compromise on the Ottawa Convention. In this sense, majority voting 
helped the EU to achieve limited external effectiveness. 
Table 7.3  EU Effectiveness and Decision-Making Rules 























































































       
Notes: 
APL1: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 1: Negotiations in 1995-1996 
APL2: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 2: December 1996-May 1997 
APL3: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 3: Spring 1997-December 1997 
SALW1: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 1: Negotiation from 1998 to 2001 (including 2001 UN Small 
Arms Conference) 
SALW2: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 2 : Negotiation from 2001 to 2006 (including 2006 Review 
Conference) 
OP-AC1: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 1: October 1994-December 1998 
OP-AC2: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 




Only the case of anti-personnel landmines with the Ottawa Process included majority voting; 
however, this case confirms the hypothesis that majority voting does increase the EU’s 
effectiveness. With only one case supporting the hypothesis that the EU’s effectiveness 
increases with the use of majority voting, Hypothesis 2 can only be partially accepted, but 
the findings show that the EU does struggle, in some cases, to be internally and externally 
effective in negotiations based on consensus.  
 
Hypothesis 3: A positive US position increases the EU’s effectiveness 
 
The role of the European Union in the promotion of human security was considered 
especially crucial as the United States, a prominent UN actor and a major partner of the EU, 
appeared less committed to the human security agenda. As summarize in Table 7.4, all three 
case studies suggest that the US more often opposed than supported the agreement on the 
Table. Its lack of support for an international agreement on small arms and light weapons 
and its refusal to sign the Ottawa Convention has damaged the US reputation in the policy 
area of human security. However, its massive contribution to mine action programmes and 
the fact that it has adopted some of the strictest arms export laws and policies in the world 
make the US a crucial actor in human security issues. 
 
With regards to the US position, the hypothesis formulated expected the following 
relationship: US support for an agreement would increase the EU’s effectiveness. To 
determine whether the US supported or opposed an agreement, the statements delivered by 
the American delegation at the beginning and the end of each phase of negotiations was 
examined. The United States was only considered to be supporting the agreement if it was 
willing to endorse the version of the agreement that was currently under negotiation. A 
nominal classification was used to measure the US position: 
 
-The United States supports the agreement  




The opposition of United States partly explains why the EU struggled to show a united front 
with regard to the Ottawa Process and the first sessions of the Working Group on the 
Optional Protocol on child soldiers. In both cases, the United States’ position in negotiations 
had an influence on EU Member States and precluded them from acting collectively. The 
first case examined is especially indicative of the influence of the US position and its ability 
to cause discord between EU Member States and affect their capacity to speak with a single 
voice. Although it did not sign the Ottawa Convention, the US was crucial player in the fight 
against landmines. The United States was the first country to adopt a moratorium on the 
export of anti-personnel landmines and, as early as 1996, pledged to lead global efforts to 
seek an agreement on a ban.  However, the American initiative to favour the Conference on 
Disarmament over the Ottawa Process to achieve a comprehensive ban created division 
within EU and hindered efforts to achieve internal effectiveness.   
 
The small arms case offers different findings. The fact that the US did not support 
international agreements of SALW did not have the same dividing effect on the EU Member 
States as in the landmines case. On the contrary, in key moments, the US opposition 
apparently encouraged the EU Member States to be more willing to work together and to 
promote the EU’s priorities. This suggests that occasionally the US opposition can be a 
catalyst for the EU’s internal effectiveness.  However, US opposition in the small arms case 
was an important obstacle for the EU’s achievement of external effectiveness.  
 
But, as the third hypothesis suggests, does a positive US position increase the EU’s 
effectiveness? The fact that the United States decided to join the Ottawa Process at Oslo and 
to support the mine ban treaty convinced some EU Member States to participate in the last 
phase of negotiations of the Ottawa Convention and also support the agreement. In addition, 
in the case of the Optional Protocol, the shift in the American position in the last session of 
the Working Group produced similar results. These findings suggest that a positive position 







Table 7.4 EU Effectiveness and US position 
Dependent Variable: Effectiveness: Internal (I) and External (E) 
Cases 
Variables 
































































































*US supported until the very end of negotiations but did not sign the agreement. 
Notes: 
APL1: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 1: Negotiations in 1995-1996 
APL2: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 2: December 1996-May 1997 
APL3: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 3: Spring 1997-December 1997 
SALW1: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 1: Negotiation from 1998 to 2001 (including 2001 UN Small 
Arms Conference) 
SALW2: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 2 : Negotiation from 2001 to 2006 (including 2006 Review 
Conference) 
OP-AC1: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 1: October 1994-December 1998 
OP-AC2: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 2: January 1999-January 2000 
 
It is important to observe two other results of the case studies that relate to the role of the US 
and the EU’s effectiveness in human negotiations. First, the cases reveal that the United 
States’ “special relationship” with the United Kingdom can impact negotiations at the 
international level, but also influence the effectiveness of the EU (on the UK influence on 
effectiveness see Hypothesis 5 below). In both the anti-personnel landmines and, more 
importantly, in the Optional Protocol cases, the fact that both the US and the UK opposed the 





Second, although the United States is an important actor in the UN, it is not the only actor. 
The case studies reveal that other actors, including several members of the G-777, had an 
impact on the EU Member States achieving their objectives and should also be considered. 
For example, the small arms case suggests that the EU’s focus on convincing the United 
States meant that it did not spend enough time lobbying several African and Asian states, 
two of the most affected regions by the scourge of small arms and light weapons. In the end, 
some African and Asian countries blocked EU proposals. In the case of the Optional 
Protocol on child soldiers, the need to address the problems of child soldiering in developing 
countries became a central issue during negotiations. Yet, most of the negotiations only 
involved developed states. For example, approximately twelve sub-Saharan African States 
participated in negotiations of the Working Group, but not one state was represented in the 
sessions.8 EU Member States defending the straight-18 position might have exerted more 
influence on African countries, which could have potentially been allies. The lack of allies 
became problematic for several EU Member States and hindered the EU’s external 
effectiveness.  
 
The case studies indicate that the US position does have an effect on the EU’s effectiveness, 
but the increase of the EU’s effectiveness is not necessarily linked to a positive US position. 
In fact, occasionally, the US opposition actually encouraged EU Member States to work 
collectively. The case studies do show evidence that US support for an agreement facilitated 
the achievement of the EU’s objectives.  Thus, the hypothesis that a positive US position 
increases the EU’s effectiveness can only be partially accepted. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The Group of 77 (G-77) was established on 15 June 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries. It 
now includes more 130 countries and is the largest intergovernmental organization of developing 
states in the United Nations. The aim of G-77 is to “provides the means for the countries of the South 
to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating 
capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote 
South-South cooperation for development.” See www.g77.org. 
8 Happold argues that the sporadic attendance of African states is probably due to budgetary 
constraints rather than a lack of interests. See M. Happold, “The Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts” in H. Fischer and A. 
Macdonald (eds.), Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol.3, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2000, p.231.  
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Hypotheses at the EU level (Level II) 
 
The second set of hypotheses was formulated to examine the relationship between the 
dependent variable and independent variables at the EU level. The hypotheses were designed 
to explore the influence of main actors in EU external relations on the EU’s effectiveness. 
These actors included the Presidency, the Commission, and France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. 
   
Three hypotheses were formulated: 
• Hypothesis 4: A high level of involvement on the part of the Presidency increases 
the EU’s effectiveness. 
• Hypothesis 5: A high level of participation of the European Commission increases 
the EU’s effectiveness. 
• Hypothesis 6: A high level of French, German and British support increases the 
EU’s effectiveness. 
 
Hypothesis 4: A high level of involvement of the Presidency increases the EU’s 
effectiveness. 
 
The first hypothesis at the EU level relates to the role of the Council Presidency. The 
hypothesis suggested that a high level of involvement of EU Presidencies increased the EU’s 
effectiveness. The involvement of the Presidencies was measured using the following ordinal 
scale:  
 
1. Low level of Involvement of the Presidency: Adoption of Statements, Declarations, 
Conclusions (politically binding CFSP instrument) 
2.  Medium Level of Involvement of the Presidency: Adoption of Joint Actions and 
Common positions  
3. High Level of Involvement of the Presidency:  Adoption of EU strategy which 




As summarize in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6, the level of involvement of the EU Members 
States holding the Presidency varied across the three cases. 
Table 7.5. CFSP Instruments Adopted  
Cases CFSP Instruments 
Adopted 








































APL1: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 1: Negotiations in 1995-1996 
APL2: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 2: December 1996-May 1997 
APL3: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 3: Spring 1997-December 1997 
SALW1: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 1: Negotiation from 1998 to 2001 (including 2001 UN Small 
Arms Conference) 
SALW2: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 2 : Negotiation from 2001 to 2006 (including 2006 Review 
Conference) 
OP-AC1: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 1: October 1994-December 1998 
OP-AC2: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 2: January 1999-January 2000 
 
In the anti-personnel landmine case, the level of involvement of the EU Presidencies was low 
for the first two phases of negotiations and medium for the last phase of negotiations. 
Interestingly, the low level of involvement coincided with Presidencies held by states that 
were not only pro-ban, but also pro-Ottawa Process. It is evident that EU Member States 
holding the Presidency during the Ottawa Process (Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) played an important role in ensuring the continued attention to the issue of 
landmines within the EU. If Greece or Finland had held the Presidency during this period, 
negotiations might have taken another turn. Nonetheless, in cases where the positions of EU 
Member States are more “extreme” on a certain question and the position of the Presidency 
is more “reformist,” the more likely the Presidency will encounter difficulty in achieving 




Table 7.6 EU Effectiveness and Involvement of Presidency 
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Notes: 
APL1: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 1: Negotiations in 1995-1996 
APL2: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 2: December 1996-May 1997 
APL3: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 3: Spring 1997-December 1997 
SALW1: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 1: Negotiation from 1998 to 2001 (including 2001 UN Small 
Arms Conference) 
SALW2: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 2 : Negotiation from 2001 to 2006 (including 2006 Review 
Conference) 
OP-AC1: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 1: October 1994-December 1998 
OP-AC2: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 2: January 1999-January 2000 
 
 
A high level of involvement of the Presidency was observed in the case of small arms and 
light weapons where the EU was especially internally effective. Several Member States 
holding the Presidency convinced their EU partners of the need to address the SALW issue 
and helped to harmonize the EU’s position regarding the illicit trade of small arms and light 
weapons. This had a direct impact on the EU’s internal effectiveness. Between 1997 and 
2006, the EU adopted more than a dozen agreements addressing the issue of small arms, 
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including a series of Joint Actions, an EU Code of Conduct, an EU Plan of Action and the 
EU Strategy. Between the 2001 Small Arms Conference and the 2006 Review Conference, 
the EU’s position progressed. More importantly, it was reinforced by the adoption of CFSP 
instruments.9  These developments contributed to the perception that the European Union 
was as a significant actor with high expectations, particularly at the commencement of the 
2006 Review Conference. Curtailing the spread of small arms and light weapons was an 
important priority on the disarmament agenda for the EU countries which held the 
Presidency either just prior to or during the negotiations on small arms. The case of small 
arms and light weapons confirms the hypotheses that a high level of involvement of the 
Presidency augments the EU’s effectiveness, particularly its internal effectiveness. 
 
A low level of involvement of the Presidency is found in the case of the Optional Protocol on 
the involvement of children in armed conflicts. In this case, the EU’s position was divided, 
as some EU Member States refused to compromise. The fact that several “conservative” 
Member States held the Presidency during the negotiations of the Working Group provides 
the explanation for why the European Union remained relatively silent on the issue. This, 
however, may also reflect the fact that one of the most important tasks of the Council 
Presidency is to reach consensus on an issue. One interviewee pointed out that in Geneva, 
when there is a clear divide between the positions of the Member States on a specific human 
rights issue, the EU does even attempt to reach consensus.10 The Optional Protocol was such 
an issue.  
 
While some interviewees noted that holding the Presidency does permit EU Member States 
to place more of their priorities on the EU agenda and to advocate their views,11 most 
stressed that it would be a very sensitive issue for an EU Member State to push for their own 
position to be adopted as an EU position.12 The Presidency’s role is, first and foremost, to 
find consensus within EU. Any attempt of one Presidency to advocate excessively their 
                                                 
9 Interview with an official from UK Mission to the United Nations, New York, 20 June 2006 
10 Interview with an official from a Mission of an EU Member States to the UN, Geneva, 22 April 
2006 
11 Interview with an official from a Mission of an EU Member States to the UN, New York, 21 June 




priorities could potentially jeopardize its position as chair of EU Meetings. “Reformist” 
states may even prefer not to have the presidency as this would enable them to lobby their 
EU colleagues more intensively. Regarding the 2006 Review Conference, one interviewee 
noted that Germany was most likely relieved not to be holding the Presidency of the EU 
because their views on ammunitions were controversial.13 Holding the Presidency would 
have prevented Germany from intensively lobbying other states for an agreement on this 
issue.  
 
Another revelation that emerges from the case studies is that while discussion in the Council 
Working Groups, whether CONUN, CODUN, COARM or COHOM, set the priorities and 
objectives, negotiations on the specifics occur in New York and Geneva. For example, the 
adoption of the EU Strategy under the UK Presidency was an important guiding document 
for the elaboration of the EU’s position for the 2006 Small Arms Review Conference, but the 
actual EU position for the Review Conference was negotiated between the capitals and the 
missions in New York and Geneva. Furthermore, while officials working in New York and 
Geneva recognized the authority of the Council of Ministers, they argue that often the 
documents adopted in Brussels do not reflect the reality of negotiations in New York and 
Geneva.14 However, the officials also contend that the Presidency’s role remains significant, 
especially when setting objectives for the EU regarding issues on the UN agenda and 
achieving consensus within the EU.  
 
The case studies confirm that a higher level of involvement of the Presidency increases the 




                                                                                                                                          
12 Interview with an official from a Mission of an EU Member States to the UN, Geneva, 22 April 
2008., Interview with an official from a Mission of an EU Member States to the UN, New York, 20 
June 2006, 20 June 2006 
13 Interview with an official from a Mission of an EU Member States to the UN, New York, 20 June 
2006, 
14 Interview with an official from a Mission of an EU Member States to the UN, New York, 20 June 




Hypothesis 5: A high level of participation of the European Commission increases 
the EU’s effectiveness 
 
The second hypothesis at the EU level suggested that a high degree of participation of the 
Commission would increase the EU’s effectiveness. The participation of the European 
Commission was measured using this ordinal scale:  
1. Low level of participation: Statements by EU Commissioners.  
2. Medium Level of participation: Statements by EU Commissioners and Adoption of 
Communication from the Commission (COM documents).  
3. High Level of participation: Statements by EU Commissioners, adoption of COM 
documents and cooperation with the Presidency (production of material/reports for 
the UN conferences, organization of international events).  
 
Each of the three cases suggests that the actual role of the Commission at the UN in human 
security negotiations is often limited to participating in EU coordination meetings and 
organizing side-events. The Commission officials are usually invited to UN meetings dealing 
with human security issues, but are not allowed to participate in negotiations.15 Nonetheless, 
the European Commission is seen as an important interlocutor by non-EU Member States: 
the Commission may help partners to better understand the position of EU Member States 
regarding certain human security issues.16 
 
Through the Ottawa Process, the European Union was viewed as a central player in the fight 
against landmines. Yet, this was, to a certain extent, due to the role of the European 
Commission in this field. Despite the EU Member States’ division over the adoption of a 
comprehensive ban, the European Commission continued to work closely with the UN and 
fund mine-related activities. In fact, by the early 1990s, the European Commission was 
already a major donor for mine-related programmes and ECHO had developed a strong 
partnership with the ICRC for mine clearance projects. In the EU, anti-personnel landmines 
were first portrayed as human rights issues (as in the European Parliament Resolution), but 
                                                 
15 Interview with an official from the European Commission, DG Relex, Brussels, 17 October 2007. 
16 Interview with an official from the European Commission, DG Relex, Brussels, 15 October  2007 




also as humanitarian and development issues. However, for the Member States, the military 
aspect of APL eclipsed all other dimensions of the questions: APL were first and foremost a 
CFSP issue. While the European Commission’s activities made it a central actor in the fight 
against APL, the level of involvement of the European Commission remained low (see Table 
7.7). The Commission did not become a key player in negotiations of the Ottawa Process. 
Although the Commission was welcomed to attend the Council meetings where the APL was 
discussed, it was not directly involved in the development of the EU’s APL policy. The fact 
that the ICBL did not generally target the European Commission is another indication of the 
secondary role of this institution during the Ottawa Process. The European Commission’s 
involvement on anti-personnel landmines had little impact on the EU’s effectiveness in 
negotiations on the mine ban treaty. 
In the small arms case, the level of participation of the European Commission was high. 
First, the European Commission worked in a close partnership with some of the Council 
Presidencies. The EU Strategy on Small Arms also acknowledged the role of the European 
Commission. As with APL, the production and trade of small arms do not fall into the 
competence of the Commission as they are considered CFSP issues.  However, the 
Commission is responsible for the European Community actions in the field of humanitarian 
and development assistance, which are intrinsic parts of the efforts against the proliferation 
of small arms. Following the 2001 Small Arms Conference, the Commission became 
increasingly active in several SALW-related programs using different lines of budget and 
programs, such as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and 
the European Development Fund (EDF). The European Commission also developed specific 
initiatives to increase its visibility in the field of small arms. It commissioned a wide-ranging 
research project to study consistency problems of the EU SALW policy. The aim of the 
report was to offer suggestions on how the European Union could become more effective in 
this field. The report also proposed specific initiatives that the Commission was to 
implement. With this project the European Commission signalled its intention to play a 
greater role in the issue of small arms and light weapons. The EU Member States 
acknowledge the Commission role in negotiations and its contribution is found especially 
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useful in providing “facts and figures.”17 However, the Commission has yet to influence 
negotiations at the UN on this specific issue. 
 
Table 7.7 EU Effectiveness and Participation of European Commission  
Dependent Variable: Effectiveness: Internal (I) and External (E) 
Cases 
Variables 
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Level 
 








    
Notes: 
APL1: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 1: Negotiations in 1995-1996 
APL2: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 2: December 1996-May 1997 
APL3: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 3: Spring 1997-December 1997 
SALW1: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 1: Negotiation from 1998 to 2001 (including 2001 UN Small 
Arms Conference) 
SALW2: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 2 : Negotiation from 2001 to 2006 (including 2006 Review 
Conference) 
OP-AC1: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 1: October 1994-December 1998 
OP-AC2: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 2: January 1999-January 2000 
 
In the final case, the European Commission was mostly involved with the UN Special 
Representative for children and armed conflicts and displayed a medium level of 
participation. At the time of the last sessions of the Working Group on the Optional Protocol, 
regular consultations were organized between the Special Representative and the 
                                                 
17 Interview with an official from a Mission of an EU Member States to the UN, New York, 20 June 
2006, and Interview with an official from a Mission of an EU Member States to the UN, Geneva, 22 
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Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs and Development. The Commissioner also 
collaborated closely with the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers and endorsed the 
Coalition’s campaign. Yet again, the European Commission did not participate in the 
negotiations of the Working Group on the Optional Protocol and had little impact on the 
EU’s effectiveness in negotiations on the Protocol. There are several explanations for this. 
First, the Optional Protocol was to be annexed to a human rights treaty and the 
implementation of the EU’s external human rights policy through international organizations 
such as the UN is a CFSP issue. Second, the Optional Protocol dealt with the rights of 
children, but also had a military dimension. As with the cases of APL and SALW, the 
military character of the question was omnipresent in negotiations of the Working Group. 
Thus, the European Commission could contribute little to the debate and did not become a 
significant actor in the negotiations.  
 
Based on the findings of all three cases, the Commission’s level of participation does not 
affect the EU’s effectiveness at the UN in human security negotiations. Thus, the hypothesis 
that a high level of participation of the European Commission increases the EU’s 
effectiveness is rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 6: High level of French, German and British support increases the EU’s 
effectiveness 
 
The hypothesis that a high level of French, German and British support increases the EU’s 
effectiveness was the third and last put forward for the EU level. An ordinal classification 
was used to examine this variable:  
1. Low Level of Support: France or Germany or the United Kingdom champions EU 
initiatives that support UN agreement on human security issues, and supports the 
potential UN agreement without any reservations.  
2. Medium Level of Support: Two of these states (France-Germany or France-UK or 
Germany-UK) champion EU initiatives that support UN agreement on human 
security issues, and support the potential UN agreement without any reservations. 




3. High Level of Support: France, Germany and the UK champion EU initiatives that 
support UN agreement on human security issues, and all three states support the 
potential UN agreement without any reservations.   
 
As Table 7.8 summarizes, a high level of support of France, Germany and the UK affected 
the EU’s effectiveness in all three cases. This is particularly true regarding negotiations 
dealing with conventional weapons such as landmines and small arms. The position of these 
three countries influenced the position of other (smaller) EU Member States. Once France, 
Germany and the UK support an initiative on conventional weapons, other smaller EU states 
are generally quite content to follow.18 The Big Three also influence each other’s positions. 
In general, all three states wished to be united: none of these three states desires “to stand 
alone” in negotiations.  One interviewee pointed out that “90% of the time, [France, 
Germany and the UK] agree on issues that are discussed at the UN.”19 This statement is also 
representative of the three case studies examined in this thesis. The case studies confirmed 
that France, Germany and the United Kingdom were dominant players at the international 
level in human security negotiations. Their support for or opposition to an agreement in the 
field of human security were influential in getting other EU Member States on board but also 
for the successful completion of negotiations at the international level.  
 
In the anti-personnel landmine case, Germany’s early support for the Ottawa Process was 
judged crucial, as most other states in the Core Group were small states or middle powers. 
However, Germany was also attracted by the dual-track approach and was seen by both 
camps (pro-CD and pro-Ottawa Process) as an ally. Germany was therefore, unable to 
influence the EU’s support for one position over the other. The shift in the British and 
French position did clearly have an impact on other EU member states. This case study 
revealed that once the UK and France had joined the Ottawa Process in June 1997, other EU 
member states that had been more pro-CD quickly followed and shifted their position; by the 
Oslo Conference, all EU member states except Greece and Finland fully participated to the 
negotiations. The internal effectiveness of the EU increased significantly after 1997. The fact 
that the British, French and German governments supported the Ottawa Process was 
interpreted as a signal by other states that a comprehensive ban could be achieved. The APL 
                                                 
18 Interview with an official from EU Member States Mission to the Conference on Disarmament, 
Geneva, 22 April 2008. 
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case supports the hypothesis that a high level of support of France, Germany and the UK 
increases the EU’s effectiveness. 
Table 7.8 EU Effectiveness and French, German and British Support 
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Notes: 
APL1: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 1: Negotiations in 1995-1996 
APL2: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 2: December 1996-May 1997 
APL3: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 3: Spring 1997-December 1997 
SALW1: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 1: Negotiation from 1998 to 2001 (including 2001 UN Small 
Arms Conference) 
SALW2: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 2 : Negotiation from 2001 to 2006 (including 2006 Review 
Conference) 
OP-AC1: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 1: October 1994-December 1998 
OP-AC2: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 2: January 1999-January 2000 
 
France, Germany and especially the UK were also unquestionably important actors in small 
arms negotiations. These states were supportive from the beginning of the negotiations, were 
                                                                                                                                          
19 Interview with official from UK Mission to the UN, New York, 8 June 2006. 
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actively involved, and supported EU actions in this sphere. However when these three 
Member States decided to pursue their own priorities rather than the EU position, the EU’s 
effectiveness deteriorated. In fact, not only the UK, but also France and Germany were 
criticized by other EU Member States during the 2006 Review Conference because they 
made several proposals and suggestions to the President of the Conference without 
consulting their EU partners. This resulted in a situation where these EU Member States 
adopted stronger positions, rather than allowing the more moderate EU statements to 
represent them.  
 
It is also important to note that the UK’s distinctive rapport with US has led some observers 
and EU Member States to question the leadership of the UK on issues such as the illicit trade 
of small arms and light weapons.20 This special relationship, however, can also be beneficial 
for the EU and, in some cases, increase the EU’s external effectiveness. The UK is 
recognized by its EU partners as “a bridge between the EU and US.”21 EU Member States 
often look to the UK for help when negotiating with the United States and ensuring the US 
participates in negotiations and supports agreements on human security issues.22 The UK’s 
relationship with the United States may thus help EU Member States and the European 
Union achieve their objectives. Yet, in the case of small arms and light weapons, the UK 
failed to convince the US to support the agreement. 
 
The case study on the Optional Protocol on child soldiers revealed that France and Germany 
were both actively involved in negotiations of the Working Group and generally in favour of 
a strict Optional Protocol on the issue of recruitment and participation. Nonetheless, these 
two countries preferred to achieve a protocol by consensus, rather than seeking a “straight-
18” outcome. This position was adopted by most other EU Member States, including the 
United Kingdom, but not by those supporting the “straight-18” principle. The French and 
Germans struggled to convince the more “reformist” states to drop the principle. The EU was 
unable to be entirely internally effective during the negotiations. The UK position on the age 
for participation and recruitment also contributed to this situation. Not only did the UK cause 
negotiations in the Working Group to linger, but its inflexibility directly hindered the EU 
                                                 
20 Interview, with IANSA delegate, New York, 6 July 2006. 
21 Interview with an official from a Mission of an EU Member States, 22 April 2006. 
22 Interview with an official from UK Mission to the United Nations, New York, 8 June 2006 and 
Interview with an official from UK Mission to the United Nations, Geneva, 22 April 2008. 
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ability to speak with one voice and influence negotiations. One interviewee described the 
UK’s involvement as follows: “Great-Britain will never be against initiatives on child 
soldiers but it is less active on the issue than other EU Member States and has very limited 
leadership”23. The UK was a hesitant actor in the negotiations on the Optional Protocol: 
during the negotiations, the UK reiterated that it was willing to compromise and would not 
block consensus on the Optional Protocol. However, its position on many issues exasperated 
many of the other states. In the case of the Optional Protocol, the position of the UK, rather 
than the position of France and Germany, had a significant influence on the EU’s 
effectiveness. 
Evidence from the three case studies confirms that a higher level of French, German and 
British support does increase the EU’s effectiveness. Hypothesis 5 is accepted. 
 
Hypotheses at the Domestic Level (Level III) 
 
In a three-level game analysis, the third level of analysis focuses on examining domestic 
politics. A comprehensive three-level analysis of negotiations involving the EU would 
require the review of national politics in 27 Member States. To limit the scope of and 
simplify the analysis of case studies, this thesis focused on domestic politics in France, 
Germany and the UK, and, when relevant to the analysis, EU Member States holding the 
Presidency. To simplify the analysis, all EU Member States holding the Presidency are 
represented by one category “The Presidency”. Two hypotheses were formulated at the 
domestic level. The first hypothesis concerned the relationship between the cohesive position 
of national governments and the EU’s effectiveness. The second hypothesis involved testing 
the relationship between the activities of NGOs in EU Member States and the EU’s 
effectiveness.    
 
Hypotheses 7:  A unified position of various national departments/ministries in EU 
Member States increases the EU’s effectiveness. 
 
                                                 




The first hypothesis at the domestic level stipulated that the presence of a common position 
within EU Member States increases the EU’s effectiveness. This variable was assessed using 
a nominal classification:  
-Presence of a unified position in EU governments  
-Absence of a unified position in EU governments 
The three case studies have demonstrated that in addition to officials from the national 
foreign ministries, other ministries/departments are involved in human security negations. 
These departments may have their programmes and policies directly affected by agreements 
on human security issues. At the domestic level, the ministries of defence tend to be the ones 
to “lose out”when stricter standards and norms are adopted in the field of human security. In 
each investigated case, the ministries of defence became vocal players in the negotiations 
(see Table 7.9).   
 
The absence of a unified position in some EU governments had a critical impact on the EU’s 
effectiveness in the case of anti-personnel landmines. Internal disagreements had several 
effects on negotiations both at the domestic level and the international level. First, at the 
domestic level, the case shows that solving internal disputes requires time and energy: EU 
governments had to conduct studies to convince the ministries/departments that would be 
potentially disadvantaged that the agreement would enhance the security of states and 
individuals. Internal disputes also create a situation where negotiators arrive at the 
negotiating Table with “tied hands”24 and with less flexibility to compromise with their 
partners at the international level. Furthermore, the case study also indicates that the absence 
of a consensual position within a government can create confusion at the international level 
with regards to the position of the government on the agreement. Declarations and initiatives 
made by one department in support of the agreement can be swiftly neutralized by the 




                                                 
24 On the consequences of  having “tied hands” for negotiators, see P.B. Evans, “Building an 
Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics”, in ” in P.B Evans et al. (eds.), Double-
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Table 7.9 EU Effectiveness and Unified Position within EU Governments 
Dependent Variable: Effectiveness: Internal (I) and External (E) 
Cases 
Variables 
APL1 APL2 APL3 SALW1 SALW2 OP-AC1 OP-AC2 
Independent  
Variable: 
Unified Position  






























F Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No   No Yes 
G Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No   No Yes 
UK     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No     
Presence  
of unified  
position in  
France,  
Germany,  
UK and  
Presidency 
P Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No     
F   No No       No No   
G           No No   
UK Yes Yes No No       No No No Yes 
Absence of 
unified  
position in  
France,  
Germany,  
UK and  
Presidency 
P           No No No Yes 
Notes: 
APL1: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 1: Negotiations in 1995-1996 
APL2: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 2: December 1996-May 1997 
APL3: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 3: Spring 1997-December 1997 
SALW1: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 1: Negotiation from 1998 to 2001 (including 2001 UN Small 
Arms Conference) 
SALW2: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 2 : Negotiation from 2001 to 2006 (including 2006 Review 
Conference) 
OP-AC1: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 1: October 1994-December 1998 
OP-AC2: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 2: January 1999-January 2000 
 
In some EU Member States, including France and the UK and also EU Presidencies such as 
Belgium, the support or opposition of the Ministry of Defence for a comprehensive ban on 
anti-personnel landmines apparently played a key role in negotiations. The case study 
revealed that EU Member States struggled to be considered serious campaigners for a 
comprehensive ban until their ministry of defence openly supported this option. This 
situation prevented some Member States from giving support to the Ottawa Process, but also 
                                                                                                                                          
Edged Diplomacy- International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, University of 
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to lobby for a comprehensive ban at the EU level. Thus, the absence of a common position 
within a government negatively influenced the EU’s internal effectiveness. In contrast, 
countries such as Germany, where the various ministries and departments involved in 
negotiations on landmines collectively supported a total ban, were able to actively advocate 
for a comprehensive ban and to give their full support to the Ottawa Process.  
 
The positive effect of the presence of a unified position in EU Member States government on 
the EU’s effectiveness was evident in the small arms case. In nearly all EU countries there 
was not a clear division on the SALW issues among the various departments/ministries. 
Certain EU Member States created internal initiatives to coordinate the position of  various 
ministries and as well as existing SALW programmes managed by the ministry of foreign 
affairs, the ministry of defence and the ministry responsible for development aid. The UK 
was particularly successful in this domain. One interviewee emphasized that in the case of 
small arms, the UK is in a better position to influence negotiations as its ministries do not 
compete. The interviewees stressed that the UK does witness in other EU Member States 
rival discussions that involve the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of defence and 
added “this doesn’t tend to happen with us. It’s easier for us, because there is a mechanism 
which has ministerial support.”25 Having a unified government position can give an 
advantage to an EU Member State as it is able to adopt a stronger position in negotiations 
and without considering the consequence on intragovernmental bargaining. A unified 
government position increases the ability of an EU Member State to efficiently lobby its EU 
partners as well as other states in negotiations and thus, can affect the EU’s internal and 
external effectiveness. 
 
Most ministries of defence in the EU regarded the Optional Protocol as a treaty that could 
have potential negative and disruptive effects on their armed forces. It was clear that the 
position on the Optional Protocol of the Ministries of Defence were heavily weighed in the 
decision process. In the 1990s, military reforms were introduced in several EU Member 
States. These reforms had diverse consequences. In some countries, the age for recruitment 
and participation was raised and thus allowed some national governments to actively lobby 
for a strong Optional Protocol. However, in a significant number of EU Member States, 
                                                                                                                                          
California Press, 1993, pp.402-403  
25 Interview with an official from the UK Mission to the UN, New York, 20 June 2006. 
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armed forces gradually became all-volunteer forces. The move to a professional army was 
regularly invoked by the ministries of defence as the reason why they could not support the 
“straight-18” position. This caused complications for a few EU Member States, including the 
Netherlands and the UK, where the Ministry of Defence was defending its right to recruit 
under-18s, while the Ministry responsible for development assistance was reaffirming its 
commitment to contribute to UN efforts to reduce the number of children involved in armed 
conflicts. Without a unified governmental position on the issue of the involvement of under-
18s in armed conflicts, a number EU government were unable to support a “reformist” 
agenda and find a consensus with other EU partners. The absence of a common position in 
these states affected the EU’s internal effectiveness. 
 
The cases of anti-personnel landmines and the Optional Protocol on child soldiers confirm 
that internal bargaining can be a significant challenge to a state when adopting a strong 
position in negotiations and for an EU Member State to reach consensus with its EU 
partners.  Hypothesis 7, the presence of a unified position in EU governments increases the 
EU’s effectiveness, is accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 8:  The Presence of Influence of NGO/Coalitions of NGOs in EU 
Member States increases the EU’s effectiveness.  
 
The final hypothesis suggested in this thesis is that the presence of influence of 
NGOs/Coalitions of NGOs increases the EU’s effectiveness. This variable was measured 
using the following nominal classification:  
-Absence of Influence: there is no or limited evidence that NGOs/Coalition of NGOs 
used one of the influence mechanisms (mass electoral pressure or shifting elite 
coalition or bureaucratic utilization).  
-Presence of Influence: NGOs/ Coalitions of NGOs used at least of one the three of 
the influence mechanisms (mass electoral pressure, shifting elite coalition, 
bureaucratic utilization).  
 
Electoral pressure occurs when growing activism and mobilization of public opinion produce 
electoral incentives for action. The second mechanism, elite coalition-shift, involves NGOs 
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becoming part of the dynamics of elite coalition formation: coalition of like-minded elites 
will instigate action on the issue or ask a government to shift its policy. Lastly officials 
within the policy-making system can gain an advantage in debates with other actors in the 
government through bureaucratic utilization, or the use of arguments that the NGOs provide.  
 
The case studies only provide partial evidence of the actual influence of NGOs and NGOs 
coalition within the EU. It is important to stress that an absence of influence does not suggest 
that NGOs were not active in the European Union. It only indicates that there is little or no 
evidence of the use by NGOs of at least one of the three influence mechanisms in France, 
Germany and the UK and the Presidency.  Again, to simplify the analysis, all EU Member 
States holding the Council Presidency are represented by the category “Presidency”. If there 
is evidence of NGOs using at least one of the influence mechanisms in one of the EU 
Member States that was holding the Presidency, then it was concluded that there was 
evidence of presence of influence on the Presidency.  
 
There is clear evidence of the presence of influence of NGOs across all three cases (see 
Table 7.10). However, some EU Member States were targeted more than others. This is the 
case with France, Germany and the United Kingdom. In these countries, NGOs appear to 
have been particularly active when a shift in the government policy was desired.  
 
The role of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the pressure of public 
opinion on governments to change their landmines policy had an effect on the negotiations 
of the Ottawa Convention. The case studies indicate that throughout negotiations in the 
Conference on Disarmament and the Ottawa Process, NGOs and the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines used all the three influence mechanisms in various EU Member States. 
The ICBL was particularly active in France and the United Kingdom. In both countries, the 
ICBL coalition used the mechanisms of electoral pressure and bureaucratic utilization. The 
latter mechanism was used by NGOs due to the fact that ministries in the French and British 
governments were divided regarding a total ban on landmines. In contrast in Germany, 
NGOs focused their efforts on shifting elite coalition and encouraging the German 
government to promote the ban at the international level.  It is interesting to note that in 
some states holding the Presidency, such as Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands, the 
presence of influence of NGOs is mostly related to NGOs using the mechanism of shifting 
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elite coalition and encouraging Member States to act internationally on the issue. In the 
landmine case, NGOs influenced the EU achieving both internal and external effectiveness. 
 
 Table 7.10 EU Effectiveness and Influence of NGOs/Coalition of NGOs 
Dependent Variable: Effectiveness: Internal (I) and External (E) 
Cases 
Variables 
APL1 APL2 APL3 SALW1 SALW2 OP-AC1 OP-AC2 
Independent 
Variable: 































F Yes Yes No No Yes Yes         
G Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes 
UK Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes 
Presence  
of NGO  
influence  
In France,  
Germany,  
UK, and  
Presidency 
 
P Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No     
F       Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes 
G               
UK               
Absence of  
NGO  
influence    
in France,  
Germany,  
UK, and  
Presidency 
 
P           No No No Yes 
Notes: 
APL1: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 1: Negotiations in 1995-1996 
APL2: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 2: December 1996-May 1997 
APL3: Anti-personnel Landmines (APL) Phase 3: Spring 1997-December 1997 
SALW1: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 1: Negotiation from 1998 to 2001 (including 2001 UN Small 
Arms Conference) 
SALW2: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Phase 2 : Negotiation from 2001 to 2006 (including 2006 Review 
Conference) 
OP-AC1: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 1: October 1994-December 1998 
OP-AC2: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict Phase 2: January 1999-January 2000 
 
In the small arms case, European NGOs and IANSA were extremely active during the 
negotiations. They were also used by the national governments to raise public awareness on 
the question on small arms. Throughout the negotiations on SALW, the EU and several of its 
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Member States were perceived as natural allies by the NGO Community. IANSA expected 
the EU to speak with one voice and strongly encouraged EU Member States to show a united 
front. In that sense, IANSA’s influence supported the EU’s efforts to be internally effective. 
However, IANSA was apparently active in a limited number of EU Member States.  The 
majority of NGOs which created IANSA were UK-based; therefore, this coalition focused 
their efforts on influencing (or supporting) the UK. There is little evidence of IANSA 
activities in France. IANSA only had one French representative at the Review Conference. 
In addition, Austria and Finland, Germany and the UK included IANSA representatives in 
their delegations for the 2006 Review Conference. France’s delegation did not include a 
representative from civil society. Nonetheless, IANSA generally maintained pressure on all 
EU Member States not only to act cohesively, but also to play a greater role in negotiations. 
   
The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers had constant exchanges and widely 
cooperated with the Nordic States including three EU Member States (Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden). The Coalition encouraged these states to advocate the “straight-18” position at the 
international level. The Coalition was in close contact with the German government, which 
held the Presidency of the EU in the first-half of 1999. Germany hosted the European 
conference on the Use of Children as Soldiers in October 1999. In contrast, the Coalition 
appeared to have less harmonious relations with the British government. The Coalition 
repeatedly singled out the UK as the EU country with the poorest record of children involved 
in armed conflicts. The Coalition attempted to use the bureaucratic utilization pathway in the 
UK but was unsuccessful. Interestingly, there is little evidence of the presence of influence 
of NGOs in France. In fact, the French Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers was only 
created in 2004.26  Yet, the French government became especially active on the issue of child 
soldiers at the UN.  When compared with other NGO coalitions studied in this thesis (ICBL 
and IANSA), the Coalition was created quite late in the negotiation process and only had a 
limited number of months (from June 1998 to January 2000) to lobby states to support the 
Optional Protocol. While NGOs were active in several EU Member States during 
negotiations of the Optional Protocol, NGOs were apparently unable to influence the EU’s 
effectiveness (both internal and external). 
 
                                                 
26On the Collectif, see www.amnesty.fr 
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The hypothesis formulated is confirmed by two of the three cases. It is reasonable to suggest 
that the presence of influence on coalitions of NGOs in EU Member States does affect 
positively the EU’s effectiveness. The hypothesis is thus accepted. 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
This comparative analysis has identified conditions under which the EU is an effective actor 
at the UN in human security negotiations. The three cases studied showed a variation in both 
the EU’s internal and external effectiveness. The EU was the most internally effective in the 
small arms case. However, it failed to achieve external effectiveness. The EU’s effectiveness 
in the landmines case was variable, but ultimately, the EU did achieve both internal and 
external effectiveness. In contrast, the EU was not internally effective in the case of the 
Optional Protocol on children in armed conflicts, yet the EU was externally effective. This 
final analysis exposes the limitations of the definition of external effectiveness used in this 
thesis: the definition assumed that the EU’s external effectiveness was dependent on the 
EU’s internal effectiveness. The analysis revealed that, in some cases, the EU can be 
externally effective, without achieving internal effectiveness. However, it should be 
emphasized that in these cases, it is the external effectiveness of certain EU Member States 
that contributed to the success of negotiations rather than the effectiveness of the European 
Union as an actor. The definition of “external effectiveness” employed in this thesis should 
be reassessed: first, external effectiveness does not always depend on internal effectiveness; 
second, a distinction should be made between the EU’s effectiveness and the EU Member 
States’ effectiveness to influence negotiations. Another interesting result indicates that, in the 
case of children and armed conflicts, the internal effectiveness currently displayed by the EU 
(especially since the adoption of the EU Guidelines on children and armed conflicts) is a 
direct result of the negotiations of the Optional Protocol: consensus at the international level 
made consensus possible within the EU.   
 
The majority of the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis were either accepted or 
partially accepted. The comparative analysis confirmed that a high level of involvement of 
the Presidency, a high level of French, German and British support, the presence of a unified 
position in EU governments and the presence of influence of NGOs/Coalition of NGOs are 
conditions under which the EU is an effective actor at the UN in human security 
negotiations. Hypotheses on the EU’s commitment to multilateralism, on the use on 
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consensus in negotiations, and on the position of the United States were partially accepted. 
Further cases should be investigated to confirm or reject these hypotheses. Only one 
hypothesis was rejected: a high level of participation of the European Commission does not 
affect the EU’s effectiveness. The role of the European Commission was, to a certain extent, 
overestimated in the hypothesis tested. This observation is not surprising for all human 
security issues discussed at the UN have been characterized as CFSP issues. However, this 
confirms that generally EU Member States do not acknowledge the role of the Commission 
and its development cooperation policy in human security negotiations.  
 
Finally, this chapter also highlighted that other independent variables may influence the 
EU’s effectiveness. For example, the case studies showed that the position of countries other 
than the United States had an impact on the EU Member States achieving their objectives. 
The position of these states should be considered in any explanation of the EU’s 
effectiveness on human security issues. Furthermore, by focusing on the European Union as 
an actor at the United Nations, this research project did not examine the role of individuals, 
although the interviews conducted for the research project revealed that the United Nations, 
especially in New York, is a personality-driven environment: “New York is very personality 
driven, so everything depends on your ambassador’s interests and commitment and the 
delegate’ interests”27 and “in terms of the UN on disarmament, […] it’s not about a country 
position but it’s more about individuals. And you’ll have some individuals who will speak a 
lot and achieve a lot…’. 28 The observation of the importance of individuals within the UN 
framework underscores the limitations of using the three-level game to examine the EU as an 
actor at the UN in human security negotiations. Nevertheless, this comparative analysis 
demonstrated that the study of the EU in human security negotiations requires an analytical 
framework that considers the interactions between different levels of negotiation. 
                                                 
27 Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission, New York, 20 June 2006 










This thesis examined the EU’s effectiveness as an actor at the United Nations in the field of 
human security and examined the question: under what conditions is the EU an effective 
actor at the UN in the policy area of human security? The thesis argued that the two-level 
game metaphor, which Putman used to depict international negotiations and to show the 
entanglements between international and domestic politics, was a useful analytical 
framework to investigate the research question. Due to the European Union’s distinctive 
nature as a global player, this thesis argued that that an analysis of three different level of 
negotiations (international, EU, and domestic) was required to explain the complexity of the 
European Union as an actor at the UN in human security negotiations. Thus, this thesis 
expanded Putnam’s two-level game metaphor to a three-level game. 
 
In this thesis, the concept of effectiveness (the dependent variable) was defined in two ways: 
internal effectiveness and external effectiveness. The thesis also developed eight different 
tesTable hypotheses on the relationship between the EU’s effectiveness (dependent variable) 
and independent variables found at three levels of negotiations. Through the use of a three-
level game approach, three cases studies were analyzed to track the conditions and test the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The case studies selected 
were the ban of anti-personnel landmines, the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, 
and the Optional Protocol on involvement of children in armed conflict. Each of the three 
case studies addressed issues that were considered part of the human security agenda as they 
exhibited several similar characteristics, including the focus on the protection of individuals 
and the emphasis on the links between issues of disarmament, development, and human 
 
 226
rights. Finally, a comparative analysis of the three case studies was undertaken to accept or 
reject the hypotheses.  
 
This chapter provides a general discussion of thesis’ research results. It will also demonstrate 
the thesis’ contribution to the study of the EU in world affairs and to the field of 
International Relations. This chapter is divided in four sections. The first section highlights 
the primary results of this thesis. It argues that in recent cases of human security 
negotiations, the EU’s effectiveness was inconsistent. It also discusses the conditions that 
affected the EU’s effectiveness.  The second section links the thesis’ findings to the study of 
the EU as a global actor. This section argues that this research emphasizes the importance of 
EU Member States and of domestic politics in the explanation of European integration and 
European foreign policy and thus, supports liberal intergovermentalist arguments. However, 
the research has also highlighted some of the shortcomings of liberal intergovernmentalism 
when examining the EU as an actor in international negotiations.  The section then explores 
the implications of the findings on the study of European institutions in the EU’s external 
relations. The third section considers the potential contributions of this thesis to the study of 
international negotiations and the discipline of International Relations. This thesis has 
demonstrated that the study of the EU in human security negotiations requires the integration 
of international and domestic level of analysis as well as an additional level of analysis (the 
EU level). As the thesis has refined the two-level game metaphor, this section will examine 
the theoretical conceptualization of the two-level game metaphor. Finally, the fourth section 
of this chapter evaluates avenues for future research.  
 
 
8.2 EU effectiveness and human security at the UN 
 
The comparative analysis in this thesis has shown that, in recent cases of human security 
negotiations, the EU was unable to be consistently29 effective. EU Member States not only 
                                                 
29 On the issue of consistency in the EU see S. Nuttall, “Coherence and Consistency” in C. Hill and 
M. Smith, International Relations and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 
pp.91-112. On the EU, human security and consistency, see J.Alcalde and C. Bouchard, “Human 
Security and Coherence within the EU; the Case of  the 2006 UN Small Arms Conference”, Hamburg 
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struggled to speak with one voice (be internally effective) in the cases of the Ottawa Process, 
but failed to reach a common position in negotiations on the Optional Protocol on child 
soldiers. The small arms and light weapons case was the only example where the EU 
displayed internal effectiveness; however, the strong insistence on national priorities of 
certain EU Member States in the 2006 Small Arms Review Conference caused the internal 
effectiveness to crumble. The European Union as a collective actor also frequently failed to 
achieve its objectives and influence negotiations (external effectiveness). While the EU 
achieved internal effectiveness, it was unable to influence other actors in the UN to support 
the adoption of an outcome document that would strengthen the 2001 Programme of Action 
on small arms. Furthermore, in cases where negotiations were successful in achieving an 
agreement, the success of negotiations owed more to the work of certain EU Member States 
rather than the EU’s external effectiveness. This was particularly the case of the Optional 
Protocol on children in armed conflict.  
 
The comparative analysis revealed several factors that affected the EU’s effectiveness. It 
should be emphasized that the conditions identified are not sufficient; this is the only factor 
that can explain the EU’s effectiveness. Yet, evidence from the case studies suggests that 
some conditions are necessary for the EU to increase its effectiveness at the UN. Indeed, four 
conditions were accepted as positively affecting the EU’s effectiveness: a high level of 
involvement of the EU Presidency, a high level of French, German and British support, the 
presence of a unified position within EU governments, and the presence of influence of 
NGOs/Coalition of NGOs.  
 
The case studies confirmed that a higher level of involvement of the Presidency increases the 
EU’s effectiveness, particularly its internal effectiveness. A high level of involvement of the 
Presidency was observed in the case of small arms and light weapons where the EU was 
particularly internally effective. However, the research also revealed that in situations where 
EU Member States have extreme positions, a Presidency that is “reformist” may have more 
difficulty in convincing their EU partners to find a common EU position. A higher level of 
French, German and British support also affected the EU’s effectiveness in all three cases. 
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This is was particularly visible in negotiations about conventional weapons such as 
landmines and small arms and light weapons. The position of these three countries 
influenced the position of other (smaller) EU Member States. The Big Three also influenced 
one another’s positions. In addition to these two conditions, the anti-personnel landmines 
and the Optional Protocol on child soldiers cases confirm that internal bargaining (that 
involves the ministries of foreign affairs and the ministries of defence) can be genuine 
obstacle to EU Member States in reaching a consensus on human security issues. In contrast, 
the presence of a unified position in EU governments, as in the small arms case, reinforces 
the EU’s effectiveness. The case studies also provided strong evidence of the presence of 
influence of NGOs. However, some EU Member States, especially Germany and the UK, 
have apparently witnessed more NGO activities than their EU partners. In these countries, 
coalitions of NGOs were significantly active when a shift in the government policy was 
desired.  
 
Three factors partially shape the EU’s effectiveness: the EU’s commitment to 
multilateralism, on the use of consensus in negotiations, and on the position of the United 
States. The case studies show that generally a higher degree of commitment to 
multilateralism increases the EU’s internal effectiveness. Yet, the degree of the EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism does not have a significant influence on the successful 
conclusion of negotiations. The comparative analysis also revealed that the EU does 
generally struggle to be internally and externally effective in negotiations based on 
consensus. However, the case of the Ottawa Process, which was based on majority voting, 
also suggests that the EU’s effectiveness increases when voting is used in negotiations. The 
position of the United States does have an effect on the EU’s effectiveness – especially its 
external effectiveness. However, an increase of the EU’s effectiveness is not necessarily the 
result of a positive US position. In fact, the small arms case revealed that US opposition 
actually encouraged EU Member States to work collectively and strengthen the EU’s internal 
effectiveness. Although the United States is an important actor in the UN, it is not the only 
actor. The case studies also reveal that other actors such as the G-77 are also significant 
actors in negotiations and that their positions on an agreement should be considered. 
 
Lastly, one condition, the involvement of the Commission, does not affect the EU’s 
effectiveness in human security negotiations. Even in the case of small arms and light 
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weapons where the Commission displayed a high level of participation, it had little impact 
on the EU’s effectiveness in human security negotiations. 
 
8.3 Studying the EU and human security at the UN 
 
The findings of this thesis have several implications for the study of the European Union as a 
global actor. First, several of the conditions that shape the EU’s effectiveness relate to the 
role of the Member States in negotiations. This is not surprising as the European Union is not 
a member of the United Nations (and is unlikely to become one in the near future) and EU 
Member States remain the primary decision-makers at the UN. The EU’s effectiveness at the 
UN reflects the willingness of EU Member States to work collectively and to favour EU 
output.  In addition, when addressing the issue of human security at the UN, the support for 
EU action of three particular EU Member States, France, Germany and the UK, can have 
significant consequences.  
 
Second, this thesis has demonstrated that domestic politics should be seriously considered in 
any attempt to explain EU’s foreign policy, especially its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy . The cases examined show that internal bargaining within EU Member States directly 
impacts the EU’s effectiveness as an actor. Divisions within EU governments on specific 
issues can hinder the EU’s ability to speak with a single voice. This was particularly 
apparent in the cases on the ban of anti-personnel landmines and the Optional Protocol on 
children and armed conflicts.  
 
These observations confirm the view of liberal intergovernmentalism that not only gives EU 
Member States a crucial role in decision-making process, but also states that the preferences 
of states are shaped by domestic politics.30  However, the research of this thesis highlights 
the limitations of liberal intergovermentalist approach. Intergovernmentalists do not 
thoroughly consider the possibility that external actors can influence the positions of EU 
                                                 
30 See A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht, London, UCL Press, 1998. 
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Member States. The research suggests that two external actors to the EU had an influence or 
partial influence on the EU’s effectiveness: the United State and coalitions of NGOs. 
 
The United States position partially affected the EU’s effectiveness. The findings 
demonstrate that the US position can have a dividing or unifying effect on the EU Member 
States. The case studies also demonstrated that the United States’ “special relationship” with 
the United Kingdom can affect negotiations at the international level as well as impacting the 
EU’s effectiveness. The United States thus becomes a player and has an influence in the 
CFSP system.   
 
In all three cases studied, coalitions of NGOs became significant players in the domestic 
game. NGOs were particularly effective in mobilizing public opinion, which in turn, produce 
incentives for national governments to act. Furthermore, the European Union is generally 
perceived as a natural ally by the NGO Community. NGOs expect the EU to speak with one 
voice and have strongly encouraged EU Member States to be united. These findings imply 
that NGOs and their role in negotiations must be considered when explaining the behaviour 
of the European Union and its Member States in negotiations. These observations indicate 
that when liberal intergovernmentalism neglects the role of external actors, it fails to 
acknowledge potential influential factors.   
 
While the research confirms that EU Member States continue to be central players at the UN, 
it also offer insights into the role of the European institutions. The EU level was inserted in 
the two-level game metaphor to highlight the role of specific actors and institutions within 
the EU. The comparative analysis of the case studies has revealed that in human security 
negotiations, the EU level is important when setting general guidelines and objectives. The 
Council of Ministers has a role in so far as the Presidency of the Council represents the EU 
at the UN. The EU Presidency can play a significant role in negotiations, but only to the 
extent that the EU is united regarding issues that are being negotiated. If EU Member States 
lack the willingness to work together through the EU and to develop a common position, 
then the role of the Presidency can be quite limited (if nonexistent) at the international level. 
The Council also sets the general guidelines and broader objectives of the EU. Negotiations 
within the Council are thus significant in the development of a common position in the EU 
and in the achievement of internal effectiveness. Yet, in specific negotiations, a two-level 
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game (Geneva-New York, capitals) apparently eclipses the three-level game (Geneva-New 
York, EU level, capitals). Do these observations imply that the EU level should be 
abandoned when examining the international negotiations of the EU on CFSP issues? 
Additional case studies would need to be examined to answer this question; however, there is 
evidence that negotiations at the EU level – even if they fail to produce a common position 
within the EU – encourage EU Member States to re-evaluate their position vis-à-vis human 
security agreements. This suggests that negotiations at the EU level do have an impact and 
should be considered in a formal model that theorizes the EU as an actor in international 
negotiations.  
 
Until now, UN issues addressed in human security negotiations have occurred within CFSP, 
thus limiting the role of the European Commission in negotiations. The involvement of the 
Commission has little influence on the EU’s effectiveness in human security negotiations. 
Most human security issues are defined as CFSP issues, thus the participation of the 
Commission is limited. The Commission officials are usually invited to UN meetings that 
address human security issues, but are not allowed to participate in negotiations.31 This thesis 
did not analyze the role of the European Parliament. This institution was often the first EU 
institution to address the issue at the EU level and encouraged Member States to find 
common position in all three cases studies. However, in the cases examined, the European 
Parliament was not an important actor at the UN in human security negotiations.  
 
In contrast to other international organizations, such as the WTO, the involvement of EU 
institutions in general negotiations at the UN is often limited to observation. The 
participation of the Commission in negotiations at the UN is still, in general, regarded as a 
delicate issue, even when the issues discussed are within the Commission’s competency. 
One interviewee noted that non-EU Member States are reluctant to give the European 
Commission member state rights at the UN as this could potentially affect the dynamics of 
negotiations, especially in the Security Council.32 Nonetheless, non-EU Member States see 
the European Commission as an important interlocutor: the Commission may help partners 
to better understand the position of EU Member States regarding certain human security 
                                                 
31 Interview with an official from the European Commission, DG Relex, Brussels, 17 October 2007. 
32 Interview with an official from EU Member States Mission, New York, 20 June 2006.  
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issues.33 Unless substantive reforms are introduced within the EU as well as within the UN, 
European institutions are likely to remain supporting actors at the United Nations.  
 
8.4 A multilevel game approach to international negotiations  
 
This thesis also examined the encounter between the study of international negotiations and 
the study of the EU as a global actor. This next section is designed to have an “analytical 
spill back function”34 and to demonstrate this thesis’ contribution to the debates on 
international negotiations in the field of International Relations. This section, first, argues 
that this thesis strengthened Putnam’s arguments that “state-centric” or systemic theories do 
not offer explanations of how domestic and internal politics are interrelated. The case studies 
examined in this thesis have demonstrated that assessing the EU’s effectiveness requires the 
understanding of interactions between the three levels of negotiations. This project 
emphasized the importance of integrating, rather than “adding” or “superimposing”, three 
levels of analysis. Second, this section advances the theoretical conceptualization of the two-
level game metaphor. More specifically, it offers specifications and definitions on three 
specific sets of questions: domestic politics, the environment of international negotiations, 
and the negotiators’ preferences. 
 
Three levels of reverberations 
 
This thesis has shown that the entanglements of three levels of negotiations are a crucial 
component of the explanation of the effectiveness of the EU in human security negotiations. 
It thus reinforces Putnam’s argument that state-centric and systemic theories that have 
examined domestic causes and international effects or international causes and domestic 
effects “miss an important part of the story”.35 First, while these theories recognize the 
existence of domestic politics and even stress that states may use the mobilization of 
                                                 
33 Interview with an official from the Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, New York, 15 June 
2006. 
34 K. E. Jørgensen, “Overview: The European Union and the World” in K.E. Jorgensen, M. A. Pollack 
and B. Rosamond, Handbook of European Union Politics, London, Sage Publications, 2007, p.520. 
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domestic bargaining resources to realize their preferences, these theories argue that 
international outcomes are primarily influenced by international environment. Second, in the 
view of systemic theories, states function in the international environment as if they are 
unitary actor (even if this not accurate).36 In this sense, systemic theories are limited when 
examining a multifaceted and multilevel actor such as the European Union. The two-level 
metaphor, which argues that interaction between levels of negotiations should be considered 
and that different groups of actors within states have power over decision-making, is thus a 
more convincing analytical tool in the examination of negotiations that involve an actor such 
as the European Union. 
 
The two-level game metaphor implies that there is reverberation between the two levels of 
negotiations: “strategies and outcomes at different levels of the game simultaneously affect 
one another.”37 In the case of human security negotiations, this thesis has demonstrated that 
reverberation occurred at the three levels of analysis. First, domestic policies in specific 
Member States were used to affect negotiations both at the EU and the international level. 
Second, negotiations at the EU level also shaped negotiations at the domestic and the 
international level. Finally, debates at the international level had repercussions on the two 
other levels and were used to achieve both EU and domestic goals. 
 
In the three cases studied in this thesis, domestic politics influenced negotiations both at the 
EU and international level. First, EU governments that experienced difficult internal 
bargaining struggled not only to support the EU initiatives to achieve effectiveness, but also 
to be considered influential players in the negotiations. This was particularly apparent in the 
ban of anti-personnel landmines and the Optional Protocol on children and armed conflicts. 
At the domestic level, the presence of coalitions of NGOs also affected the EU’s 
effectiveness. These networks primarily strove to modify the behaviour of EU Member 
States. To persuade EU Member States to change their position, NGOs incorporated 
                                                                                                                                          
35R.D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, International 
Organization, vol.42, no.3,1998, p.430. 
36 On the limitation of systemic theories to integrate international and domestic politics, see A. 
Moravcsik, “Introduction. Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International 
Bargaining”, in P. Evans et al. (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and 
Domestic Politics, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, pp.6-9.  
37 L.A. Patterson, “Agricultural policy reform in the European Community: a three-level game 
analysis”, International Organization, vol.51, no.1, 1997, p.142. 
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international level issues in domestic debates. On this point, the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines was particularly successful in publicizing the Ottawa Process in EU 
countries that were reluctant to endorse a comprehensive ban on landmines.   
 
Outcomes of negotiations at the EU level affected and were affected by both negotiations at 
the domestic and the international level. In the small arms case, the European Union used 
international negotiations to address questions that had been discussed at the EU level. 
Achieving an agreement on the issues at the international level could only facilitate the EU 
in the achievement of its own objectives. Furthermore, negotiations at the EU level also 
pressed EU Member States to address the issues discussed at the domestic level. While 
discussions at the EU level affected both domestic and international negotiations, the EU 
level clearly experienced reverberations from the two other levels. The research reveals that 
several key players (including France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Council’s 
Presidency) influence negotiations on human security at the EU level. The extent to which 
these players became influential in negotiations at the EU level was based on the state of 
their domestic politics. For example, EU countries that suffered from internal divisions were 
rarely capable of exercising any leadership at the EU level. Furthermore, in all three cases 
studied, international negotiations had an effect on the EU’s effectiveness: they encouraged 
the EU to consider uniting on the issue. In two of the cases (anti-personnel landmines and 
small arms and light weapons) “pressures” from the international level had positive 
consequences in prompting debates at the EU level on the role the European Union should 
play in negotiations. In contrast, in the case of the Optional Protocol on child soldiers, 
negotiations at the international level not only exposed the extent to which the EU was 
unable to play any kind of role in negotiations, but also exacerbated divisions in the EU 
camp. The more divided EU Member States were divided at the international level, the less 
the European Union was able to find a common position on the issue.  
 
Lastly, negotiations at the international level reverberated both at the EU and the domestic 
level. As highlighted in the above section, negotiations at the international level fuelled 
debates at the domestic and the EU level, but also were deeply influenced by the presence of 
divisions both within EU governments and between EU Member States. This thesis has 
argued and confirmed Putnam’s argument first, that the omission of any level would limit the 
understanding of negotiations; second, that the assessment of interactions of the three levels 
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can only lead to better understanding and potential theorization of the domestic and 
international influence on international bargaining.  
 
Moving towards a theoretical conceptualization 
 
As Putman has rightly stressed, “[m]etaphors are not theories”.38  The two level-game is a 
useful analytical framework to explore international negotiations; however, it remains a 
metaphor. Moravcsik argues that if the two-level metaphor is to become a theoretical model, 
three sets of definitions and specifications are needed: first, specifications of domestic 
politics; second, specifications of the environment of international negotiations; third, 
specifications of the negotiators’ preferences.39  The following sections explore key findings 
of the case studies that may help to refine the three sets of definitions and specifications and 
to contribute to the development of the game metaphor into a theoretical model. Future 
theorizing should consider the causal relationship between theses factors and successful 
negotiations outcomes.  
 
 Domestic Politics: Internal Bargaining and Transnational Coalition of NGOs.  
 
This thesis has illustrated that domestic politics are an important part when determining 
whether the European Union is internally and externally effective at the UN in human 
security negotiations. The two-level game metaphor focuses on the importance of the 
ratifying process. Putnam defines “ratification” as any decision-process at the domestic level 
that is required to endorse or implement an international agreement whether formally or 
informally. At the domestic level, two factors were identified as having a shaping influence 
on the ratification process: internal bargaining within EU governments and the influence of 
NGOs/Coalitions of NGOs. 
 
                                                 
38Ibid., p.435.  
39 A. Moravcsik  “Introduction: International Bargaining and Domestic Theories of International 
Bargaining” in P.B Evans et al. (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy- International Bargaining and 
Domestic Politics, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, p.23. 
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Internal bargaining is a crucial part of the ratification process in EU Member States. Players 
in the internal game may have competing interests and the position defended by a specific 
government in international negotiations is partly the result of internal bargaining. This 
research shows that internal disputes regarding human security agreements often oppose the 
Ministry in charge of foreign affairs and the Ministry of Defence. At the domestic level, 
internal dissensions can complicate or prolong the ratification process, especially if the 
potential losers make their case known to national institutions in charge of formal ratification 
of the agreement.  Second, finding a consensual position in a government can take 
considerable time and energy. Players in internal bargaining who may potentially “lose out” 
if the agreement is approved often must be accommodated or compensated, especially if they 
give their public support to the agreement on the Table. Intragovernmental bargaining can 
complicate negotiations not only at the domestic level, but also at the international level. 
 
At the international level, difficult internal bargaining may entail that negotiators have their 
“hands tied” and thus have less leeway to compromise. Internal divisions within a 
government may also be exploited by those opposed to the agreement. On the other hand, 
negotiations at the international level can also pressure divided governments to find a unified 
position. Furthermore, intense international negotiations may create a sense of urgency and 
encourage various groups within a government to rapidly reach a consensus on the issue.  
The importance of internal bargaining and the role of certain ministries in this type of 
bargaining should thus be integrated into a theoretical model to explain the success and 
failure of international actors when approving international agreements. 
    
Similarly, the influence of NGO should be considered when examining the EU as a global 
actor, the influence of NGOs in a two-level game on the success or failure of international 
negotiations should be investigated. NGOs contribution to negotiations may vary between 
cases. In the cases examined in this thesis, most domestic NGOs were either part of or had 
strong links with the international coalition of NGOs formed to address specific issues that 
were negotiated at the international level. International coalitions of NGOs can mobilize 
public opinion, lobby government and disseminate information to groups within national 
governments. They may also participate in negotiations at the international level. To date, 
the contribution of NGOs in negotiations is limited to the domestic level, as they have 
mostly been excluded from formal negotiations at the international level. States remain the 
vital players for the successful conclusion of negotiations, but the role of NGOs coalition 
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may be crucial in the pre-negotiation phase including for the emergence of the issue on the 
international agenda. Furthermore, NGOs can become key players in the development of 
coalitions of like-minded governments and international organizations and thus impact the 
dynamics of negotiations. Indeed, coalitions of like-minded governments have been 
influential players in the successful conclusion of several human security negotiations.40 The 
role of coalitions of NGOs in the creation of link-minded groups of states should also be 
considered in a theoretical model explaining international bargaining.41  
 
Environment of International Negotiations: Voting versus Consensus   
 
At the international level, the research of this thesis suggests that further consideration 
should be given to the negotiating conditions, more specifically to decision-making rules 
used in negotiations. Decisions by vote rather than the use of consensus apparently increases 
successful negotiations. It also has a direct impact on the united EU and their influence on 
negotiations.  In addition to the case of the ban of anti-personnel landmines examined in this 
thesis, the case of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the recent treaty banning the 
use of cluster bombs confirm this proposition. It should be emphasized that using voting 
does not necessarily entail removing negotiations from traditional negotiating forums, as in 
the case of the Ottawa Process. What is more important is that the option of voting is 
available in the case of strong dissensions.  Voting, however, may also entail potential limits 
for the agreements reached at the international level. Despite the fact that three cases of 
negotiations aforementioned were successful, they were also opposed by major international 
players, most notably the United States, Russia (except in the case of the ICC), and China.  
 
Consensus based negotiations have the advantage of including all parties. The findings of 
this thesis suggest that reaching consensus on an issue may become more important than the 
adoption of a stringent agreement. This can have a positive and negative effect on 
agreements. For the sake of consensus, some countries may abandon their more 
                                                 
40 See D. Hubert, The Landmine Ban: a Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy, The Thomas J. 
Watson Jr.  Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper #42, Providence, Brown University, 
2000. 
41 On the subject of coalitions of NGOs and like-minded states and human security negotiations, see 
F.O.Hampson with H.Reid “Coalition Diversity and Normative Legitimacy in Human Security 
Negotiations”, International Negotiation, vol.8, 2003, pp.7-42. 
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“conservative” positions and join the majority. Conversely, “reformist” countries may decide 
to renounce more stringent commitments as this may jeopardize a consensus. Concluding 
successful negotiations becomes more important than the end result. Agreements adopted 
under consensus can often be diluted version of the stronger agreements that were initially 
negotiated. Although the use of consensus has been recently criticized, working by 
consensus is an important feature of the UN system and promotes cooperation. Thus, it has 
been argued that favouring voting over consensus in negotiations would be harmful to the 
United Nations.  
 
Preferences of Negotiators 
 
This thesis has focused on the European Union as an actor at the United Nations. By doing 
so, this research project has overlooked the role and preferences of one key player in 
Putnam’s two-level game metaphor: the statesperson or “chief of government” (COG). 
However, the case studies reveal that the United Nations is a personality-driven 
environment. Further attention should be given to study of the role and preferences of 
individuals in negotiations. Data collection has also revealed that most EU Member States, 
ambassadors or officials in New York and Geneva are given a certain degree of autonomy 
from the capitals. These two observations indicate that the preferences of the “statesperson” 
can be significant in the analysis of the behaviour of an EU Member States in negotiations. 
The “statesperson’s” preferences and strategies may become a significant factor in the 
analysis an EU Member States’ behaviour during negotiations. Furthermore, the role and 
preferences of the chair in negotiations also has a decisive effect on the success or failure of 
negotiations. For example, the end result of negotiations may be very different if the 
chairperson gives more importance to concluding successful negotiations by consensus than 
adopting stringent commitments and standards. A strong chairperson who is well-organized 
may also contribute to the success of negotiations and should be considered in a formal 
theoretical model.      
 




With its strong commitment to human rights, development and humanitarian assistance, the 
EU was a serious contender to be a leader in the promotion of human security at the United 
Nations; however, the EU’s response has focused on managing expectations, rather than 
aspiring to meet high expectations. The EU has not yet become a “force for goodness”42 in 
the policy area of human security. In some sense, the European Union has failed to 
strengthen and advance the United Nations’ work in this area and thus, failed to promote 
“effective multilateralism”. It remains clear that the concept of human security, that is, as yet 
to be fully integrated as a guiding principle in the EU’s external policy. At the present, the 
European Union is not a “normative power” that emphasizes the protection and “rights of 
individuals and not only the right of states to sovereign equality”.43  Protecting individuals 
has not yet developed into a core principle of the EU’s foreign policy and it is unknown if 
the EU will ever adopt a human security approach. However, as Matlary rightly argued, 
human security may be useful as a rhetorical tool and there could be severe ethical 
consequences if rhetoric promises more than the EU enacts.44 
  
 
Nonetheless, EU Member States have begun to recognize another important feature of 
human security: an effective response to disarmament issues need to encompass 
development and human right aspects. This thesis has revealed that the involvement of EU 
actors responsible for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance has been 
limited. In the three cases studied, the European Commission did not become a significant 
player. A recent judgement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) indicates that this may 
change in the future. On 20 May 2008, the Court delivered its judgement in Case 91 C-91/05 
Commission versus Council. The Judgement concerned a Council decision implementing a 
Joint Action (2002/589/CFSP) on a moratorium on small arms and light weapons in 
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States).45 The Judgement of the Court is 
interesting as it emphasizes the view of both the EU Member States and the Commission as 
                                                 
42 On this concept, see K.E., Jørgensen and  K. Laatikainen, The European Union and the United 
Nations, Second Pan-European Conferences. Standing Group on EU Politics, no.293, Bologna, 24-26 
June 2004. 
43 H. Sjursen, “The EU as a “normative” power: how can this be?”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, col.13, no.2, March 2006, p.249.  
44 Matlary, J.H., “Much ado about little: the EU and human security”, International Affairs, vol.84, 
no.1, 2008, pp.143. 
45 Case C-91/05, Commission v Council, 20 May 2008, OJ C 115, 14.05.2005, p. 10. 
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to who should have the competence to act to combat the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons.   
The judgement reveals that the Commission, supported by the European Parliament, argued 
that the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons had become an 
integral part of its development cooperation policy and thus fell within the scope of the 
competences conferred on the Community. According to the Commission, cooperation in the 
long-term development of a country can be effective only where there is stability and 
democratic legitimacy. The Commission argued that policies such as decommissioning on 
SALW and mine clearance constitute indispensable means to achieve the objective of 
development cooperation policy. In opposition, the Council contended that the campaign 
against the spread of SALW was part of the CFSP’s fundamental objective, the preservation 
of peace and the strengthening of international security. The Council argued that neither the 
campaign against the spread and accumulation of SALW, nor the more general objectives of 
preserving peace and security fell within the competences conferred on the Community. It 
also contended that according to the treaties, the main objective of Community development 
cooperation is the reduction of poverty and that though the SALW may incidentally affect 
the prospects for sustainable development does not mean that it should fall within 
Community competences.  
 
The Court did not form a judgement on whether the combating the spread of SALW is part 
of the CFSP or development cooperation policy. It did, however, note that certain measures 
aiming to prevent fragility in developing countries, including those adopted to combat the 
proliferation of small arms, can contribute to the elimination or reduction of obstacles to the 
economic and social development of those countries. According to the Court, the Joint 
Action was part of a general perspective of preserving peace and strengthening international 
security, but also had the specific objective of strengthening the capacities of a group of 
developing countries to combat a phenomenon that constitutes an obstacle to the sustainable 
development of those countries. Ultimately, the Court judged that the objectives of the Joint 
Action was not only within CFSP, but also a Community development policy and should 
have been adopted under the EC treaty and not the EU treaty.  
 
It will be interesting to observe the reaction of the EU Member States and the Commission to 
the judgement. This reaction may have a direct impact on whether the EU and more 
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importantly, EU Member States decide to adopt a human security approach in EU’s foreign 
policy. Following this judgement, EU Member States will have to become very cautious in 
their approach to issues that are part of the human security agenda. If they acknowledge that 
certain issues are part of the general objective of the CFSP but are also obstacles to 
sustainable development, then they encounter the possibility that CFSP instruments adopted 
to address these issues will be challenged by the Commission. By recognizing fundamental 
aspects of human security, EU Member States may also instigate the Community’s 
involvement in this domain. The Commission’s reaction will also be interesting to observe. 
Will the Commission portray other issues that are currently within CFSP framework, for 
example, cluster munitions, as integral parts of its development policy? The outcome 
remains to be seen. Nevertheless, these questions suggest that the debate on human security 
within EU should not be discarded. 
 
In recent years, negotiations have led to the signature of landmark treaties on issues such as 
landmines, child soldiers, and the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). All 
these initiatives have focused on the protection of civilians. However, much work remains to 
ensure the security of individuals and civilian populations and it is unclear if the European 
Union will ever become a significant player in this field. The EU has been a strong supporter 
of the concept of “Responsibility to Protect”. 46 This concept means protecting civilians from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. 47 Recent events in 
various parts of the world have reignited the debate on this concept. The question of the 
international community’s intervention in the protection of civilians will undoubtedly 
dominate debates at the UN Security Council for years to come. The development of its 
military capabilities for humanitarian assistance gives the European Union an ideal 
opportunity to become a major player in the international community’s commitment to 
“never again”. Only the future will tell, if in this case, the EU will aspire to meet higher 
expectations. Therefore this topic deserves continued scholarly attention. 
                                                 
46 At the UN World Summit in 2005, the European Union firmly supported of the inclusion of this 
concept in the Summit Outcome Document. See EU Presidency Statement- UN 2005 World Summit, 
14 September 2005, New York. 
47 On this concept, see Report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The 
Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa, the International Development Research Centre, December 2001. 
Interestingly the Report does stress the importance of human security, however it refrains from using 







When research first started on this thesis, secondary literature on the EU in human security 
negotiations was practically non-existent. It rapidly became clear that interviews would be 
the most effective way to obtain information that could not be found in documents. 
   
A total of 22 interviews were conducted between June 2006 and April 2008 in New York 
(June-July 2006), Brussels (October 2006) and Geneva (April 2008). The interviewees 
included officials from EU Member States’ Missions to the UN both in New York and 
Geneva, officials from non-EU Member States’ Missions in New York and Geneva, officials 
of the European Commission and NGOs delegates (for a complete list see Appendix II). 
Almost all the interviews were conducted in person; one interview was conducted via email. 
All the interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis to encourage the interviewees 
to express themselves freely and honestly.   
 
Almost all face-to-face interviews were recorded. All the interviews were transcribed and 
general notes were taken. In all cases, interviewees were sent via email a short description of 
the research project and a list of broad questions and topics to be raised in the interview. 
Interviews were conducted in English and in French. Most interviews lasted between 50 
minutes to an hour. However, the interviews conducted during the Review Conference (June 
July 2006) were shorter due to time constraints. Five interviews lasted between 1.30 hours 
and 2 hours.         
 
In addition to formal interviews, data was collected using non-participant observation. This 
observation took place during the United Nations Small Arms Review Conference 2006 (26 
June-7 July) in New York. Getting access to the Conference revealed itself to be more 
complicated than first thought. However, through contacts in the UK Mission to the UN in 
New York, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) offered the author an 
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NGO accreditation to the Review Conference. The author was able to attend almost all the 
High-level plenary meetings of the Review Conference and was also allowed to attend the 
IANSA’s (International Action Network on Small Arms) daily coordination meetings. The 
author also attended several of the Conference Side Events including those organized by EU 
Member States and UN agencies. While at the Conference, the author witnessed first hand 
the procedures of coordination between EU member states and acquired valuable knowledge 
of UN practices and procedures. The author also gained access to primary documents from 
the Review Conference that were not made available to the public. For the interviews 
conducted during the Review Conference, the author made sure to stress that she was not a 
delegate of IANSA to encourage the interviewees to speak freely and honestly. The author 
also checked with IANSA that the information gathered during the IANSA meetings could 
be used in the thesis. The only negative aspect of the time spent at the Review Conference 
was the fact that the demanding agenda and schedule of the Review Conference and the 




List of Interviews 
 
 
New York (June-July 2006) 
- Interview with an official from UK Mission to the UN.  
(08/06/2006 
- Interview with an official from the Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN   
(15/06/2006) 
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN 
(20/06/2006) 
- Interview with an official from UK Mission to the UN 
(20/06/2006) 
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN 
(21/06/2006) 
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN 
(27/06/2006) 
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN 
(29/06/07) 
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN 
(28/06/2006) 
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN 
(28/06/2006) 
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN 
(28/06/2006) 
- Interview with Saferworld official (06/07/2006) 
- Interview with IANSA delegate (07/07/2006) 
- Interview with IANSA delegate (10/07/2006) 
Brussels (October 2006) 
- Interview with an official from the European Commission – DR Relex (17/10/2007) 
- Interview with an official from the European Commission – DR Relex (17/10/2007) 
- Interview with an official from the European Commission – DR Relex (19/10/2007) 
- Interview with an official from the European Commission – DR Relex (19/10/2007) 
Geneva (April 2008) 
- Email Interview with an official from Canadian Mission to the UN (17/04/2008) 
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the Conference on 
Disarmament (21/05/2008.) 
- Interview with an official from the European Commission – EC Delegation in 
Geneva (22/04/2008) 
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN 
(22/04/2008) 












Aberbach, J.D. and Rockman, B.A., “Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews”, Political 
Science and Politics, vol.35, no.4, 2002, pp.673-676. 
 
 
Alcalde, J. and Bouchard, C., “Human Security and Coherence within the EU; the Case of  
the 2006 UN Small Arms Conference”, Hamburg Review of Social Science, Special Issue on 
Revisiting Coherence in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Vol.3, Issue 1, 
2008, pp.141-173. 
 
Allen, D., “Who speaks for Europe?” The Search for an effective and coherent external 
policy in J. Peterson and H. Sursjen (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? 
Competing Visions of the CFSP, London, Routledge, 1998, pp.41-58. 
 
Andreatta, F., “Theory and the European Union’s International Relations” in C. Hill and M. 
Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2005, pp.18-38. 
 
Annan, K., “Towards a Culture of Peace” 2001. 
<http:www.unesco.org/opi2/letters/TextAnglais/AnnanE.html > accessed on 25/05/05 
 
Annan, K., We the Peoples, New York, United Nations, 2000. 
 
Anthony, I, “Appendix 8C- European Union approaches to arms control, non-proliferation 
and disarmament”,   SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.599-614. 
 
Armstrong, D., Loyd, L. and Redmond, J., International Organisation in World Politics, 3rd 
Ed. Basingtoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
 
Arts K. and Popovski, V. (eds.), International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of 
Children, The Hague, Hague Academic Press, 2006. 
 
Axelrod, R. and Keohane, R., “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and 




Axworthy, L., “Human Security: An Opening for UN Reform”, in R. M. Price and M. W. 
Zacher (eds.), The United Nations and Global Security, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004, pp.245-259. 
 
Axworthy, L.,  “Canada and human security: the need for leadership”, International Journal, 
vol..52, no.2, 1997, pp.183-196. 
 
Axworthy, L., “The Ottawa Process”, UNIDIR Newsletter- Special Issue, no.3, 1997, pp.7-
10. 
 
Baerh, P.R. and Gordenker, L., The United Nations at the End of the 1990s, Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999. 
 
Baratta, R., “Overlaps between European Community Competence and European Union 
Foreign Policy Activity” in E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in 
International Relations, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.51-75. 
 
Bartlett, R., “Child Soldiers: law, politics and practice”, The International Journal of 
Children Rights, vol.4, no.2, 1996, pp.115-128. 
 
Batchelor, P. and McDonald, G., “Too close for comfort: an analysis of the UN tracing 
negotiations”, Disarmament Forum, no.1, 2006, pp.39-48. 
 
Batchelor, P. “The First Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms: Building Momentum for 
Global Action”, Disarmament Diplomacy, no.72, August-September 2003, 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd72/72op1.htm, accessed on 07/07/2006. 
 
Bauer, S., “The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports – Enhancing the accountability of 
arms exports policies?”, European Security, vol.12, nos. 3-4, September-December 2003, 
pp.129-147. 
 
Behringer, R.M., “Middle Power Leadership and the Human Security Agenda”, Cooperation 
and Conflict, vol.4 , no.3, 2005, pp.305-342. 
 
Berkhol, I., La Conférence des Nations Unies de Juillet 2001 sur les armes légères, 
Bruxelles, GRIP, 2001. 
 
Bettati, M.,  “La convention sur l’interdiction de l’emploi du stockage, de la production de 
mines antipersonnel et sur leur destruction (Ottawa, 18 septembre 1997) ”, Annuaire français 




Bettati, M., “L’interdiction ou la limitation d’emploi des mines (Le protocole de Genève du 
3 mai 1996) ”, Annuaire français de Droit international, 42, 1996, pp.187-205. 
 
Biting the Bullet and IANSA, Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006- Assessing the First 
Five Years of the UN Programme of Action.London, Biting the Bullet and IANSA, 2006. 
 
Blaikie N., Designing Social Research, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000. 
 
Bomberg, E., Stubb, A. and Peterson, J., “Introduction” in E. Bomberg, J. Peterson and A. 
Stubb (eds.), The European Union: How does it work?, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2008, pp.3-21. 
 
Bomberg, E., Peterson, J.and Stubb, A.(eds.), The European Union: How does it work?, 2nd 
ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Bomberg, E. and Stubb, A.(eds.), The European Union: How does it work? Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
 
Bondi, L., “U.S. Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons”, Naval War College Review, 
Winter 2006, vol.59, no.1, pp.119-140. 
 
Bondi, L., “Disillusioned NGOs Blame the United Nations for a Weak Agreement” , SAIS 
Review, vol.22, no.1, 2001, pp.229-233. 
 
Boothby, D. “Disarmament: Successes and Failures”, in J.E. Krasno (ed.), The United 
Nations. Confronting the Challenges of Global Society, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004, pp.193-223. 
 
Boutwell, J. and Klare, M.T. (eds.), Light Weapons and Civil Conflict. Controlling the Tools 
of Violence, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999. 
 
Bowers, P. and Dodd, T., “Anti-Personnel Mines and the Policies of two British 
Governments”, RUSI Journal, vol.143, no.1, 1998, p.11-23. 
 
Brem, S. and Rutherford, K., “Walking Together or Divided Agenda? Comparing 
Landmines and Small Arms Campaign”, Security Dialogue, vol.32, no.2, 2001, pp.169-186. 
 





Brett, R., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (OP/CAC), International Council on Human Rights Policy and 
International Commission of Jurists, Workshop, Geneva, 13-14 February 2005. 
 
Brückner, P., “The European Community and the United Nations”, European Journal of 
International Law, vol.1, no.1, 1990, pp.174-192. 
 
Buchanan, C., The UN Review Conference on small arms control: Two steps backwards? 
available at www.hdcentre.org.  accessed on  20/11/06 
 
Burnham, P., Gilland, K., Grant, W. and Layton-Henry, Z., Research Methods in Politics, 
Houndmills Basingtoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
 
Buzan, B., “Negotiations by Consenus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea”, The American Journal of International Law, vol.75, 
no.2, 1981, pp.324-348. 
 
Cameron, F., “After Iraq: The EU and Global Governance”, Global Governance, vol.10, 
no.2, 2004, pp.157-163. 
 
Cameron, F., “Building a common foreign policy. Do Institutions matter?” in J. Peterson and 
H. Surjsen (eds.) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe, London, Routledge, 1998, pp.59-
76. 
 
Carlsnaes, W., Sjursen, H. and White, B. (eds.), Contemporary European Foreign Policy, 
London, Sage Publications, 2004. 
 
Cattaneo, S., ‘New Multilateralism’ and ‘High Politics’: State-NGO Relations on Human 
Security Issues. Thèse présentée à l’Université de Genève pour l’obtention du grade de 
Docteur en relations internationales (science politique), Institut des Hautes études 
internationales, Genève, 2007. 
 
Caporaso, J., "International relations theory and multilateralism: the search for foundations", 
International Organization, vol.46, no.3, 1992, p.599-632. 
  
Chabasse, P., “The French Campaign” in M. Cameron., R .J. Lawson and B.W. Tomlin (ed.), 
To Walk without Fear- The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, Don Mills, Ontario, 
Oxford University Press Canada,1998, pp.60-67.   
 
Chamberlain, P. and Long, D., “Europe and the Ottawa Treaty: Compliance with Exceptions 
and Loopholes” in R. Matthews, B. Mcdonald and K.R.Rutherford (eds.), Landmines and 
Human Security, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2004, pp. 81-96. 
 
Cloos, J., “EU-UN Cooperation on Crisis Management- Putting Effective Multilateralism 
into Pratice”,in  J.Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys (eds.), The United Nations and the 
 
 249
European Unions: An Ever Stronger Partnership, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2006, 
pp.259-266. 
 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers: CRC Country Briefs, London, 
Coalition to  Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, October 2003. 
 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Global Report on Child Soldiers, London, 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001. 
 
Collinson, S., “Issue-systems”, “multi-level games” and the analysis of the EU’s external 
commercial and associated policies: a research agenda”, Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol.6, issue 2, 1999, pp.206-224. 
 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament. The European Union and the United Nations: the 
choice of Multilateralism, COM(2003) 526 Final, Brussels, 10/09/2003. 
 
Commission of the European Communities, The Fight against Anti-personnel Landmines 
(APL): Proposal for an Integrated and Coordinated Approach,  Commission Staff Working 
Paper,  Brussels, 05/11/1996. 
 
Commission of the European Communities, The European Community, international 
organizations and multilateral agreements, 3rd ed., Luxembourg: Office for the Official 
Publications of the European Communities,1983. 
 
Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, Brussels, 4 
December 2003. 
 
Council of the European Union, Annual Report on Human Rights, Luxembourg, Office for 
Official Publication of the European Communities, 2000. 
 
Cooper, A.F., “Like-minded nations, NGOs, and the changing pattern of diplomacy within 
the UN system: An introductory perspective” in A.F. Cooper, J. English and R. Thakur (eds.) 
Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy?, Tokyo-New York-Paris, 
United Nations University Press, 2002, pp.1-18. 
 
Cooper, A.F., English, J. and Thakur, R. (eds.) Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a 
New Diplomacy, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2002. 
 
Control Arms. Parliamentary Briefing. 2006- a crucial year for controlling the global arms 
trade. www.controlarms.org accessed on 27/10/2006. 
 
Cornish, P., Anti-Personnel Mines- Controlling the Plague of « Butterflies », London, Royal 




Cremona, M., “The Union as a Global Actor: Roles, Models and Identity”, Common Law 
Market Review, No.41, 2004, pp.553-373. 
 
Damro, C., “EU-UN Environmental Relations: Shared Competence and Effective 
Multilateralism”, in K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith (eds.), The European Union at the 
United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms, London, Palgrave, 2006 pp.175-192, 
 
Dannreuther, R., International Security: The Contemporary Agenda, Cambridge, Polity, 
2007. 
 
De Vaus D.A., Research Design in Social Research, London, Sage, 2001. 
 
Dedring, J., “Reflections of the coordination of the EU member states in organs of the 
United Nations”, CFSP Forum, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, pp.1-3. 
 
Dennis, M.J., “Newly Adopted Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child”, The 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 94, no.4, 2000, pp.789-796. 
 
Denza, E., “The Community as a Member of International Organizations”, in N. Emiliou and 
D. O’Keeffe (eds.), The European Union and World Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay 
Round, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1996, pp.3-15. 
 
Depledge, J., “The Opposite of Learning: Ossification in the Climate Change Regime”, 
Global Environmental Politics, 6:1, 2006, pp. 
 
Desgagné, R., “European Union Practice in the Field of International Humanitarian Law: An 
Overview”, in V. Kronenberger (ed.) The European union and the International Legal 
Order: Discord or Harmony?”, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001, pp.455-477. 
 
Devuyst, Y., “The European Community and the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round”, in C. 
Rhodes and S. Mazey (eds.), State of the European Community, Vol.3, Building a European 
Polity?, Boulder, Lynne-Rienner, pp.449-467. 
 
Dolan, M. and Hunt, C., “Negotiating in the Ottawa Process: the New Multilateralism”, in  
M. Cameron., R .J. Lawson and B.W. Tomlin (eds.), To Walk without Fear- The Global 
Movement to Ban Landmines, Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press Canada, 1998, 
pp.392-423. 
 
Donowaki, M., “Prologue” in L. Lumpe (ed), Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New 




Drieskens, E., Marchesi, D., Kerremans, B., “In Search of a European Dimension in the UN 
Security Council”, The International Spectator, vol.42, no.3, 2007, pp.421-430 
 
Dutli, M.T. and Bouvier, A., “Protection of children in armed conflict: the rules of 
international law and the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross”, The 
International Journal of Children’s Rights, vol. 4, no.2, 1996, pp.181-188. 
 
Eavis, P. and Benson, W. “The European Union and the Light Weapons Trade” in J. 
Boutwell and M.T. Klare (eds.), Light Weapons and Civil Conflict. Controlling the Tools of 
Violence, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999, pp.89-100. 
 
Edström, B.,  “Japan’s foreign policy and human security”, Japan Forum, vol.15, Issue 2, 
June 2003, pp.209-225. 
 
Elgström, O. and Strömvick, M., “The European Union as an international negotiator” in O. 
Elgström, O. and C. Jönsson (eds.), European Union Negotiations. Processes, Network and 
Institutions, London, Routledge, 2005, pp. 117-129. 
 
Elgström, O. and C. Jönsson (eds.), European Union Negotiations. Processes, Network and 
Institutions, London, Routledge, 2005. 
 
European Commission, Building an effective partnership with the United Nations in the 
fields of development and humanitarian affairs, Brussels, 2 May 2001. COM (2001)231 final 
 
European Commission, European Union- United Nations Relations – The EU at the UN 
Overview, Brussels, 2001. 
 
European Commission, Small arms and light weapons. The Response of the European 
Union, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2001. 
 
European Commission, The response of the European Union to the anti-personnel landmines 
challenge, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2000. 
 
European Council, EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and the trafficking of SALW 
and their ammunition, Brussels, 15-16 December 2005. 
 
European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 
Brussels, 2003. 
 
European Council, European Union Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit 
Trafficking in Conventional Arms 9057/97 DG E- CFSP IV, Brussels, 26/09/1997. 
 
European Council, Additional criteria adopted in 1992 by the European Council of 




European Council, Annex VII Declaration on non-proliferation and arms exports, 
Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg 28 and 29 June 1991, SN 151291, Brussels, Council 
of the European Communities, June 1991.  
 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, The Role of the European 
Union in tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation, Brussels, 1 
December 2005. 
European Parliament, Directorate General for Research and Documentation, European 
Political Cooperation: Examination of the Voting Behaviour of the Member States at the 
United Nations 1976-1979, Luxembourg, 1980.  
 
European Union, The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making 
Multilateralism Matter, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2004. 
 
European Union, EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Council document 8675/2/98 
Rev.2, Brussels, 8/06/1998 
. 
Evans, P., “Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics”, in P, 
Evans, H.K. Jacobson and R.D. Putnam (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy. International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, pp.397-
430. 
 
Evans, P.E., Jacobson, H.K. and Putnam, R.D. (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1993. 
 
Farrell, M., “EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations” in K.V. 
Laatikainen and K.E. Smith (eds.), Intersecting Multilateralism: The European Union at the 
United Nations, London: Palgrave , 2006, pp.27-46. 
 
Fassbender, B., “The Better Peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s Practice and the United 
Nations”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 15, no.5, 2004, pp.857-884. 
 
Feakes, D., “The Emerging European Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Agenda on 
Chemical and Biological Weapons”, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No.65, July-August 
2002. 
 
Fischer H. and Macdonald A. (eds.), Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol.3, 
The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2000. 
 
R. Foot, N. Macfarlane and M. Mastanduno, “Conclusion: Instrumental Multilateralism in 
US Foreign Policy” in R. Foot, S.N. Macfarlane and M. Mastanduno (eds.), US Hegemony 




Foot, R., Macfarlane, S.N. and Mastanduno, M. (eds.), US Hegemony and International 




Foot, R., “The European Community’s Voting Behaviour at the United Nations General 
Assembly”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.17, no.4, 1979, pp.350-360. 
 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department of Trade and Industry, Department for 
International Development and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export 
Control- Annual Report 2003, London, June 2004. 
 
Foremand, J.,“UN Conferences: Media Event or Genuine Diplomacy”, Global Governance, 
vol.2, no.3, 1996, pp. 361-375. 
 
Gaulin, T., “A Necessary Evil: Reexamining the Military Utility of Antipersonnel 
Landmines” in R. Matthews, B. Mcdonald and K.R.Rutherford (eds.), Landmines and 
Human Security, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2004, p.209-223. 
 
Gegout, C., “The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US Directoire at the 
Heart of the European Union’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol.40, no.2, 2002, pp.331-344. 
 
Ginsberg, R.H., The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire, Lanham, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001. 
 
Glasius, M. and Kaldor, M., “Individual First: A Human Security Strategy for the European 
Union”, Internationale Politik and Gesellschaft, no.1, 2005, pp.62-84. 
 
Goldstein, K., “Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviewing”, Political 
Science and Politics, vol.35, no.4, 2002, pp.669-672 
 
Goldring, N.J., “Domestic Laws and International Control”, in  in J. Boutwell and M.T. 
Klare (eds.), Light Weapons and Civil Conflict. Controlling the Tools of Violence, Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999, pp.101-128. 
 
Govaere, I, Capiau, J. and Vermeersch, A.,“ In Between Seats: The Participation of the 
European Union in International Organizations”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol.9, 




Gramizzi, C., Nkundabagenzi, F., Nolet, S. and Santopinto, F., Enfants soldats, armes 
légères et conflits en Afrique- Les actions de la coopération au développement de l’Union 
Européenne et de la Belgique, Brussels, GRIP, 2003.  
 
Greene, O.,  “The 2001 UN Conference: A Useful Step Forward?” SAIS Review of 
International Affairs, vol.22, no.1, 2002, pp.195-201. 
 
Groenleer, M. and van Schaik L.,  The EU as a global actor: Case studies of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate and the International Criminal Court, Second 
Pan-European Conference Standing Group on EU politics, Bologna, 24-26 June 2006. 
 
Gwozdecky, M. and Sinclair J., “Landmines and Human Security” in R.G. MacRae et al. 
(eds.), Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace, 
Montreal, McGill-Queen’s Press- MQUP, 2001, p.28-40. 
 
Hakim, C., Research Design, 2nd ed., London, Routledge, 2000. 
 
Hampson, F.O. with Reid, H., “Coalition Diversity and Normative Legitimacy in Human 
Security Negotiations”, International Negotiation, vol.8, 2003, pp.7-42. 
 
Hampson, F. O. with Daudelin,J., Hay, J.B., Martin, T and Reid, H.,  Madness in Multitude: 
Human Security and the World Disorder, Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press, 
2002. 
 
Happold, M., Child Soldiers in International Law, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
2005. 
 
Happold, M., “The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts” in H. Fischer and A. Macdonald (eds.), 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol.3, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2000, 
pp.226-244. 
 
Harvey, R., Children in Armed Conflict. A guide to international humanitarian and human 
rights law, Wivenhoe Park/Montreal, Children and Armed Conflict Unit, University of Essex 
and International Bureau for Children’s Rights, 2003 
 
Harvey, R. Child Soldiers in the UK: Analysis of recruitment and deployment practices of 
under-18s and the CR, Task Force on Children in Armed Conflicts, Living Commentary, 
Children and Armed Conflicts Unit, Children’s Legal Centre, June 2002. 
 
Harvey, R. The NGO report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child: The Children and 






Hayes-Renshaw, F., “The Council of Ministers” in J. Peterson and M. Shackleton (eds.), 
“The Institutions of the European Union”, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
Hazelzet, H., “ The EU’s Human Rights Policy in the UN: An Example of Effective 
Multilateralism” , in  J.Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys (eds.), The United Nations and 
the European Unions: An Ever Stronger Partnership, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2006 
pp. 183-194. 
 
Hill, C., “The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Different 
Arenas”, in K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith (eds.), Intersecting Multilateralism: The 
European Union at the United Nations, London, Palgrave, 2006, pp.49-69. 
 
Hill, C. “Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.42, no.1, 2004, pp.143-163. 
 
Hill, C., “Closing the Capability-Expectations Gap” in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds.), A 
common Foreign Policy for Europe? London, Routledge, 1993, pp.18-38. 
 
Hill, C. and Smith, M. (eds.) International Relations and the European Union, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Hill, C. and Wallace, W. “Introduction. Actors and actions” in C. Hill (ed.), The Actors in 
Europe’s Foreign Policy, London, Routledge, 1996, pp.1-16. 
 
Hoffmeister, F. and Kuijper, P.-J.,“The Status of the European Union at the United Nations: 
Institutional, Ambiguities and Political Realities”, in J.Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys 
(eds.), The United Nations and the European Union: an Ever Stronger Partnership, The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, pp.9-34. 
 
Holm, K., “Europeanising Export Controls: The Impact of the European Union Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports in Belgium, Germany and Italy”, European Security, vol.15, no.2, 
June 2006, pp.213-234. 
 
Hovi, J., Skodvin, T. and Andresen, S., “ The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other 
Annex I Countries Move on Without the United States”, Global Environmental 




Hubel, H., “The EU’s Three-Level Game in Dealing with Neighbours”, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, vol.9, no.3, 2004, pp.347-362. 
 
Hubert, D., The Landmine Ban: a Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy, The Thomas J. 
Watson Jr.  Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper #42, Providence, Brown 
University, 2000. 
 
Hudson, A., Case Study: EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, London, Overseas 
Development Institute, 2006.   
available at http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/projects/RAP0031/docs/EU_PCD_Security.pdf, 
accessed on 30/10/2007. 
 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000, New York, Human Rights Watch, 2000. 
 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999, New York, Human Rights Watch, 1999. 
 
Hurwitz, L., “ The EEC in the United Nations: the Voting Behaviour of Eight Countries, 
1948-1973”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol3, no.3, 1975, pp.224-243. 
 
ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 1999- Toward a Mine-Free World, New York, Human 
Rights Watch, 1999. 
 
ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2000- Toward a Mine-Free World, New York, Human 
Rights Watch, 2000. 
 
ICRC, The Geneva Conventions: The core of international humanitarian law, Geneva, 
ICRC, 2006.   
available at http:://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions, accessed  
on 16/06/07. 
 
ICRC, Arms availability and the situation of civilians in armed conflict: a study presented by 
the ICRC, Geneva, ICRC Publication, 1999. 
 
ICRC, Banning anti-personnel mines: the Ottawa treaty explained, Geneva, ICRC, 1998. 
 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 




Janes, J., “Between a Rock and Hard Places: Germany on the UN Security Council”, Issue 
Report,  American Institute For Contemporary German Studies, 9 January 2003. Available at  
www.aicgs.org, accessed on 12/11/207. 
 
Johansson-Nogués, E., “The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: 
What Future for the European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the “Old” and the 
“New” Europe”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol.9, 2004, pp.67-92. 
 
Johnson, J.B. and Joslyn, R.A., Political Science and Research Methods, 3rd Ed., Washington 
DC, CQ Press, 1995 
 
Johnson, R., “Changing Perceptions and Practice in Multilateral Arms Control 
Negotiations”, in J. Borrie and V. Martin Radin (eds.), Thinking Outside the Box in 
Multilateral Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations, Geneva, UNIDIR-United Nations 
Publications, 2006, pp.55-87. 
 
Joli, M. (ed.), La lutte contre les mines antipersonnel, Brussels: Commission européenne, 
CIDEV-Handicap International-MPWD, 1996. 
 
Jørgensen, K.E., “Overview: The European Union and the World” in K.E. Jorgensen, M. A. 
Pollack and B. Rosamond (eds.), Handbook of European Union Politics, London, Sage 
Publications, 2007, pp.507-525. 
 
Jørgensen, K.E., Pollack, M. and Rosamond, B. (eds.), Handbook of European Union 
Politics, London, Sage Publications, 2007. 
 
Jørgensen, K.E. and Laatikainen, K., The European Union and the United Nations, Second 
Pan-European Conferences. Standing Group on EU Politics, no.293, Bologna, 24-26 June 
2004. 
 
Jørgensen, K.E., “ The European Union’s Performance in World Politics: How Should We 
Measure Success”, in Z. Zielonka (ed.), Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp.87-101. 
 
 
Kaldor, M., Martin, M. and Selchow, S., “Human Security: a new strategic narrative for 
Europe”, International Affairs, vol.83, no.2, 2007, pp.273-288. 
 
 
Keane, R., “EU Foreign Policy Motivation: A Mix of Human Security and Realist 
Elements”, in S.J. Maclean, and D.R, Black (eds.), A Decade of Human Security- Global 









Keohane, R.O., International Institutions and State Power, Boulder, Westview Press, 1989. 
 
 
King, G., Keohane, R.O. and Verba, S., Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994 
 
Knopf, J.W., Domestic Society and International Cooperation. The Impact of Protest on US 
Arms Control Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
Kotsopoulos, J, “A human security agenda for the EU: would it make a difference?”, Studia 
Diplomatica, vol. 60, issue 1, 2007, pp.213-231. 
 
Krasno, J.E., (ed.), The United Nations. Confronting the Challenges of Global Society, 
Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. 
 
Krause, K., “Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm Building, and UN Conferences: The Case of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons”, Global Governance, vol.8, no.2, 2002, pp247-263. 
 
Krause, K., The Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 3rd International Security 
Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security 
Studies Institute, “Networking the Security Community in the Information Age”, Workshop 
5D: Arms Control and Disarmament, Zurich, 19-21 October 1998. 
 
Laatikainen, K.V. and Smith, K.E., “Introduction”, in K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith 
(eds.), Intersecting Multilateralism: The European Union at the United Nations, London, 
Palgrave, 2006, pp.1-23. 
 
Laatikainen, K.V., “Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN: Authority, Cohesion, 
Recognition and Autonomy”, CFSP Forum, vol.2,no.1, 2004, pp.4-9. 
 
Lachowski, Z., « The ban on anti-personnel mines », SIPRI Yearbook, 1999, pp.655-662. 
 
Lachowski, Z., « The ban on anti-personnel mines », SIPRI Yearbook, 1998, pp.545-558. 
 
 
Lachowski, Z., "The CD and the Ottawa Process: Rivals or Partners?",UNIDIR Newsletter- 
Special Issue,3,1997, pp.10-14. 
 
 
Lawson, R., Gwozdecky, M. , Sinclair, J. and Lysyshyn, R., “ The Ottawa process and the 
International Movement to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines”, in  M. Cameron., R .J. Lawson 
and B.W. Tomlin (eds.), To Walk without Fear- The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, 




Leech, B., “Interview Methods in Political Science”, Symposium, Political Science and 
Politics, vol.35, no.4. 2002, pp.663-688. 
 
Lewis, J. “The methods of community in EU decision-making and administrative rivalry in 
the Council’s infrastructure”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol.7, no.2 June 2000, 
pp.261-289. 
 
Lijphart, A., “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Methods”, The American Political 
Science Review, vol.65, no.3, 1971, pp.682-693. 
 
Lindemann, B., “European Political Cooperation at the UN: a challenge for the Nine”, in D. 
Allen, R. Rummel and W. Wessels (eds.), European Political Cooperation:  Towards a 
foreign policy for Western Europe, London, Butterworth Scientific, 1982, pp.110-133.   
 
Lodgaard, S., Human Security; Concept and Operationalization, Geneva: Expert Seminar on 
Human Rights and Peace, December 2000. 
 
Long, D., “The European Union and the Ottawa Process to ban landmines”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol.9, no.3, 2002, pp.429-226. 
 
Long , D., “Multilateralism in the CFSP”, in M. Holland (ed.), Common Foreign and 
Security Policy: The Records and the Reforms, London, Pinter, 1997, pp.184-200.   
 
Long, D. and  Hindle, L., “Europe and the Ottawa Process : an Overview”, Canadian 
Foreign Policy Journal, vol.5, no.3, 1998, pp.69-83. 
 
Long, D. and Hindle, L., “Europe and the Ottawa Process : an Overview”, in M. Cameron., 
R .J. Lawson and B.W. Tomlin (eds.), To Walk without Fear- The Global Movement to Ban 
Landmines, Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press Canada, 1998, pp.248-268. 
 
Luif, P., EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly, Occasional Papers no.49, Paris: Institute 
for Security Studies, December 2003. 
 
Lumpe, L., “U.S. Policy and the Exports of Light Weapons” in J. Boutwell and M.T. Klare 
(eds.), Light Weapons and Civil Conflict. Controlling the Tools of Violence, Lanham, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999, pp.65-87. 
 
Lumpe, L. (ed.), Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues, Aldershot, UNIDIR-
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1999. 
 
Macfarlane, S.N. and  Khong,Y.F., Human Security and the UN. A Critical History., 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2006. 
 




Maclean, S.J. and Black, D.R., (eds.), A Decade of Human Security- Global Governance and 
New Multilateralism, Aldershot, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2006. 
 
Macleod, I., Henry, I.D. and Hyett, S., The External Relations of the European Communities. 
A manual of law and practice, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996. 
 
Maillet, A., “The EU: Greening the UN? Environmental Cooperation between the EU and 
the UN”, in  J.Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys (eds.), The United Nations and the 
European Unions: An Ever Stronger Partnership, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2006, pp. 
211-227. 
 
Malone, D.M., “US-UN Relations in the UN Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era” in 
R. Foot, N. Macfarlane and M. Mastanduno (eds.), US Hegemony and International 
Organizations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.73-92. 
 
Manners, I. and Whitman, R.G.,“Introduction” in I. Manners and R.G. Whitman (eds.), The 
Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States, Manchester and New York, 
Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 1-17. 
 
Manners, I. and Whitman, R.G. (eds.), The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member 
States, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2000. 
 
Marchisio, S., “EU’s Membership in International Organization”, in E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The 
European Union as an Actor in International Relations, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2002, pp.231-260. 
 
Marsh, S. and Mackenstein, H., The International Relations of the European Union, Harlow, 
Pearson Longman, 2005. 
 
Marshall, C. and Rossman, G.B., Designing Qualitative Research 2nd ed., London, Sage, 
1995. 
 
Maslen, S., “The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross”, in M. Cameron., 
R .J. Lawson and B.W. Tomlin (eds.), To Walk without Fear- The Global Movement to Ban 
Landmines, Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press Canada, 1998, pp.80-98. 
 
Matlary, J.H., “Much ado about little: the EU and human security”, International Affairs, 




McDonald, B.,  “The Global Landmine Crisis in the 1990s”, in R. Matthews, B. Mcdonald 
and K.R. Rutherford (eds.), Landmines and Human Security: international politics and war’s 
hidden legacy, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2004, pp.21-33. 
 
Mearsheimer, J.J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York and London, Norton, 
2001. 
 
McNulty. M., “French arms, war and genocide in Rwanda”, Crime, Law and Social Change, 
vol.33. 2000, pp.105-129. 
 
McRae, R. and Hubert, D. (eds.) Human Security and the New Diplomacy, Montreal, 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001. 
 
Mermet, J., “Protocole facultatif à la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant concernant 
l’implication d’enfants dans les conflits armés : Quel progrès pour la protection des droits de 
l’enfants ? ”, Actualités et Droit International, Juin 2002, pp.1-7. 
 
Metcalfe, D., “Leadership in European Union Negotiations: The Presidency of the Council” 
International Negotiations, vol.3, no.3, 1998, pp.413-434. 
 
Meunier, S. Trading Voices- The European Union in International Commercial 
Negotiations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005. 
 
Meunier, S., “What Single Voice? The European Institutions and EU-US Trade 
Negotiations”, International Organization,vol. 54, no.1, 2000, pp.103-135.  
 
Miller, S.,“Politics over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms control”, International 
Security, vol.8, no.4, 1984, pp. 67-90. 
 
Milner, H., Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and Information, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997.  
 
Miyet, B.,  “Les Nations Unies et la lutte contre les mines antipersonnel au-delà d’Ottawa”, 
Politique étrangère, vol.62, no.4, hiver 1997-1998, pp.629-639. 
 
Moreno-Ocampo, L., “The Rights of Children and the International Criminal Court” in K. 
Arts and V. Popovski (eds.), International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of 
Children, The Hague, Hague Academic Press, 2006, pp.111-117. 
 
Moravcsik, A., The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 




Moravcsik, A., “Armaments Among Allies. European Weapons Collaboration” in P. B. 
Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy. International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, pp.128-
167. 
 
Moravcsik, A.,“Introduction: International Bargaining and Domestic Theories of 
International Bargaining” in P.B Evans et H.K. Jacobson and R.D. Putnam. (eds.), Double-
Edged Diplomacy- International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1993, pp.3-42. 
  
Morrow, J,. “Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms control”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol.35, 1991, pp.245-265. 
 
Morse, J. M., “Designing Funded qualitative research”, in N.K. Denzin and Y.S.Lincoln, 
Stategies of Qualitative Inquiry , London, Sage, 1998. 
 
Nef, J., Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of 
Development and Underdevelopment. Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 
1999. 
 
Newman, E. and Richmond, O., The United Nations and human security, Houndmills 
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001. 
 
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security with  the cooperation of the UN 
Department for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Department of Public Information, The 
Future of Disarmament. Banning Nati-Personnel Land Mines: The Ottawa Process and 
Beyond, Edited transcripts of the Panel Discussion at the United Nations 21 October 1997, 
United Nations, New York, 1998. 
 
Nuttall, S., “Coherence and Consistency” in C. Hill and M. Smith, International Relations 
and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.91-112. 
 
Øhrgaard, J.C., “International Relations or European Integration: is the CFSP sui generic?”, 
in B. Tonra and C. Christiansen (eds.), Rethinking European Foreign Policy, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2004, pp.26-43. 
 
Odell, J.S., “International Threats and Internal Politics. Brazil, the European Community and 
the United States, 1985-1987”,  in P.B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds.), 
Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1993, pp.233-264. 
 
Ortega, M.,“Conclusion. UN Reform: as necessary as it is difficult”  in M. Ortega (ed.) The 
European Union and the United Nations- Partners in effective multilateralism, Chaillot 




Ortega, M. (ed.),  The European Union and the United Nations- Partners in effective 
multilateralism, Chaillot Paper no.78, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, June 2005.  
 
Owen, T., “Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a 
Proposal for a Threshold-Based Defintion”, Security Dialogue, vol.35, no.3, 2004, pp.373-
387. 
 
Paarlberg, R., “Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round; Synergistic Linkage in a 
Two-Level Game”, International Organization, vol.51, no.3, 1997, pp.413-44. 
 
Paris, R., “Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air”, International Security, vol.26, no.2, 
2001, pp.87-102. 
 
Patterson, L., “Agricultural policy reform in the European Community: a three-level game 
analysis”, International Organization, vol.51,no.1,1997, pp.135-165. 
 
Pennings, P., Keman, H.,and  Kleinnijenhuis, J., Doing Research in Political Science, 
London, Sage Publications, 1999. 
 
Peterson, J., “The EU as a Global Actor” in E. Bomberg, J. Peterson and A. Stubb (eds.), The 
European Union: How does it work?, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 
pp.201-221. 
 
Peterson, J. and Smith, M.E., “The EU as a Global Actor” in E. Bomberg and A. Stubb 
(eds.), The European Union: How does it work? Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 
pp.195-215. 
 
Pollack, M., “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2001, vol.39, no.2, pp.221-244. 
 
Price, R., “Emerging Customary Norms and Anti-personnel Landmines”, in C. Reus-Smith 
(ed.), The Politics of International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 
pp.106-130. 
 
Price, R. “Reversing the Gun Sight: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines”, 
International Organization, vol.52, no.3, 1998, pp.613-644. 
 
Price, R.M. and Zacher, M. W. (eds.), The United Nations and Global Security, New York, 




Putnam, R.D., “Two-Level Games: The Impact of Domestic Politics on Transatlantic 
Bargaining”, in H. Haftendorn and C. Tuschhoff (eds.), America and Europe in a Era of 
Change, Oxford, Westview Press, 1993, pp.69-83.  
 
Putnam, R.D,. “ Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, 
International Organization, vol.42,no.3, 1988, pp.427-460. 
 
Reisen, van M. and Stefanovic, A., Children’s Right in European Foreign Policy, Position 
paper for the closing conference “The Netherlands in Europe, Europe in the World”, The 
Hague, 2 December 2004. 
 
Riggs, R.E. and Plano, J.C., The United Nations. International Organization and World 
Politics, 2nd ed., Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994. 
 
Rittberger, V. “Global Conference Diplomacy and International Policy-Making: The Case of 
UN-Sponsored World Conferences”, European Journal of Political Research, vol.11, no.2, 
1983, pp.167-182. 
 
Ruggie, J.G., "Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution", International Organization, 
vol.46, no.3, 1992, pp.561-598. 
 
Rutherford, K. R., “A Theoretical Examination of Disarming States : NGOs and Anti-
Personnel Landmines”, International Politics, vol.37, no.4,2001, pp.457-478. 
 
Ruxton, S. What about us? Children’s Rights in the European Union. Next Steps, Brussels, 
EURONET, 2005. 
 
Sack, J., “The European Community’s Membership of International Organizations” , 
Common Market Law Review, vol..32, 1995, pp.1227-1256. 
 
Saferworld, Undermining Development: The European Trade with the Horn of Africa and 
Cenral Africa, London, Saferworld, 1998. 
 
Scott. J.,  A Matter of Record- Documentary Sources in Social Research, Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1990. 
 
Senti, R., “The Role of the EU as an Economic Actor within the WTO”, European Foreign 
Affairs, vol.7, no.1, 2002, pp.111-117.    
 
Sheppard, A., “Child Soldiers: Is the optional protocol evidence of an emerging “straight-18” 




Sieber, A.J. et  Dean ,J.T ., “The Joint Research Center”, UNIDIR Newsletter- Special 
Issue,3,1997, pp.30-36. 
 
Smaghi, L.B., “A Single EU Seat in the IMF”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.42, 
no.2, 2004, pp.229-248.  
 
Small Arm Survey, Small Arms Survey 2006 – Unfinished Business, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
 
Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2002- Counting the Human Costs, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002 
  
Smith,K.E., “Speaking with One Voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human Right 
Issues at the United Nations”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.44, issue 1, 2006, 
pp.113-137.  
 
Smith, K.E.,“The European Union, Human Rights and the United Nations”, in K.V. 
Laatikainen and K.E. Smith (eds.), The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting 
Multilateralisms, London, Palgrave , 2006, pp.154-174. 
 
Smith, K.E., European Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003. 
 
Smith, K.E., “The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations”, The 
Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol.9, Issue 2, 2003, pp.103-113. 
 
Smith, M.E., “Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy 
Cooperation”, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 10, no.1, 2004, pp.95-136. 
 
Smith, M.E., Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy – The Institutionalization of 
Cooperation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Smith, M.E., “Diplomacy by Decree: The Legalization of EU foreign Policy”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol.39, no.1, 2001, pp.79-104. 
 
Smith, M.E., “Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy co-
operation”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol.7, no.4, 2000, pp.613-631. 
 
Snyder, R., “The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict” in R. 
McRae and D. Hubert  (eds.) Human Security and the New Diplomacy, Montreal and 




Spear, J., “Arms and Arms Control”, in B. White, R. Little and M. Smith (eds.), Issues in 
World Politics, 3rd ed., Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp.96-117.  
 
Specht, I., Attree L. and Kemper, Y., “Children and Armed Conflicts: the Response of the 
EU” in UNIDIR, Humanitarian Perspectives to Small Arms and Explosive Remnants of War, 
Geneva, UNIDIR, 2005, pp.19-47. 
I.  
Spence, D., “ The Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries in the Conduct of European Union 
Affairs” in B. Hockings and D. Spence (eds.), Foreign Ministries in the European Union, 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp.18-36. 
 
Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 
Barcelona, 15 September 2004. 
 
Stohl, R., “Children in conflict: Assessing the Optional Protocol”, Conflict, Security and 
Development, vol.2, no.2, 2002, pp.135-140. 
 
Stohl, R.,  “European Act on Child Soldiers Issue”, Weekly Defense Monitor, vol.3, issue 42, 
28 October 1999. Available at http://www.cdi.org/weekly/1999/issue42.html#2, accessed on  
24/07/2007. 
 
Sutter, P., “ Les mines antipersonnel : le rôle de la France et de l’Union européenne”, 
Défense nationale, vol.51, no.7, 1995, pp.99-106. 
 
Taylor, P.,“The Institutions of the United Nations and the Principles of Consonance: an 
Overview” in P.Taylor and A.J.R. Groom (eds.), The United Nations at the Millennium: the 
Principals Organs, London, Continuum, 2000, p.307. 
 
Taylor, P. and Groom, A.J.R. (eds.) The United Nations at the Millennium: the Principals 
Organs, London, Continuum, 2000. 
 
Thakur, R., “Security in the new millennium” in A.F. Cooper, J. English and R. Thakur 
(eds.) Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy, Tokyo, United Nations 
University Press, 2002, pp.268-286. 
 
Thakur, R. and Newman, E. (eds.), New Millennium, New Perspectives. The United Nations 
Security and Governance,  Tokyo, New York, Paris, United Nations University Press, 2000.   
 
Thakur, R. and Maley, W., “The Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A Landmark 
Humanitarian Treaty in Arm Control”, Global Governance, vol.5, no.3, 1999, pp.273-302. 
 
Thomas, C., “Introduction” in C. Thomas and P.Wilkin (eds), Globalization, Human 




Thomas, C. and Wilkin P. (eds.), Globalization, Human Security, and the African 
Experience, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. 
 
Thomas, D.C., The Institutional Construction of EU Foreign Policy: CFSP and the 
International Criminal Court”, prepared for presentation at the European Union Studies 
Association, Austin, Texas, March 31-2 April 2005 
 
Thomas, N. and Tow, W.T., “The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian 
Intervention”, Security Dialogue, vol.33, no.2, 2002, pp.177-192. 
 
Tonra, B. and Christiansen, T., “The Study of EU foreign policy: between international 
relations and European studies”, in B. Tonra and C. Christiansen (eds.), Rethinking 
European Foreign Policy, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, pp.1-9. 
 
Tonra, B. and Christansen, T. (eds.), Rethinking European Foreign Policy, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2004. 
 
UNICEF/ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Guide to the Optional Protocol on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, New York, UNICEF, 2003. 
 
UNIDIR, European Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of 
War. Final Report. Geneva, UNIDIR, 2006 
 
UNIDIR, Humanitarian Perspectives to Small Arms and Explosive Remnants of War, 
Geneva, UNIDIR, 2005. 
 
United Nations- Mine Actions Service, Landmines- A Special issue : A Review of the United 
Nations Activities in Mine Action, New York, United Nations, April 1999. 
 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP).Human Development Report 1994. New 
York,, United Nations, 1994. 
  
Uribe de Lozano, G. “The United Nations and the Control of Light Weapons” in J. Boutwell 
and M.T. Klare (eds.), Light Weapons and Civil Conflict. Controlling the Tools of Violence, 
Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999, pp.161-171. 
 
Van Orden G. and Cox, R., “The European Union’s Role in Overcoming the Tragedy of 
Anti-Personnel Landmines”, UNIDIR  Newsletter- Special Issue, no.3, 1997, p.26-30. 
 
Verbeke, J.,“EU Coordination on EU Security Council Matters” in J. Wouters, F, 
Hoffmeister and T. Rhys (eds.), The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever 




Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, New York, Addison-Wesley, McGraw-Hill, 
1979. 
 
Wareham, M., “Rhetoric and Policy Realities in the United States”, in M.A. Cameron, R .J. 
Lawson and B.W. Tomlin., To Walk Without Fear. The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, 
Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press Canada, 1998, pp.212-243. 
 
Weiss. T. G., Forsythe, D.P., Coate, R.A. The United Nations and Changing World Politics, 
3rd ed., Oxford, Westview Press, 2001. 
 
Wessel, R.A., The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. A Legal Institutional 
Perspective, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999. 
 
Williams J.and Goose, S., “The International Campaign to Ban Landmines”, in M. Cameron, 
R .J. Lawson and B.W. Tomlin (eds.), To Walk without Fear- The Global Movement to Ban 
Landmines, Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press Canada, 1998, pp.20-47. 
 
Wouters, J., “The European Union as an Actor within the United Nations General 
Assembly” in V. Kronenberg (ed.) The EU and International Legal Order: Discord or 
Harmony, the Hague, T.M.C.Asser Press, 2001, pp.375-404. 
 
Wouters, J., Hoffmeister, F.and Ruys, T., “Epilogue: The UN and the EU- The Road to 
Partnership”, in J.Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys (eds.), The United Nations and the 
European Unions: An Ever Stronger Partnership, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2006, 
pp.383-388. 
 
Wouters, J., Hoffmeister, F. and T. Ruys T. (eds.), The United Nations and the European 
Unions: An Ever Stronger Partnership, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2006. 
 
Yin, R., Case Study Research – Design and Methods, 3rd  ed., Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2003.  
 
Young, A.R. “What game? By which rules? Adaptation and flexibility in the EC’s foreign 
economic policy” in M. Knodt and S. Princen (eds.), Understanding the European Union’s 
External Relations, London, Routledge, 2003, pp.54-71. 
 
Ziegler, A., “ L’interdiction des mines antipersonnel ”, Regards sur l’actualité, no.237, 
1998, pp.3-11. 
 
 
 
